WHAT HAPPENED TO THE PCC?

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 SAO PAULO 000558

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

STATE FOR WHA/BSC,

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PINR PGOV PREL SNAR BR AVERY
SUBJECT: WHAT HAPPENED TO THE PCC?

REF: A. ASUNCION 701 (08)

B. ASUNCION 338 (07)

C. INCSR BRAZIL 2008

D. SAO PAULO 228 (08)

E. SAO PAULO 66 (08)

F. SAO PAULO 873 (07)

G. SAO PAULO 447 (07)

H. SAO PAULO 975 (06)

I. SAO PAULO 526 (06)

J. SAO PAULO 319 (06)


1. (SBU) Summary: For three days in May 2006, the
imprisoned leaders of the Sao Paulo-based criminal
organization, the First Capital Command (PCC),orchestrated
uprisings in Sao Paulo's streets and in Brazil's prisons
that killed almost fifty police, captured global headlines
and paralyzed the nerve center of the world's
eighth-largest economy. Police struck back, killing scores
of PCC members (Refs H, I and previous). The violent
outburst ended as
swiftly as it began and the PCC has not since launched any
similar mass attack. While observers attribute the uneasy
peace to better police capabilities, limits on imprisoned
PCC leaders' access to outside contacts, and the housing of
key PCC leaders in a new "supermax" prison in Parana State
(Ref I),the PCC remains strong, benefiting from lucrative
drug and arms smuggling operations that reach across Brazil
and extend deeply into neighboring Paraguay with
international links to
Bolivia and even Portugal (Refs A, B, C, H). Locally, the
PCC
retains its insurrectionary capability, at times reacting to
police drug
raids with neighborhood-level uprisings that last for a
night.
To truly eliminate the PCC criminal threat, Brazil must
further
professionalize its police, both expand and tighten its
porous prison
system, and see that greater state services and
opportunities reach the marginalized youth of the poorest
neighborhoods where the PCC recruits its followers. End
Summary.

Three Days that Shook Sao Paulo


2. (SBU) Following the transfer of some of its imprisoned
leadership to isolated facilities, the Sao Paulo-based
criminal organization First Capital Command (PCC) waged war
against police, judicial and prison authorities for three
days (May 12-15) in 2006. Organized PCC gang members
openly attacked police stations and police officers at
home, took over several prisons, burned buses, and
effectively paralyzed the country,s financial nerve
center. Almost 50 police were killed in the attacks, which
captured headlines around the world. Initially taken by
surprise, the police struck back, killing over 150 alleged
PCC members and, according to critics, at least some
innocents caught in cross fires (Refs H, I). The violence
ended suddenly on May 15, when PCC leaders announced a
"truce" with local government authorities (something the
latter denied) (Ref F). Even so, in the ensuing months,
Sao Paulo remained jittery, as smaller incidents of
apparent PCC-related violence flared. Since that time, the
PCC has lowered its overall profile. The organization
remains strong, however, benefiting from lucrative trades
in drugs and arms, a strong presence in prisons, and a
demonstrated capability to mobilize violent neighborhood
uprisings against police intervention in the narcotics
trade.

PCC Origins: Born in the Prison System


3. (SBU) The PCC was founded in 1993 by eight inmates of
Sao Paulo State's Taubate prison, allegedly as an
organization dedicated to fighting for prisoner rights.
Unlike more typical criminal organizations, it has a series
of founding statutes that emphasize its goals to reform the

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prison system and to promote "peace and justice." (Members
refer to the organization as "the Party.") Operationally,
the PCC modeled itself after the Sicilian Mafia with strict
entrance requirements, organized contribution obligations
for members and an agreed death penalty for disloyalty.
The group grew quickly in Sao Paulo's overcrowded, laxly
administered prison system, using smuggled-in cell phones
to coordinate outside actions, primarily trade in illegal
drugs and guns, but also other criminal activities.

Less Violent Efforts to Control PCC Take Root


4. (SBU) State and national authorities responded to the
PCC's 2006 uprising with commensurate violence on suspected
PCC members that left scores dead and reportedly included
extrajudicial executions and the deaths of some innocents.
(COMMENT: Human Rights watchers argue that these cases have
never been fully investigated. END COMMENT). Since 2006,
Brazilian authorities have taken more subtle but, experts
say, effective measures against the group such as
controlling the entry of cell phones into prisons which are
the PCC,s key tool for coordinating its operations inside
and outside of Brazil,s prisons. Likewise, the GOB
constructed a maximum security prison in Catanduvas in
Parana State and transferred some forty senior PCC members
to this facility. Finally, the Brazilian police have
enhanced their operational capabilities to monitoring PCC
cell phone communications and carry out larger, more
complex law enforcement operations.

How the PCC Perpetuates Itself


5. (SBU)Several key factors keep the PCC going:

--Plenty of Money: Despite the loss of numerous members in
2006, restrictions on their communications and police
pressure, the PCC persists. Trade in guns and drugs
provide lucrative sources of income. Many of Sao Paulo's
poorest neighborhoodshave little or no state presence and
the PCC can easily generate illicit financial opportunities
for the unemployed. Sao Paulo Civil Police Chief Alberto
Angerami
told Poloff that he knew of the case of a young drug user
who, after being arrested, was threatened with death if he
revealed the names of his drug suppliers and, upon his
release, was offered USD 2500/month to oversee the
distribution of drugs in his neighborhood. The PCC's drug
tentacles spread far outward from Sao Paulo. During a March
trip to the Paraguay-Brazil border in Matto Grosso do Sul
State and September travel to Foz de Iguacu, local
authorities in both areas complained to Poloff of PCC
drug-running in their cities, moving illegal narcotics from
Paraguay to markets in Sao Paulo and Rio de Janeiro, and
the associated violence this generates in poor
neighborhoods where the PCC has taken root.

--International Connections: The PCC strong presence at
Brazil's
borders indicates its international linkages. Brazil Federal
Police in Foz de Iguacu complained that PCC leaders live
openly
in Paraguay, due to the generally lax administration of the
law in their neighbor's country. (Note: Brazil Federal Police
did praise Paraguay's SENAD. Nonetheless, the weakness of
other
Paraguayan institutions makes that country an attractive
place for
PCC leaders to maintain residences. End Note.) Over the
last
several years, reports have indicated further PCC
drug-smuggling
linkages to Bolivia and even Portugal. PCC members have been
arrested
in both Paraguay and Portugal (Refs A, B, C, H).

--Porous Prisons: Though the prisons are less rebellious
than three years ago, liberal rules regarding visits (which
permit conjugal meetings between prisoners and their

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romantic partners) create multiple opportunities to smuggle
cell phones into the prisons as well as transfer messages
in and out (Ref E). Moreover, Sao Paulo's prisons, probably
among
the best in Brazil, remain overcrowded with guards
underpaid. Most likely, the increased orderliness of Sao
Paulo State's prison system results from an "agreement"
between prison authorities and PCC leaders to keep things
quiet, according to University of Sao Paulo Professor and
penitentiary expert Fernando Salla.

--Long-Term Vision: Federal Police sources grudgingly
praise the PCC for its "long-term" vision. The
organization, they say, is cultivating its own lawyers,
working to get control of key judges and backing select
local politicians in Rio and Sao Paulo. One officer
interviewed predicted that the PCC will eventually either
establish or "rent" a political party that can promote its
interests.

Adjusting Tactics, But Still Dangerous


6. (SBU) Although no major uprisings have taken place in
Sao Paulo since 2006, the PCC maintains an insurrectionary
capability. Just this year -- on February 8-9, August 26,
and September 1 -- drug arrests by police in different Sao
Paulo neighborhoods that resulted in the deaths of local
residents
sparked rioting and bus burning in the style, if not the
scale, of the 2006 uprisings. Police reacted in all cases
by flooding the area with riot police and using helicopters
to monitor developments. Order was quickly restored in each
case, but
many observers believe that local elements of the PCC
directed the riots to remind authorities of the PCC,s hold
over Sao Paulo,s poorest neighborhoods.

Long-Term Solution: Police Professionalism, Improved
Prisons, and Youth Outreach


7. (SBU) Several key human rights issues are closely
interwoven with efforts to control the PCC. Most
importantly, police violence has frequently been the spark
for PCC riots and neighborhood uprisings usually after
police kill someone during a law enforcement operation.
These incidents generally take place in poor neighborhoods
where citizen trust of the police is low to non-existent.
Brazil,s Civil Police, who are usually on the front lines
of urban police work, receive low pay and enjoy little
prestige. They have a human rights office, but, according
to Consulate RSO, the program is not well funded or
effective. Until professional levels are raised, the Civil
Police will likely remain trapped in a vicious circle of
unprofessional behavior and citizen mistrust.


8. (SBU) Likewise, Brazil's prisons remain far from
adequate for containing and cutting off highly
organized criminals with communications
ability. Police sources told Poloff that, despite
augmented control efforts, cell phones are still smuggled
into penitentiaries and permit PCC members to coordinate
activities with those on the outside, thanks to
easily-corrupted,
often-underpaid prison guards.


9. (SBU) Finally, too many of Sao Paulo's peripheral
neighborhoods remained ungoverned spaces with little or no
state presence, fertile recruiting grounds for
PCC-connected gangs who can offer criminal opportunities to
local unemployed youth. However, PCC associations come
back to haunt many youth. The Sao Paulo Human Rights
Commission runs a shelter for PCC-threatened youth.
Originally designed to respond to problems of family
violence, the program has become, instead, a kind of
witness protection program for young men fleeing reprisals
from drug gangs supported by the PCC. More than half of
the 90 youth enrolled in the program are seeking refuge from
narcotics traffickers, who torture and even kill youths who

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decide to leave drug smuggling organizations, according to
Commission official Celia Christina Whitaker.

Comment: The PCC is Still There


10. (SBU) While Brazil has not faced a large-scale PCC
outburst since 2006 and a number of tactical responses by
law enforcement authorities have helped check PCC
operational capability, the PCC remains a serious criminal
threat. With a rudimentary ideology, criminal connections
that span the country and extend into neighboring states,
and an impressive operational capacity, the group's present
lowered profile should not lull observers into believing
it has gone away. The PCC will continue to damage Brazilian
society and threaten community security, until the GOB
adopts a more comprehensive and long-term strategy to
improve law enforcement professionalism and opportunities for
under-privileged youth.
WHITE