CONCERTACION AIMS FOR COMPREHENSIVE DEFENSE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SANTIAGO 000264

SIPDIS

STATE FOR WHA/BSC--CATO AND CROFT, PM/RSAT--BURNETT
OSD FOR KRISTI HUNT

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/19/2019
TAGS: MARR PGOV CI
SUBJECT: CONCERTACION AIMS FOR COMPREHENSIVE DEFENSE
MINISTRY RE-ORGANIZATION

REF: A. IIR 6 817 0075 09 (DTG 022042Z JAN 09)

B. SANTIAGO 251

C. SANTIAGO 124

Classified By: Political Officer Jennifer Spande for reason 1.4 (b).


1. (C) SUMMARY. The Concertacion has proposed an extensive
re-organization of Chile's Defense Ministry, transforming
civilian contractors into direct-hire employees, moving from
a service branch-based structure to a joint structure, and
developing a position similar to the Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff. Although long overdue, the proposed
re-organization is controversial. Conservatives decry the
lack of detail in many aspects of the plan, and call for more
rigor and congressional oversight, while progressives say
that overly specific legislation would serve as a
straitjacket when changes are needed in the future. Both
political coalitions would prefer to implement the changes
when they control the executive branch, partially so they can
choose how to fill the new direct-hire civilian positions.
Senator Jorge Arancibia (UDI),the former Navy
Commander-in-Chief and likely next president of the Senate
Defense Committee, will have great influence over prospects
for passage this year. End Summary.

Creating a Corps of Civilian Defense Staff
--------------


2. (C) Ministry re-organization is a controversial topic
among the small number of Chilean experts who follow it
closely. All sides agree that the Ministry of Defense lacks
well-trained, effective civilian military advisors, but
interlocutors pin the blame on different factors.
Progressives typically emphasize the shortage of civilian
personnel while conservatives highlight the limitations of
the current civilian staff: the wrong roles, some poor
performers, and lax hiring procedures.


3. (C) According to MOD civilian advisor Juan Esteban
Montes, there are about 160 direct-hire civilian employees at
the Ministry--mostly low-paid secretarial positions with
little advancement potential. There are also about 300
civilian professionals hired through contracts or on an
hourly basis. Even Congresswoman Maria Angela Cristi (UDI),
a staunch conservative on the lower chamber's defense
committee, pointed out to Poloff and Army Attache that there
are fewer civilians working in the Ministry now than under
Pinochet's rule. (Note: In addition to the civilians at the
Ministry, several thousand civilians work directly for one of
the service branches. They would not be affected by the
proposed changes. End Note.)


4. (C) While insufficient numbers of staff are one part of
the problem, poor hiring mechanisms and low-quality staff
complete the picture. Congresswoman Maria Angela Christi
(UDI) and Guillermo Patillo, a conservative academic and
former MOD staffer, say that most civilian MOD employees have
no military experience and little understanding of the
military world. Guillermo claims that nearly all civilian
professionals at the ministry are "paper
pushers"--accountants and administrators rather than
economists, engineers, or lawyers. Indeed, the core advisors
on military policy and planning appear to be just 10-15
civilians who form the Committee of Advisors. (Note:
According to Montes, the Minister has a total of about 25
civilian advisors and Undersecretary of War Gonzalo Garcia
has five. End Note.) Conservatives, and even MOD advisor
Montes (a Christian Democrat),contend that nepotism and
political rewards influence hiring decisions within the
ministry. Most civilian MOD professional staff are
essentially political appointees who would leave the Ministry
if opposition candidate Sebastian Pinera were to win the
presidential election. (Comment: Problems of nepotism,
political favoritism, and the over-use of informal, expensive
hiring methods are common among Chile's ministries. End
Comment.)


5. (SBU) Compensation for the civilian staff is also a
political issue. Civilian professionals working as contract

or hourly employees are paid higher salaries than they would
otherwise earn to compensate for their lack of job security.
Many contract positions are technically half-time but
actually require a nearly full-time commitment.


6. (C) The current draft law would create a substantial
number of direct-hire civilian positions within the Ministry
for the first time. However, the law does not specify how
many civilians, in what capacities, or in what departments
they would work. Progressive academic Claudio Fuentes sees
this as a strength--or at least as a realistic approach. If
the law were more specific, he told Poloff, then every time
the MOD wanted to change its structure, Congress would have
to pass a new law to do so. In contrast, Senator Jorge
Arancibia (UDI) and other conservatives argue that the law is
overly vague and gives the Ministry too much discretion in
determining what the civilian positions would be and how to
fill them. Axel Bucheister, of the conservative Libertad y
Desarollo think tank, would like to see a robust civil
service selection system to fill these new jobs--a topic on
which the draft law is silent.

A Joint Staff, and a Strategic Conductor
--------------


7. (SBU) Under the proposed law, the Estado Mayor de Defensa
Nacional (EMDN, National Defense Staff) would be re-named the
Estado Mayor Conjunto (Joint Staff),explicitly making it a
joint body. The current Chief of National Defense Staff
(JEMDN, Jefe de Estado Mayor de Defensa Nacional) would be
replaced by a Chief of the Joint Staff (JEMC, Jefe de Estado
Mayor Conjunto). This position would be similar to the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the U.S. Most
critically, the rank and authority of the new JEMC position
would be dramatically increased.


8. (C) The JEMDN position has evolved in recent years, from
a relatively junior position to one that is more senior
(three-stars) but poorly-defined and viewed by military
officers as a dead-end job for an otherwise senior officer.
In fact, the position has typically been filled as the last
assignment of an officer ready for retirement. Bachelet has
attempted to raise the profile of the position. For example,
several months ago she asked the well-regarded Army Chief of
Staff, Lieutenant General Alfredo Ewing, to postpone his
retirement to serve as JEMDN, a position he has occupied
since December 2008 (Ref A). (Note: General Ewing is
believed to be the most likely first JEMC if the position is
created by 2010. End Note.)


9. (C) The proposed reform would continue Bachelet's effort
to bolster the JEMDN/JEMC position. As JEMC, the position
would be elevated from a three-star to a four-star position,
equal to the service chiefs, and the tour of duty for the new
position would be increased from two years to four years.
The JEMC would oversee any "joint" issues, including
exercises, budget, and purchases. Montes envisions that the
position's new rank and responsibilities would cause it to be
the "ambition of all military officers." Most critically,
the JEMC would function as a "Strategic Conductor," directing
all military operations. (Note: Earlier versions of the law
called for the JEMC to direct military operations only in
event of war or crisis, taking orders from the Minister of
Defense. According to Montes, this language has since been
abandoned after complaints that it was difficult to define
precisely when a situation had escalated into a war or
crisis. Moreover, analysts feared that the very act of
officially declaring that Chile was in a war or crisis
situation could escalate an already tense situation. End
Note.)


10. (C) For the military and many analysts, the proposal to
create a Strategic Conductor is the most controversial part
of the MOD reform bill. Service chiefs are said to oppose
the idea of taking orders from a new Strategic Conductor.
Senator Arancibia, who will likely head the Senate Defense
Committee in 2009, has a unique vantage point, having served
as JEMDN when it was a more junior position and later
becoming Navy Commander-in-Chief. Arancibia told Poloff and

Army Attache that although he supports the notion of
jointness and the creation of a JEMC, he does not believe
that that official should act as the Strategic Conductor.
Instead, the Commander in Chief in the affected theater
should be directing military action, he said. (Comment:
Araniciba was referring to the two operational theaters in
Chile--north and south--which already operate in a limited
joint capacity. End Comment.)


11. (C) Inter-service rivalry is another impediment to the
JEMC proposal. The JEMC would undoubtedly reduce the power
of the service chiefs, and so arouses controversy from some
in Chile's fiercely independent service branches. The Navy
opposes the idea, fearing that the JEMC would typically be an
Army officer, although the current draft bill stipulates that
the position rotate among the three service branches.
Senator Arancibia, as a retired Admiral and former Navy
Commander in Chief, is unlikely to support any proposal that
does not have Navy backing. In contrast, the Army Commander
in Chief supports the idea, including the rotating JEMC
position.

Less Stovepiping, More Jointness
--------------


12. (SBU) Another proposed change would increase jointness
by replacing the current five undersecretaries (representing
Army, Navy, Air Force, Carabineros, and the Criminal
Investigations Police) with just two. An Undersecretary for
Defense would be responsible for policy and planning and an
Undersecretary for the Armed Forces would be in charge of
personnel and other management issues. The two
undersecretaries would share responsibility for procurement.
The Carabineros and the Investigative Police, who currently
report to the Ministry of Interior but are funded by the
Ministry of Defense, would be wholly integrated into the
Ministry of Interior, with their funding coming from Interior
rather than Defense.


13. (C) Many analysts see the joint administration of the
three service branches as a key change, and Buchheister
believes that this part of the proposed reforms has the most
support. According to Fuentes, the different service
branches are currently stovepiped, with each developing their
own policies, handling their own procurement, etc.
Buchheister described the three services as "three islands."
Rearranging the structure so that a single person oversees
all management issues will force the different branches to
work together more closely.


14. (C) Senators Arancibia and Jaime Gazmuri (PS),both
members of the Senate Defense Committee, also support this
change. Arancibia told emboffs that the military has been
saying for two decades that it needs to do more to work
together, but that today the services are more prepared to
work with other countries than to work with each other.
Gazmuri asserted that the service branches are so separate
that even their communications gear is not interoperable.
"In case of war, they'd need to use pigeons," he smirked.


15. (C) Similar to their concerns about civilian staff,
conservatives fear that the proposed law is too superficial,
and want details such as the number of divisions each new
Undersecretary would have and how responsibilities will be
divided among sub-secretaries.


16. (C) Congresswoman Cristi was very concerned about moving
the Carabineros from the Ministry of Defense to the Ministry
of Interior. Both police groups were put under Ministry of
Defense authority to make them more politically independent
and enable them to focus on national security, she claimed.
She fears that moving them wholly out of the Ministry of
Defense could undercut these objectives. Perhaps the
Criminal Investigations Police, which has a more civilian
culture, could be moved to the Ministry of Justice, she
offered. But the Carabineros have a military culture and
should stay as part of the Ministry of Defense, especially
because "democracy has brought so much delinquency," she
asserted.


Prospects for Passage
--------------


17. (C) It is unclear when the proposed re-organization
would come to a vote. Upcoming parliamentary and
presidential elections will become a major distraction,
probably beginning in September. Both sides of the political
spectrum would prefer to pass the law when they control the
executive branch. The existing civilian defense staff
working on contracts, many of whom have ties to the
Concertacion, would probably take the new direct hire
positions if the law were passed and implemented this year.
An Alianza government would likely try to either enact a new,
more transparent hiring process or fill the positions with
their supporters.


18. (C) Senator Arancibia seems inclined to hinder any
reform that he deems too radical or likely to hurt the Navy's
independence. Montes worries that the recent appointment of
outspoken former GOC spokesman Francisco Vidal to be Chile's
new Defense Minister (Ref B) may hurt the prospects for
passing any of the proposed defense reforms this year (Ref
C). The right has a strong dislike of Vidal, and may
increase their efforts to stall reform legislation if they
associate it with him.


19. (C) Even if the law is passed, there are no guarantees
that it would be implemented in its current form. Some
conservatives, like Buchheister and Congresswoman Cristi,
assert that the provisions giving the proposed Strategic
Commander direct control of the armed forces are
unconstitutional. The constitution allows only the President
to order the military, they say. Moreover, they maintain
that a constitutional amendment would be required to create a
new position senior to the service chiefs. Based on these
concerns, the right would likely challenge the new law at a
constitutional tribunal unless major revisions are made,
Buchheister said.

Comment
--------------


20. (C) Chile's Ministry of Defense, created in 1930 and
developed piecemeal over the years, rather than being
strategically designed, is overdue for a restructuring.
Embassy officers have been astonished by the relatively small
number of effective civilian advisors attempting to manage
extremely broad portfolios. Moreover, collaborative efforts
such as attempts to support the development of a more robust
group of civilian personnel within the Ministry have suffered
from the lack of effective Chilean personnel to work on such
efforts. However, passing a ministry reorganization law this
year will be a hard sell--the Alianza has a majority of votes
in both bodies, and parliamentarians may be too distracted by
electoral politics to focus on such a complex topic. END
COMMENT.
URBAN