Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09SANSALVADOR507
2009-06-05 17:14:00
SECRET//NOFORN
Embassy San Salvador
Cable title:  

FUNES GOVERNMENT'S SPLIT PERSONALITY

Tags:  ES PINR PREL PTER 
pdf how-to read a cable
P 051714Z JUN 09
FM AMEMBASSY SAN SALVADOR
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1185
INFO JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
FBI WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
NSC WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
S E C R E T SAN SALVADOR 000507 


NOFORN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/05/2019
TAGS: ES PINR PREL PTER
SUBJECT: FUNES GOVERNMENT'S SPLIT PERSONALITY

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Robert Blau; Reasons 1.4(b) and (d)

S E C R E T SAN SALVADOR 000507


NOFORN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/05/2019
TAGS: ES PINR PREL PTER
SUBJECT: FUNES GOVERNMENT'S SPLIT PERSONALITY

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Robert Blau; Reasons 1.4(b) and (d)


1. (U) This is an action request, see paragraph 8 below.

--------------
SUMMARY:
--------------


2. (S/NF) President Mauricio Funes has assembled a cabinet
that combines individuals from the leftist FMLN, some of whom
have a violent, radical past; with others from an
organization that coalesced around his presidential campaign
called "Friends of Mauricio." The inaugural ceremony and
initial statements and decisions indicate that the new GOES
has two personalities living and even clashing within the
same body. We are convinced that USG engagement, as
exemplified by the Secretary's visit for the inauguration,
reinforces Funes's own pragmatic instincts, strengthens the
"Friends of Mauricio," and even moderates some parts of the
FMLN. However, other parts of the FMLN are thoroughly wedded
to radical left forms of organization and policies, and
attract the most hostile and anti-American elements in the
region and elsewhere. Funes has given authority over public
security and intelligence to these elements, while at the
same time weakening the military command structure.


3. (S/NF) This message seeks guidance specifically in the
case of Manuel Melgar, the new Public Security and Justice
Minister, who is linked to the 1985 "Zona Rosa" massacre
which killed four off-duty unarmed Marine Security Guards,
two other American citizens, and several additional innocent
bystanders. Our challenge is to find a way to carry forward
the USG commitment, reiterated by Secretary Clinton, to
assist the GOES with law enforcement, despite believing that
the principal interlocutor once led a terrorist organization
that killed U.S. citizens. We present three suggested
approaches with pros and cons for each, and formally request
guidance on engaging with Melgar. End Summary.

--------------
Background:
--------------


4. (S/NF) During the presidential transition, Funes appointed
Manuel Melgar as his point man for pulling together
information on Public Security, making him a leading
candidate for a ministerial position. Once this became
public, embassy officers pointed out that Melgar had
derogatory information in his file; specifically, that he was

linked to the 1985 Zona Rosa killings. Researching this
further, we learned the following:

-- Melgar was a top leader of the PRTC, one of the armed
components of the FMLN; the PRTC publicly claimed
responsibility for the Zona Rosa murders;

-- A captured guerrilla who claimed personal knowledge of the
planning and execution of the operation provided testimony in
the United States that linked Melgar directly to the planning
of the Zona Rosa attack; the guerrilla reportedly passed a
polygraph exam related to his testimony on the attack.

-- Salvadoran elites generally believe that Melgar was behind
the Zona Rosa massacre: Former President Saca, his Minister
of Public Security Rene Figueroa, National Public Security
Commission President Oscar Bonilla, and others have expressed
this directly to Embassy staff.

-- Media have also made mention of the Melgar-Zona Rosa
connection. As a result of the media coverage, the
widely-held perception amongst the Salvadoran public is that
Melgar was involved in the Zona Rosa murder of U.S. Marine
Embassy guards.

-- The Salvadoran Armed Forces and others within the GOES
continued to compile information on Melgar and classify him
as a potentially dangerous individual up through the present.

-- There are exhaustive interagency studies and Senate Select
Committee on Intelligence reports that provide considerably
more detail on the Zona Rosa murders. In summaries made
available at post, none of these investigations appears to
offer an obvious "smoking gun."


5. (S/NF) Embassy Actions: Concerned that appointment of
Melgar to a position in the Public Security chain of command
could create a serious impediment to U.S. - Salvadoran
relations, Charge approached then President-Elect Funes
quietly and expressed our reservations. Funes' reaction was
to acknowledge that it was widely known in FMLN circles that

Melgar was linked to the Zona Rosa killings; he said he would
see about appointing someone else and thereby avoid a
controversy. Soon thereafter Funes sought confirmation with
other embassy officials, the result of which was the
reaffirmation of the USG concerns which the Charge originally
imparted. Additionally, Embassy, keeping WHA apprised of
these activities:

-- Entered Melgar in the Visas Viper system;

-- Reiterated our concerns again to Hugo Martinez, who has
since been named Foreign Minister; he promised a follow-on
meeting with Funes, which Funes canceled multiple times;

-- Reiterated our concerns to Nicolas Salume, a close
personal adviser and the number-one financial backer of
Funes. Salume agreed that Melgar would be a bad choice, but
told us he believed that Funes would pick someone else;

-- Made one last run at Hugo Martinez on May 31 when media
were already predicting that Melgar would be in the cabinet;
Martinez relayed the message to Funes, and Funes answered
that he was going ahead with the appointment.


6. (S/NF) As the appointment did not have a chance to be
studied fully by the USG, it was not ripe for discussion when
the Secretary met President Funes on his first day in office.
The Secretary was fully briefed in advance of her media
interviews. As fate would have it, the local newspaper (La
Prensa Grafica) journalist who interviewed the Secretary on
June 1 had a question about Melgar on his list, but ran out
of time before he could ask it. The story has not yet hit
the U.S. media, but could at any time, since La Prensa
Grafica has already run two articles in which Melgar is
mentioned in connection with the Zona Rosa murders.

--------------
Suggested Policy Options:
--------------


7. (S/NF) After intense discussions, the Embassy's Policy
Working Group formulated the following three options for
responding to the Melgar appointment.

Option A: Overlook Melgar's Past and Fully Engage

Pros: Path of least resistance, bureaucratically speaking.
Would seem to provide for smoothest continuity in ongoing law
enforcement and judicial reform programs. Embracing Melgar
would also likely generate additional "buy in" from lower
ranks (PNC, DGCP, etc.) for USG programs. Transmits message
that USG won't interfere in sovereign decisions.

Cons: USG will look weak and lacking the courage to stand up
for our convictions. This aura of weakness could affect
other aspects of the bilateral relationship. Will send
message that USG will fold if FMLN hard-liners press their
agenda. Gives them the impression that they have the upper
hand, and that they have license to run roughshod over the
moderate component of the GOES. Potential public relations
disaster in U.S. if Melgar,s past become focus of media
interest. Congressional inquiry (and in worse case,
Congressional hold on El Salvador Merida funds) could follow,
as well as outrage from family members of the murdered U.S.
Marines. Bestows ex post facto legitimacy on FMLN acts of
terrorism during civil war. Likely to enrage ARENA
stalwarts, and convince them that USG is only in favor of
good relations with whomever is in power. Looks inconsistent
since many from the right are still ineligible for visas,
etc., from wartime activity. Will also challenge our fair
application of the Leahy Amendment.

Operational/tactical implications: Business as usual. Sign
LOA,s with Melgar, do public appearances, interact as
normal.

Option B: Work Around Melgar

Pros: Some level of continuity in law enforcement (LE)
programs. Demonstrates to Funes that USG is willing to
cooperate on issues of mutual interest, but that a good
relationship implies some give and take. We make clear that
FMLN hard-liners with bloody hands are not the best
interlocutors for important bilateral programs. Provides
opportunity to continue along as usual with caveats.
Potentially gives Funes the chance to revisit this nomination
down the road, and ease Melgar out the door in favor of
improved LE cooperation with the USG. Reinforces that we
have leverage in this relationship, but also demonstrates our
desire to engage with GOES on crucial law enforcement and
public security issues.

Cons: Gives FMLN hard-liners an excuse to bring cooperation
to a halt, and/or to force a confrontation. Potentially
serves to draw Funes closer into hard-liner orbit. Has the
look and feel of strategic ambivalence.

Operational/tactical implications: Delicate balancing act.
Must inform Funes that we will not work with Melgar, but are
willing to continue cooperating with GOES on LE issues. Need
to keep Melgar at arms length, but at same time keep programs
and working relationship viable. All LOA,s signed with MFA.
Must implement programs through either working level
contacts at Public Security Ministry, and/or MFA, Melgar's
Deputy Minister, Attorney General, or some combination
thereof. Places premium on flexibility, adaptability, and
ability to maneuver successfully in complex environment.

Option C: Refuse to Deal with Melgar on Any Level

Pros: Establishes clear boundaries, and communicates to both
Funes and FMLN hard-liners the seriousness of our
convictions. Will not bestow legitimacy on Melgar or FMLN
wartime-era terrorism. Sends message that good bilateral
relationship with the USG is not automatic. Could
potentially help to shore up Funes' moderate inner circle if
handled correctly. Will reassure Salvadoran public that USG
has not forgotten that FMLN has dark side that must be
restrained if democracy is to flourish here. Consistent with
purported legislative intent of Leahy Amendment.
Demonstrates strategic clarity.

Cons: Could precipitate a clash with Funes. Has potential to
publicly embarrass him and drive him towards hard-liners.
Could result in rupture of law enforcement cooperation and
assistance. Potentially offers hard-liners excuse to turn to
Cubans, Venezuelans, etc., for public security assistance.
Excluding Melgar could be interpreted as inconsistent with
the commitment by Secretary Clinton to Funes to work together
on law enforcement issues.

Operational/tactical implications: USG ostracizes Melgar and
does not participate in events where he is the key
interlocutor. Embassy requests that Funes designate another
principal GOES point of contact for LE, public securiy, and
Merida programs. All LOA,s signed with MA. PA crafts
strategy to deal with inevitable P fallout. All cooperation
capped at level of Naional Civilian Police (PNC) Director,
or throughanother part of GOES. Likely to generate Public
ecurity Ministry obstructionism and interference i course
of implementing Merida and other LE progams. Difficult
issues such as Melgar access to LEA, handling of public
events when he appears, tc., a constant to be dealt with.

--------------
Action Requests:
--------------


8. (S/NF) Embassy requests a full interagency review of all
pertinent information held on Melgar and the Zona Rosa
murders. We also request formal guidance for how we are to
proceed, along the lines of options A, B, and C, as discussed
in paragraph seven, or any other option the USG deems
appropriate.


9. (S/NF) Comment: How the USG responds, or not, will be
watched very closely by Salvadoran elites, media, civil
society, the private sector, and public at large. All of
them, plus the now opposition ARENA, want and expect the USG
to engage the Funes government at some level. The key
questions for this exercise are: (1) How much and how soon
do we believe engagement means pushing back assertively
against the influence of the hard-line part of the FMLN, and
(2) Do we have enough to go on to decide to take a stand on
this case? End comment.


BLAU