ROYG FOLLOW UP ON MARCH 16 BRENNAN-SALEH MEETING

S E C R E T SANAA 000569

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR NEA/ARP:AMACDONALD,
NSC FOR JOHN BRENNAN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/01/2019
TAGS: PREL KDRG YM
SUBJECT: ROYG FOLLOW UP ON MARCH 16 BRENNAN-SALEH MEETING

Classified By: Ambassador Stephan A. Seche for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).



1. (S) Summary. Deputy Foreign Minister al-Dhabbi called
in Ambassador April 1 to express concern about the outcome of
last month,s discussion between APDNSA John Brennan and
President Saleh on GTMO detainees, and solicit the
Ambassador,s views as to how we can move this issue forward.
Dhabbi agreed that Yemen can ill-afford to miss the
opportunity to demonstrate its readiness to cooperate with
the Obama Administration on an issue of such importance, but
asked that we appreciate the internal pressures that limit
President Saleh,s options. Dhabbi repeated Saleh,s
proposal that the US and KSA coordinate bilaterally on the
transfer of Yemeni detainees to the Saudi program, leaving
the ROYG out of the deal. He also asked that we consider
returning a small number of the least-dangerous detainees in
coming weeks as a way for the ROYG to prove its commitment to
working effectively with the USG on this issue. We believe
the first suggestion, working with Riyadh on a bilateral
arrangement, merits follow-up at this time. The second
proposal, returning Yemenis to Yemen as a way to break the
current impasse with Sana,a, may be something we will want
to consider if our discussions with the Saudis fail to
produce a way forward. End Summary.


2. (S) DFM Moheedin al-Dhabbi, a respected interlocutor
with excellent ties to senior ROYG leadership, told the
Ambassador at the outset that he understood the Brennan-Saleh
March 16 meeting did not go well. Ambassador said that was a
fair characterization, recalling Brennan,s disappointment
that the first high-level contact between the new
Administration and the ROYG yielded so little in the way of
results. Dhabbi asserted, as Saleh and others have on
repeated occasions, that the President cannot publicly agree
to send Yemeni detainees to Saudi Arabia. Dhabbi claimed
that Islamists and tribal leaders would exploit such
concurrence as a sign of weakness on Saleh,s part,
undermining his authority and ability to manage events in the
country. The Saudis know this and are disingenuous in
insisting that they need a green light from Saleh to accept
Yemenis into their rehab program, he concluded. Better to
consider the President,s offer for a bilateral US-KSA
agreement without Saleh,s concurrence, which will allow him
to claim he wasn,t consulted and avoid much of the most
pointed criticism. Dhabbi also urged us to permit the Saudis
to provide the necessary financing for construction of a
Yemeni rehab facility as an investment in Yemen that Saleh
can use to deflect some of the criticism he will inevitably
face.


3. (S) Dhabbi asked if we might consider sending a handful
of the least-dangerous Yemenis in GTMO back to Yemen in
fairly short order, to give the ROYG the opportunity to
demonstrate its commitment to effectively managing the
detainee issue. The Ambassador noted that such a proposal
was sure to meet with stiff resistance at home, as a reward
Saleh has done nothing to merit. Ambassador also noted that,
were any returns to Yemen to take place, the ROYG would have
to be prepared to provide regular, thorough and verifiable
updates on each individual,s status and whereabouts, unlike
the information we receive on those detainees returned to
Yemen previously. The Ambassador also asked Dhabbi if the
ROYG would consider receiving five of its nationals at the
same time as a similar number were sent to Saudi Arabia;
Dhabbi repeated that this was not something the ROYG would
agree to. &The Yemenis have to come back home first,8 he
asserted. The conversation ended with Dhabbi stating that he
would convey the substance of the conversation to appropriate
figures in the regime, and get back to the Ambassador if he
received any counter-proposals.


4. (S) Comment. Given al-Dhabbi,s ties to the regime, the
fact that he undertook to raise the issue with the Ambassador
likely reflects a certain realization on the part of the
leadership that Saleh,s refusal to demonstrate any
flexibility on the GTMO-detainee issue further undermined
confidence in Washington regarding the ROYG,s reliability as
a partner. Nevertheless, given what we know of Saleh,s
nature, we do not/not expect this discomfort to yield much in
the way of concessions from the ROYG. That being the case,
we believe it may be time to revisit with the Saudis their
insistence that Saleh publicly agree to permit Yemeni
detainees to enter the KSA rehab program, given the repeated
assertion, including from the President himself, that the
more acceptable approach would be a US-KSA bilateral
agreement that protects him from being accused of complicity
in a plan that sends Yemeni nationals to another country
rather than bringing them home. Should those conversations
fail to produce a way forward, we may wish to consider
sending a couple of the least-dangerous Yemenis to Yemen as a
way to break the impasse with the ROYG. End Comment.
SECHE