SANAA EAC DISCUSSES SECURITYPOSTURE DUE TO

S E C R E T SANAA 00482


NOFORN

DEPT FOR DS/IP/NEA, DS/IP/ITA, DS/CI/PII, S/CT, NEA/EX,
NEA/ARP, SES-O, DS COMMANDCENTER

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/18/2019
TAGS: AEM ASEC YM
SUBJECT: SANAA EAC DISCUSSES SECURITYPOSTURE DUE TO
TERRORIST ATTACK ON SOUTH KOREAN OTORCADE

REF: DS SPOT REPORT DATED 03/18/2009
Classified By: CDA Angie Bryan, reasons 1.4 (d andg)


1. (S/NF) Summary: On 03/18/2009, the Sana'aEAC convened to
discuss Post's security posture ue to the terrorist attack
on the South Korean mtorcade (ref A). The EAC decided that
American stff will travel in armored vehicles and the
Embasy shuttle will have an armed RSO security escort util
further notice. All movements, both officialand personal,
will be limited to essential issue only, and must be
coordinated and approved by th RSO. Saturday, (the start of
Embassy Sana'a's rgular work week) will consist of limited
staffin for all sections. The EAC will review these
retrictions on Saturday and determine if they need t remain
in place. The EAC was attended by RSO, PLM, AID, OMC,
CONS, MO, PAO, LEGAT, POLE, and caired by the CDA. End
summary.


2. (S/NF) RSOadvised the EAC that at approximately 0900
hours on March 18th (the one year anniversary of the 2008
mortar attack against the Embassy compound) a South Korean
Embassy motorcade consisting of two unarmored South Korean
Embassy vehicles and a police escort was traveling north on
airport road enroute to the airport. The motorcade was
transporting South Korean government officials and family
members of the victims of the 03/15/2009 Hadramaut
governorate terrorist attack. As the motorcade approached
within a kilometer of the airport area, a suicide bomber
stepped out from the median and detonated between the police
escort and the first Embassy vehicle. The driver swerved to
avoid the individual, preventing a head-on detonation. The
detonation blew out the windows of the vehicle's passenger
side, resulting in minimal structural damage. The motorcade
continued to a secure location at the airport. This incident
resulted in several injuries to the vehicle occupants, but no
casualties other than the suicide bomber himself. (Note: The
explosive device contained no shrapnel. Had the contrary
been true, several people would almost certainly have been
killed. End note.)


3. (S/NF) RSO recommended and the EAC agreed that all
American personnel will travel in armored vehicles and the
Embassy shuttle will have an armed RSO escort until further
notice. LES staff will have the option of armored transport,
but to limited locations. All American staff movements, both
official and personal, will be limited to essential issues
only, and must be coordinated and approved by the RSO.
Saturday will consist of limited staffing for all sections as
determined by the section head. The Consul sent a Warden
message advising the American community of the change in
security posture.


4. (S/NF) In addition, RSO has increased Surveillance
Detection assets near choke-points located around Embassy
housing clusters and the Hadda compound. A temporary surge
of host nation security assests has been requested to augment
existing security around Embassy housing areas. RSO is also
running decoy motorcades for the CDA's movements and for the
time being, will provide secure low-profile transportation in
non-traditional vehicles.


5. (S/NF) The EAC also discussed Post's current TDY personnel
status and agreed the number of TDY staff would remain at a
manageable level over the next few days. The EAC will revisit
this decision again on Saturday when more information becomes
available concerning the security environment.


6. (U) The POC for this issue is RSO Nicholas Collura.


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BRYAN