HIZBALLAH AND THE HOUTHIS: DIFFERENT GOALS AND

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 SANAA 002079

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR NEA/ARP AMACDONALD AND INR JYAPHE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/03/2019
TAGS: PTER MOPS PGOV PROP YM
SUBJECT: HIZBALLAH AND THE HOUTHIS: DIFFERENT GOALS AND
IDEOLOGY

REF: SANAA 1995

SANAA 00002079 001.2 OF 003


Classified By: Ambassador Stephen Seche for reasons 1.4(b) and (d).


1. (C) SUMMARY. In their ongoing pursuit of Western support
for their struggle against the Houthis, ROYG officials have
latched onto recent, unsubstantiated media claims of
Hizballah cooperation with the Houthis in Sa'ada in order to
bolster their argument that the Houthis are a terrorist
organization. However, such arguments ignore the cultural
and ideological differences between Hizballah and the Houthi
rebels and, thus, the unlikelihood that they would work
together. Furthermore, the Houthis could more accurately be
characterized as a movement with religious undertones and
politically addressable grievances rather than a radical,
religiously motivated sect with which the ROYG cannot
negotiate. Even their demands for greater religious freedom
could be addressed through political means. While the
possibility remains that practical reasons could trump
ideological differences, especially in light of recent
regionalization of the conflict, no solid evidence has been
shown of Hizballah activity in Sa'ada or of any desire on the
part of the Houthis for such a partnership. END SUMMARY.


2. (C) As tensions continue to rise in the Sa'ada conflict
between ROYG forces and the Houthis, ROYG officials and
government-owned media, with an eye towards securing Western
support, have ramped up statements asserting that the Houthis
have joined forces with Hizballah (reftel). Claiming that
the Houthis and Hizballah share a common ideology and goals,
the ROYG argues that the USG should view the Houthis as a
terrorist organization on par with Al Qaeda in the Arabian
Peninsula (AQAP). However, considering the ideological and
political differences between the Houthis and Hizballah, such
broad generalizations lack factual foundations.

WHO ARE THE HOUTHIS?
--------------


3. (C) The Houthis, springing from a more moderate Zaydi
Shi'a tradition, are characterized by a greater loyalty to
the Zaydi tribe rather than to the broader Shi'a religion,
and attract members based on political beliefs and grievances
held by the community in which they have historically lived.
Hizballah is a radical Shi'a group which has committed
terrorist acts. When questioned about the ideological
affinities between the Houthis and Hizballah, Majid al-Fahed,
a well-connected Sa'ada local and director of Yemeni NGO
Civic Democratic Foundation, said they each represent
completely different strands of the Shi'a faith. Fahed added
that the Houthis are more inspired by political grievances
than by religious differences with the central government.
This evaluation of the Houthi movement has been echoed
repeatedly by other Sa'ada locals, including during
discussions PolOff held on September 2 with Sa'ada tribesmen,
who characterized the Houthis as a "social and political
movement" rather than a religiously or ideologically
motivated movement. According to Abdullah al-Muaid, Sa'ada
local and Ministry of Local Administration official, the
Houthis' primary goal is "convincing the central government
to give more authority to the local levels...but not actual
independence from Yemen."


4. (C) Members of the ROYG, however, continue to
characterize the Houthis as a radical Shi'a group that takes
issue with the government for sectarian reasons rather than
for legitimate political grievances and, as such, finds a
logical ideological partner in Hizballah. Ministry of
Defense Chief of Staff Major General Ahmed al-Ashwal told
PolOff on September 14 that the Houthis "are the same as
Iran, the same as Hizballah; they share the same doctrine and
ideology." Foreign Minister Abubakr al-Qirbi told the
Ambassador on September 7 that the Houthis clearly were not
fighting for political grievances as they had failed to
delineate what they want from the ROYG, but were instead
fighting for a vague and radical ideology. (NOTE. The
Houthis have issued a number of statements listing their
grievances, which include adherence to a previously
negotiated Doha agreement and the payment of promised
reconstruction funds to Sa'ada inhabitants for damage
inflicted by ROYG forces during previous rounds of fighting.
END NOTE.)


5. (C) When questioned about the source of the Houthis'
ideology, Deputy Foreign Minister Muhi al-Dhabbi told PolOff
on Oct 17, "These religious extremes (Houthis and AQAP) are
new in Yemen. We have a very moderate religious tradition.

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It,s the Wahhabism from outside that,s created al-Qaeda,
the twelver Shiism from Lebanon and Iran that has inspired
the Houthis," explaining that Yemenis traditionally belong to
either a moderate brand of Zaydi (Shiite) faith, including
President Saleh, or moderate Shafi (Sunni) faith. (NOTE. The
Houthis identify themselves as members of a moderate Zaydi
Shi'a community historically present in Sa'ada. END NOTE.)
Some Arab academics have actually argued the opposite: that
Zaydi Shiism does not stem from external radicalizing
influences, but that it is an indigenous political movement.
A July 2009 article by Abdullah Lux in the academic journal
Contemporary Arab Affairs concludes, through numerous
interviews with Houthi leaders and analysis of statements
from Abdul Malik al-Houthi, that the Zaydi discourse
connected to the Houthi movement is actually distinct from
the Twelver Shiism practiced in Iran and among Lebanese
Hizballah members and that there is a "lack of evidence of
direct support (to the Houthis) by either Hizballah or Iran."

HOUTHIS AND HIZBALLAH: DIFFERENT SHI'A STRAINS
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6. (C) Zaydi Shiism departs from the Shiism practiced in
Lebanon, where Hizballah has drawn many of its supporters, in
a number of significant areas. Most notably, Zaydis do not
recognize the legitimacy of the last 7 of the 12 historic
imams of mainstream Shiism prominent in Lebanon. Instead,
the Zaydis recognize only the first 5 imams and then follow a
line of succession they can trace down to their very own
tribe, which culminated in the last Zaydi imam to rule Sana'a
until the republican coup of 1962. ROYG officials have often
used this fact to argue that the Houthis desire an overthrow
of the central government and a reinstatement of the Imamate;
however, the Houthis have never stipulated such a desire.


7. (C) The Houthis have, however, demanded greater autonomy
in the religious texts used and the religious teachings
presented in their schools. The Ministry of Religious
Endowments has centralized control over curriculum, requiring
all schools to teach one version of national religious
education. While the ROYG has paid lip-service to religious
freedom, as guaranteed in the constitution, there have been
increased restrictions on religious expression as the
conflict in Sa'ada has worsened. There are known cases of
Zaydi Shi'a imams being removed and replaced with Sunni imams
in northern mosques, and the ROYG continues to refuse license
requests from Zaydi schools. Among their list of political
grievances, the Houthis have stipulated greater religious
freedom as a requirement for peace; but this is one among
many purely political objections to the ROYG and one that
could be addressed through political means under the
constitution. Ultimately, the religious underpinnings of the
Houthis have less to do with the movement than does the
weakness of the central government in the north and the
refusal of the ROYG to address grievances long-held by the
inhabitants of northern governorates.

HIZBALLAH FOUNDATIONS POINT TO IRAN
--------------

8. (C) While the Houthis have never expressed regional
ambitions, limiting their political goals to Yemen, Hizballah
has openly used both Lebanon and Syria as staging grounds for
anti-Israel offensives and has received substantial support
from Iran for its activities. Hizballah was founded in
response to the Israeli invasion of Lebanon during the
Lebanese civil war in 1982. According to Adam Shatz's
influential 2004 article on Hizballah's founding, its leaders
were inspired by Ayatollah Khomeini and its militia members
were trained by the Iranian Revolutionary Guard. Iran has
continued to provide Hizballah with funds and weapons,
including Katyusha rockets, which have been fired at Israeli
targets on numerous occasions. U.S. media and UN reports
from as early as 2002 have documented Iran's material and
training support for Hizballah, with some estimates as high
as USD 50-60 million annually.


9. (C) Leaving potential religious differences aside,
speculation remains that the Houthi-Hizballah partnership may
be advantageous from a logistical perspective. On October 6,
Faris al-Saqqaf, director of the local think tank Center for
Future Studies and confidante of President Saleh's son Ahmed
Ali, told PolOff, "It is easy for Yemenis to travel to
Damascus; they don,t even need a visa. From there, the
Houthis go to Lebanon for Hizballah training, this is for
sure. Maybe they even go to Iran, but definitely to
Lebanon." Hizballah, which is reportedly seeking
rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs) to use against Israeli
aircraft, could be seeking training opportunities with

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anti-aircraft artillery in northern Yemen where they could
avoid detection and the severe retaliation they would face in
Lebanon if the Israelis discovered their operations. Adam
Shatz, Hizballah analyst and literary editor of The Nation,
has noted that Iran's former foreign minister, Kamal Kharazi,
urged Hassan Nasrallah, Hizballah's leader, to refrain from
activities that may give Israel an excuse to invade Lebanon.
On the other hand, Fahed points out the unlikelihood that the
Houthis would agree to such influence from Hizballah,
pointing to their fierce independence: "The Houthis would not
accept the outside influence of Hizballah. Tribes don't even
want to be influenced by the central government or other
tribes in Yemen."

COMMENT
--------------

10. (C) ROYG officials have repeatedly attempted to convince
the USG to classify the Houthi rebels as a terrorist
organization, first by alleging AQAP connections, then
ambiguous "Iranian influence," and now by claiming Hizballah
collaboration. Although we cannot exclude that Hizballah may
desire joint training with the Houthis for logistical
reasons, a Hizballah-Houthi alliance remains unlikely due to
deep-seated cultural and ideological differences and the lack
of international ambitions on the part of the Houthis.
Furthermore, no solid evidence has been shown of Hizballah
activity in Sa'ada. The Houthis have never mentioned any
partnership with Hizballah, perhaps recognizing that evidence
of such an alliance would substantiate the ROYG's argument
that the Houthis are part of an international terrorist
network. END COMMENT.
SECHE