PRESIDENT SALEH PRESSES FOR VISIT TO WASHINGTON

S E C R E T SANAA 001278

SIPDIS

FOR NEA/ARP:AMACDONALD

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/19/2019
TAGS: PGOV PREL KDRG PTER YM
SUBJECT: PRESIDENT SALEH PRESSES FOR VISIT TO WASHINGTON

Classified By: Ambassador Stephen A. Seche for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (S) A clearly agitated President Saleh complained to the
Ambassador July 20 that it was a negative recommendation from
Embassy Sana'a that was preventing the White House from
extending an invitation to him for an official visit with
President Obama. The Ambassador clarified to Saleh that his
recommendation has been, and remains, that the visit should
be scheduled at a moment that will allow the two presidents
to highlight the success of our bilateral relations in key
areas such as counter-terrorism, and political and economic
reform. Noting that he will travel to France in 10 days,
Saleh pressed for an answer from the White House as to
whether he should plan on adding Washington to his itinerary.
End Summary.


2. (S) During a very spirited discussion that lasted nearly
30 minutes, President Saleh and the Ambassador spoke candidly
about internal crises in Yemen confronting his government,
and what the USG contribution to solving these crises should
be. The Ambassador began the meeting by noting President
Obama's continued desire to welcome Saleh to the White House,
and our continued gratitude to Saleh for his cooperation on
the disposition of Yemeni GTMO detainees. The key question,
the Ambassador stated, was to identify the most appropriate
time for the visit, to maximize its positive impact and
further our bilateral goals. At that point, Saleh launched
somewhat inexplicably into extended criticism of the Yemeni
opposition and US Embassy contacts with it, claiming that
the Embassy accepts unquestioningly the view of the
opposition and reports it back to Washington unchallenged.
Saleh asserted: "I gave the opposition its legitimacy and I
can take it away from them." The Ambassador reminded the
President that it was his responsibility and that of his
Embassy to engage both the ruling party and the opposition.
He added that the President seemed to be under the
misapprehension that US Embassy officials met with the
opposition to encourage them to create problems for the
government; on the contrary, the Ambassador said, "we
encourage them to find a way to participate fully in the
political process in this country in order to benefit the
people of Yemen."


3. (S) Saleh then stated that "I have heard from Washington
that you (the Ambassador) have recommended against my
visiting at this time" because of unhappiness with the way
the President is managing the internal problems facing the
country. The Ambassador said a Presidential visit to
Washington without some clear progress on key issues would
likely mobilize Saleh's critics and generate a negative
environment that would benefit neither government, nor the
bilateral relationship. Saleh asked for an example of where
progress was needed, and the Ambassador suggested a
successful operation against Al Qaeda in the Arabian
Peninsula would be welcome. The President responded sharply
that his government has invited the USG to come into Yemen
and support operations against senior AQAP leadership
figures. The Ambassador said that we are cooperating closely
with ROYG security services on such operations at present and
continuing intensive training of these services so they can
act effectively against terrorist organizations. Saleh said
he couldn't understand why we were "suspicious" of Yemen's
commitment to the counter-terrorism, noting that Yemen
suffers far more than the United States as a result of it.
The Ambassador said: "I'm not suspicious. I'm simply
impatient, as I know you are," for results.


4. (S) Saleh identified counter-terrorism cooperation as
one of the three subjects he wanted to discuss with President
Obama. The other two were:

* GTMO detainees: Saleh said that it was up to the USG
to decide what it wants to do with Yemeni detainees ) return
them to Yemen or convince the Saudis to take them. He
pressed, however, for funding, from either our government or
the Saudi government ) for a rehabilitation facility, noting
that he was willing to place the detainees in a "hotel" until
the facility was ready to house them permanently. The
Ambassador replied that he respectfully disagreed with he the
President's suggestion, raised during their last meeting, to
use the grounds of the former US Embassy in downtown Sanaa
(now under renovation as a boutique hotel) as a facility for
returning detainees, noting that an earlier proposal to use
an abandoned military base near Aden seemed far more
appropriate. The Ambassador also noted that he has been
pressing for a decision on the funding for a Yemeni
rehabilitation facility and hoped that ongoing discussions in
Washington would produce one soon.
* Political reform: Saleh insisted, as he has before, that
the Southern Movement is under control, and that the ROYG
recognizes the need to devolve authority to the individual
governorates. The Ambassador proposed an additional subject
for discussion in Washington:
* Economic revitalization: The Ambassador asserted that the
international donor community is looking to the President for
direction in this key area. "We want to undertake
initiatives that will stabilize your economy, address the
issue of unemployment, but we need you and your government to
identify for us those areas where we should be focusing our
assistance." In response, Saleh asked that the USG
intervene with GCC countries to encourage them to accept more
Yemeni workers, noting the salutary effect this would have on
Yemen's unemployment problem.


5. (S) As the conversation drew to a close, the President
said that he will be travelling to France in 10 days to
discuss with the GOF the ongoing investigation into the crash
of the Yemenia Air flight near the Comoros Islands on June
30, and sales of liquefied natural gas once Yemen exports
begin. (Comment. It is unclear what the president has in
mind in this second instance, since contracts already exist
for export of LNG from Yemen over the next 20 years to South
Korea and the United States. End comment.) He said he would
postpone his trip to Paris and go first to Washington if that
was the preference of the Obama Administration. The
Ambassador promised to convey his message to Washington and
return with a response as quickly as one was received. Saleh
said as the Ambassador departed, "if I don't go (to
Washington) now, I will never go."


6. (S) Comment. This Embassy has made no bones about the
fact that it believes that it would be a mistake to invite
Saleh to the White House before he demonstrates a serious
resolve to address the multiple internal challenges he
confronts at the moment. It is quite easy to imagine that
Yemen's Ambassador to Washington is the individual
responsible for passing this message back to President Saleh,
although that does beg the question as to how Ambassador
al-Hajjri learned of Embassy Sanaa's view. All that aside,
we still believe it would be a mistake to reward Saleh for
his inactivity in the face of serious internal crises by
inviting him to Washington at this time. We don't take his
threat to "never" travel to Washington seriously, and believe
he will accept the invitation when and if we extend it. End
Comment.
SECHE