Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09SANAA1170
2009-06-28 13:23:00
SECRET//NOFORN
Embassy Sanaa
Cable title:  

SALEH PRESSES FOR MEETING WITH OBAMA

Tags:  PGOV KDRG CASC PREL YM 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXYZ0000
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHYN #1170/01 1791323
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
R 281323Z JUN 09
FM AMEMBASSY SANAA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 2205
INFO RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 0043
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL 0054
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 0192
RUEHRH/AMEMBASSY RIYADH 1645
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
S E C R E T SANAA 001170 

SIPDIS
NOFORN

DEPARTMENT FOR NEA/ARP:AMACDONALD AND INR

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/27/2019
TAGS: PGOV KDRG CASC PREL YM
SUBJECT: SALEH PRESSES FOR MEETING WITH OBAMA

Classified By: Ambassador Stephen A. Seche for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

Summary
-------

S E C R E T SANAA 001170

SIPDIS
NOFORN

DEPARTMENT FOR NEA/ARP:AMACDONALD AND INR

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/27/2019
TAGS: PGOV KDRG CASC PREL YM
SUBJECT: SALEH PRESSES FOR MEETING WITH OBAMA

Classified By: Ambassador Stephen A. Seche for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

Summary
--------------


1. (S/NF) On June 27, President Saleh urged the Ambassador to
hurry preparations for a state visit to Washington,
suggesting it would help remove obstacles impeding the
transfer of Yemeni GTMO detainees to Saudi custody. On
internal issues, Saleh dismissed concern over unrest in
Yemen'ssouthern governorates, and seemed confident of his
government's ability to keep the Houthi conflict n the north
tamped down. In contrast to the ROY's public position, he
conceded the likelihood tat al-Qaeda rather than Houthi
rebels was behindthe recent abduction of aid workers in
Sa'ada. Ed Summary.

Meeting with President Obama
--------------


2. (S/NF) President Salh reiterated to the Ambassador on
June 27 his deire to visit Washington in order to meet with
Prsident Obama. The Ambassador noted that the consenus in
Washington was that the appropriate time fr the presidents
to meet would be once the transer of Yemeni detainees in
Guantanamo to the Saud rehab program was underway. "If you
speed up peparations for my visit, we can speed up
preparatons for the detainees' return," said Saleh. Earlir
in the meeting, Saleh reiterated his willingnes to have the
Yemeni detainees placed in the Saui rehabilitation program
but noted that Saudi ing Abdullah had expresses opposition
to the idea. He added that Prince Mohamed bin Naif and
Minister of Interior HRH Prince Naif bin Abdulaziz support
the plan, however, and will continue to work to persuade the
King. The Ambassador told the President that regardless of
the state of play with th Saudis, the Obama Administration,
and the Presient himself, was grateful for his willingness
tohave the detainees transferred to the Saudi progra.


3. (S/NF) Saleh then unveiled a new proposal that the
returning detainees be housed in the fomer U.S. Embassy in
the old city of Sana'a. Thebuilding, which is now owned by
tourism conglomeate Universal Group, is located in the heart
of he capital and is being converted into a boutique otel.

Saleh immediately picked up the phone and clled Alwan
al-Shaibani, the Chairman of Universa Group, and asked how
soon the renovation would e complete. Saleh suggested that
the Ambassadortour the building as soon as possible.
(Comment: It seems unlikely that Saleh was entirely serious
about the idea. The location, in the heart of a ongested
area, would be difficult to secure. Th suggestion is
probably more demonstrative of th President's flamboyance
than any real effort tofind a solution to the problem of
locating a secue facility for the returning detainees. End
Comment.)

No Danger in the South
--------------


4. (S/NF) The Ambassador then asked for the President's
assessment of recent developments in Yemen, noting concern at
senior levels of the USG over the multiple challenges facing
the regime. Saleh said that there was "no danger" in the
south, merely the same voices expressing the same discontent
from 1994. Saleh asserted that there is an ongoing dialogue
with the southerners and that they will be allowed to express
their views. He clarified, however, that the ROYG would not
tolerate violence, sabotage or language that is "against
unity." Saleh asserted that most of the Yemeni citizens in
the south support unity and that those who did not had only
"a few websites, Al Jazeera and some telephones." The
Ambassador pointed out the recent events in Tehran have shown
a disenfranchised population with telephones and the internet
can have a profound impact.


5. (S/NF) Saleh asserted that the Southern Movement had
staged a demonstration and killed people in order to blame
their deaths on the ROYG. He also accused daily newspaper
al-Ayyam of "spreading a culture of hatred." He added that
by preventing al-Ayyam from publishing, the ROYG had stopped
"75 percent" of the unrest. The Ambassador reminded Saleh of
the USG's "great concern" about any steps that obstruct the
independent media.

Sa'ada
--------------


6. (S/NF) Saleh said the ROYG is committed to resolving the
Houthi crisis without returning to war. He asserted,
however, that Abdulmalik al-Houthi, the leader of the
rebellious movement, wants war. He complained that Houthi
rebels had killed two Yemeni soldiers and captured 24 others.
The 24 hostages were returned but not the construction
equipment that they had with them, according to Saleh.
(Note: The return of the 24 military hostages was reported
in Yemen's media. End Note.)


7. (S/NF) On the issue of the kidnapped/murdered German,
British and Korean aid workers, Saleh said there were two
likely scenarios: first that it was a terrorist act committed
by al-Qaeda and second, that is was committed by Houthis and
was related to drug-smuggling activities. The Ambassador
noted that the al-Qaeda theory seemed most compelling. Saleh
responded by noting that he has directed ROYG security
services to move against al-Qaeda leaders if the opportunity
presents itself. The Ambassador noted that Embassy elements
are currently cooperating with the National Security Bureau
on this effort. Saleh asked that this cooperation
accelerate, saying that the terrorists had received "orders
from Afghanistan" to attack either Saleh's plane or his
motorcade.

Salah's Demeanor
--------------


8. (S/NF) While Saleh appeared slightly more wound up than
usual, he did not/not appear particularly distracted or
otherwise unable to focus on the issues at hand, as some
reports lately have suggested. The only behavior he
displayed that appeared at all different was that his
interventions were delivered in extended statements that made
it difficult for his official interpreter to keep up.

Comment
--------------


9. (S/NF) Saleh made it clear once again that he is
exceedingly eager to meet with President Obama. It is likely
that he believes the prestige of such a meeting would
increase his political capital, allowing him to better handle
the various crises that beset his country. While this
meeting might be appropriate in the foreseeable future, we do
not/not believe the invitation should be extended as long as
Saleh continues to temporize in the face of Yemen's multiple
crises. End Comment.
SECHE