Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09SANAA1123
2009-06-17 13:40:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Sanaa
Cable title:  

PIRATES SEIZE YEMEN LNG CHARTER VESSEL OFF OMANI

Tags:  EIND EPET ETRD EWWT ECON PTER MCAP MY AC MU 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO1287
RR RUEHDE RUEHDH RUEHDIR
DE RUEHYN #1123/01 1681340
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 171340Z JUN 09
FM AMEMBASSY SANAA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 2143
INFO RUEHZM/GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL COLLECTIVE
RUEHAD/AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI 1057
RUEHWN/AMEMBASSY BRIDGETOWN 0007
RUEHKL/AMEMBASSY KUALA LUMPUR 0011
RUEHMK/AMEMBASSY MANAMA 0583
RUEHMS/AMEMBASSY MUSCAT 0022
RUEHDE/AMCONSUL DUBAI 0518
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHDC
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 SANAA 001123 

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR NEA/ARP ANDREW MACDONALD AND NEA/RA STEVE SOUCEK
OSD/POLICY FOR BRIAN GLENN
NSC FOR AARON JOST
USCG FOR IPSED MIKE BROWN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/17/2019
TAGS: EIND EPET ETRD EWWT ECON PTER MCAP MY AC MU
AE, YM
SUBJECT: PIRATES SEIZE YEMEN LNG CHARTER VESSEL OFF OMANI
COAST

REF: A. SANAA 1064

B. SANAA 936

SANAA 00001123 001.2 OF 002


Classified By: Ambassador Stephen A. Seche for reasons 1.4(b) and (d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 SANAA 001123

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR NEA/ARP ANDREW MACDONALD AND NEA/RA STEVE SOUCEK
OSD/POLICY FOR BRIAN GLENN
NSC FOR AARON JOST
USCG FOR IPSED MIKE BROWN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/17/2019
TAGS: EIND EPET ETRD EWWT ECON PTER MCAP MY AC MU
AE, YM
SUBJECT: PIRATES SEIZE YEMEN LNG CHARTER VESSEL OFF OMANI
COAST

REF: A. SANAA 1064

B. SANAA 936

SANAA 00001123 001.2 OF 002


Classified By: Ambassador Stephen A. Seche for reasons 1.4(b) and (d).


1. (C) SUMMARY: Pirates seized an empty cargo ship under
contract with the Yemen Liquefied Natural Gas Company (YLNG)
on June 12 off the coast of Oman. The ship was returning to
Jebel Ali, UAE, after unloading a shipment of ethylene, a
highly flammable chemical compound, at the Yemeni port of
Belhaf. The site of the attack, roughly 1,400 km from the
nearest point on the Somali coastline, caught YLNG officials
off guard. YLNG, despite lacking hard evidence, suspects
collusion between ROYG authorities and the pirates and is
worried about the safety of an upcoming ethylene shipment in
mid-July. Post has forwarded a YLNG request for a U.S. Navy
escort for this shipment to NAVCENT. END SUMMARY.

YLNG SHIP SEIZED AFTER UNLOADING HAZMAT IN YEMEN
-------------- ---


2. (C) A 50-meter long cargo vessel chartered by a Yemen
Liquefied Natural Gas Company (YLNG) contractor was seized by
pirates in Omani territorial waters, less than 20 km away
from Ad Daffah, Oman on June 12, YLNG Security Manager Gilles
Chalancon told EconOff on June 15. The Antiguan-flagged
Charelle was returning to Jebel Ali, UAE after unloading a
shipment of liquid ethylene at the YLNG natural gas
liquefaction plant at Belhaf on June 8. (Note: Ethylene, a
highly flammable chemical compound under heavy compression
when transported by ship, is a key ingredient in the LNG
refrigeration cycle that turns pipeline gas into exportable
LNG. End Note.) The Charelle, whose location is being

tracked by YLNG using an onboard electronic tracking device,
had no attack countermeasures and the crew was unarmed.
While expressing relief that the ship did not contain
hazardous materials when it was seized, YLNG officials are
extremely worried that the second of the two planned ethylene
shipments from Jebel Ali to Belhaf, scheduled for mid-July,
could suffer the same fate. "If pirates took control of an
ethylene shipment, they could accidentally cause an explosion
or intentionally transfer the HAZMAT to third-parties,"
Chalancon told EconOff.

THREATS TO SHIPPING COULD ADD TO STARTUP DELAYS
-------------- --


3. (C) If the UAE-based shipper, Gulf Agency Company, refuses
to deliver a second planned ethylene shipment to Belhaf
because of piracy fears, Yemen's natural gas export launch
would be delayed "months" until a new supplier can be found
(REF A),YLNG Shipping Manager Jean Yves Chantreau told
EconOff on June 17. The seizure of the Charelle is the
second YLNG vessel to be attacked by pirates: a
Malaysian-flagged YLNG-contracted tugboat was seized by
pirates in December 2008 and taken to Somalia. As of mid-May
2009, the Malaysian vessel was still docked at a Somali port,
but the crew had been freed, according to Chalancon. YLNG is
also increasingly concerned with the safety of the 12 ships
that eventually will transport LNG from Belhaf to the U.S.
and South Korea. YLNG's fleet of LNG tankers, each built at
a cost 10 times that of a crude oil tanker, represent an
attractive target for pirates, according to YLNG Deputy
General Manager Karim Abuhamed. Pirates attacked but failed
to seize an Omani-origin LNG tanker near Bab al-Mandab in the
Red Sea on June 15, Abuhamed told EconOff, because the tanker
was sailing too fast for the pirates to climb onboard.

CITING TIMING, YLNG SUSPECTS INSIDE JOB
--------------


4. (C) Lacking any hard evidence, YLNG nonetheless suspects
that ROYG authorities (NFI) tipped off the pirates operating
off the Omani coast regarding the Charelle's schedule and

SANAA 00001123 002.2 OF 002


route. "The site and timing of the attack are just too
perfect," Abuhamed told EconOff on June 17. "The ship had
just left its YNAV escort and pirates don't normally operate
in this area." YLNG relies heavily on the ROYG for security
(REF B) at the Belhaf facility. A Yemeni Navy (YNAV) brigade
is stationed around the plant perimeter and YNAV vessels
escort YLNG vessels, including the Charelle, from Belhaf to
the end of Yemeni territorial waters.

COMMENT
--------------


5. (C) The site of the Charelle attack, roughly 1,400 km from
the nearest point on the Somali coast, reveals a more
impressive operational capacity than that of previous Gulf of
Aden piracy incidents. Recent increases in shipping
insurance premiums on cargo traveling through the Gulf of
Aden are unlikely to put much of a dent in YLNG's profits,
owing to the net value of the LNG cargo being transported and
the already high LNG tanker charter costs (approximately USD
80,000-100,000 per day). The location of the attack clearly
caught YLNG officials off guard and the company is now
scrambling to find a security solution for future HAZMAT
shipments. YLNG has requested a U.S. Navy escort from Jebel
Ali, UAE, to the territorial water boundary between Oman and
Yemen for its next ethylene shipment in mid-July. Post
forwarded this request to NAVCENT in Manama on June 15. END
COMMENT.
SECHE