NORTHERN TRIBAL LEADER THROWS LOT IN WITH

S E C R E T SANAA 001007

NOFORN
SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR NEA/ARP:MBLONG
BAGHDAD FOR LGURIAN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/26/2019
TAGS: PGOV YM
SUBJECT: NORTHERN TRIBAL LEADER THROWS LOT IN WITH
SECESSIONISTS

Classified By: Ambassador Stephen A. Seche for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

Summary
--------------


1. (S) Sheikh Mohamed Naji al-Shaif told the Ambassador on
May 26 that he has met repeatedly with southern leader Ali
Nasser Mohamed and had committed to give financial support to
another prominent dissident. He further claimed that if
Yemen's southern governorates secede, the northern
governorate of al-Jawf, his tribal stronghold, will follow
suit. Shaif appears to be positioning himself for a
post-Saleh era. End Summary.

Throwing in his Lot with Secessionists
--------------


2. (S) Sheikh Mohamed Naji al-Shaif, eldest son of the
Paramount Sheikh of the Bakil confederation (Yemen's largest
tribal confederation),told the Ambassador on May 26 that he
has met frequently with former President of the People's
Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY) Ali Nasser Mohamed.
(Note: Mohamed has been cited by some, including some in the
Southern Movement, as a likely leader of an independent South
Yemen, although he has thus far refused to publicly endorse
secession. End Note.) Shaif told the Ambassador that he had
just returned from several meetings with Mohamed in Dubai,
which also included former Prime Minister of Yemen (after
unity) Haider al-Attas. Unlike Mohamed, who Shaif feels
would like to cut a deal with the current regime, Attas is
seeking to "break the connection" between the southern
governorates and the central government in Sana'a. (Note:
Shaif said that Attas prefers the phrase "breaking the
connection" to the more commonly used "secession." End Note.)


3. (S) Shaif told the Ambassador that Attas asked him what
"the northern position" was on unity and he responded that
the north supported unity as long as it was for all the
people of Yemen. Attas then asked if Shaif would be willing
to provide him financial support to "break the connection"
between Yemen's north and south and he agreed to do so.
(Note: Shaif did not disclose the amount of this financial
support. End Note.) Shaif went to some pains to assert that
his willingness to support the secessionists comes from his
feeling that President Saleh has betrayed the country for his
own personal gain. This is a feeling expressed by increasing
numbers of embassy interlocutors (Septel to follow).


4. (S) Shaif told the Ambassador that if the southern
governorates secede from Yemen, the northern governorate of
al-Jawf (seat of the Bakil confederation) will secede as
well, opening "a second front" against President Saleh.
Shaif told the Ambassador that secession was not the only
danger faced by the ROYG. "If there is no secession, there
will at least be war," he said.

Views on "Exiled Leaders"
--------------


5. (S) In spite of his willingness to meet and work with
Mohamed and Attas, Shaif does not feel that any of the
southerners living outside of Yemen would ever lead an
independent South Yemen. "Mohamed, Attas and (former PDRY
Vice President and briefly, in 1994, President of the
breakaway Democratic Republic of Yemen (DRY) Ali Salem)
al-Beidh want to benefit from southern independence, but they
will never lead." He said that these men (including Beidh,
who has proclaimed himself leader of the Southern Movement)
provide rallying points for unhappy Southerners, "but the
actual decisions are made in Dhale," a particularly restive
southern governorate.

Probing for Support
--------------


6. (S) The Ambassador stressed repeatedly the USG position
that an immediate and effective ROYG response to the problems
of its people is essential if Yemen's unity is to be
preserved, which, he noted, is long-standing U.S. policy.
The Ambassador asked if Shaif truly believed that the
southern governorates could become a viable, independent

state. Appearing to be fishing for an endorsement, Shaif
replied, "it could, if it gets a green light from countries
like the US and Saudi Arabia." After reiterating US support
for a unified Yemen, the Ambassador noted that the ROYG had
recently inaugurated a bewildering array of development
programs for the south and an ambitious plan to consider
devolving some power to the local level. He asked Shaif if
these steps might be enough to appease the south. "It would
take a miracle," responded Shaif.

Background on Mohamed Naji al-Shaif and the Bakil
Confederation
-------------- --------------


7. (C) While Mohamed Naji al-Shaif is not himself the
Paramount Sheikh of the Bakil confederation, he has for some
time been performing the functions of that role in his
father's name. While the Bakil are the largest tribal
confederation, they have been historically less powerful than
the smaller Hashid confederation. (Note: President Saleh and
his family are Hashid. End Note.) Nonetheless, the Bakil
confederation controls large areas in al-Jawf as well as
parts of Amran, Marib and Sa'ada, and could be a considerable
thorn in Saleh's side, particularly if he is faced with open
rebellion in the south.

Comment
--------------


8. (S) Shaif has in the past made extravagent claims and
offers to the embassy. (In March he offered to use his
tribal forces to assassinate "dangerous terrorist elements in
al-Jawf.") In this meeting, however, he appeared both lucid
and credible. It is reasonable to assume that his family,
which has amassed considerable wealth, has benefitted from
the regime's largess. In the byzantine world of Yemeni
politics, it is even imaginable that Shaif's approach to the
Ambassador had an ulterior motive or was an attempt by Saleh
(acting through Shaif) to test USG commitment to Yemeni
unity. In post's view, however, for Shaif to admit to
material and moral support for the secessionists indicates
that he truly believes that the Saleh regime will not respond
effectively to this crisis and, therefore, may not survive
the challenge of southern independence, and is trying to
position himself for the post-Saleh era. End Comment.
SECHE