Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09RPODUBAI71
2009-02-10 11:01:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Iran RPO Dubai
Cable title:  

KHATAMI'S IN - BUT CAN HE WIN?

Tags:  PGOV KDEM PREL ECON IR 
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TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0343
INFO RUEHAD/AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI PRIORITY 0274
RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE
RUEIDN/DNI WASHINGTON DC
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RUMICEA/USCENTCOM INTEL CEN MACDILL AFB FL
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 RPO DUBAI 000071 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 2/10/2019
TAGS: PGOV KDEM PREL ECON IR
SUBJECT: KHATAMI'S IN - BUT CAN HE WIN?

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CLASSIFIED BY: Ramin Asgard, Director, Iran Regional Presence
Office - Dubai, DOS.
REASON: 1.4 (b),(d)
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 RPO DUBAI 000071

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 2/10/2019
TAGS: PGOV KDEM PREL ECON IR
SUBJECT: KHATAMI'S IN - BUT CAN HE WIN?

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CLASSIFIED BY: Ramin Asgard, Director, Iran Regional Presence
Office - Dubai, DOS.
REASON: 1.4 (b),(d)

1. (C) Summary: Though Khatami's decision to run for president
gives reformist factions in Iran a cohesive leader with
undeniable brand recognition, the former president faces a
vastly different political landscape than in 1997, when he rode
a tidal wave of popular support to victory. After two terms in
office, during which time he was unable to implement most of the
political reforms promised, his luster has faded. Khatami's
ability to win, should the race effectively come down to a
two-person contest between himself and Ahmadinejad, will depend
greatly on his ability to convince enough voters to participate
in a system they disdain in return for small improvements in
economic management, personal liberties, and a less
confrontational public face to present to the world. Khatami
will also face an increased likelihood of voter manipulation as
the two institutions charged with administering the election are
in the hands of conservatives. Many key factors that will shape
the outcome of the race, not the least of which is the final
candidate list, remain undefined. Nevertheless, Khatami's entry
will force factions across Iran's political spectrum to
re-assess their electoral strategy in preparation for the June
12 contest. End summary.



Khatami Enters the Fray




2. (C) Former two-term president Seyyed Mohammad Khatami ended
months of public equivocation February 8 with the formal
announcement of his intent to stand in Iran's June 12
presidential election. Khatami had come under strong pressure
to run in recent months from fellow reformers, who view him as
their best chance to regain the presidency from the conservative
establishment, which consolidated its grip on Iran's various
power centers through wins aQthe local level in 2003, the
Majles takeover in 2004, and finally Ahmadinejad' election in

2005.




3. (C) Khatami's improbable first victory in 1997, in which he
defied conventional wisdom by roundly defeating the right's

candidate Ahmed Nateq Nuri with some 70% of the vote, was so
unexpected that according to one prominent analyst, it is
difficult to articulate the sense of `national euphoria' the
event engendered. And despite a widespread sense that Khatami
had been unable to translate his landslide victory into
meaningful political reform, voters overwhelmingly supported a
second term for him in 2001.




4. (C) After eight years in office, Khatami, and the reformers
by extension, left the presidency discredited, having failed to
deliver promised political reform at home and with their
attempts to soften Iran's foreign policy undermined by spoilers
within the security establishment and rebuffed in no uncertain
terms by the United States. Conservatives capitalized on the
reformers' disarray and the electorate's growing quiescence by
disqualifying over 3,000 reformist candidates for the 2004
parliamentary election, thus engineering a conservative takeover
of the Majles. The extent of the reformers' disorganization, as
well as the profound sense of disappointment among their core
constituent groups, helped pave the way for the Ahmadinejad's
election in 2005.



Why 2009 is not 1997




5. (C) Khatami's unexpected victory in 1997 can be attributed to
two main factors: overwhelming support among the populace for
both the reformist agenda generally and his candidacy
specifically, and the conservative establishment's failure to
understand the extent to which Khatami's candidacy would
resonate with the public. Both elements were critical to the
reformers' ability to overcome the fact that virtually every key
pillar of political and financial power had lined up in support
of Nateq Nuri, creating the pervasive sense that he was
?destined? to win the presidency.




6. (C) The landslide nature of Khatami's electoral victories was

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perhaps the most important check against fraud. According to
one analyst, though truckloads of fakes ballots were
apprehended, there were simply not enough fakes to overcome the
greater number of legitimate votes cast for Khatami. Support
for the reformers among bureaucrats overseeing the
administration of the election from the Ministry of Interior
also helped to ensure that the election was not stolen from
Khatami.




7. (C) In 2009, Khatami faces a radically altered landscape.
The highly personalized enthusiasm that many supporters once
felt for Khatami and the reformist agenda has substantially
eroded. Khatami's ability to attract support on the scale of
that which led to his landslide victories in 1997 and 2001 is
doubtful. Voters of the so-called `Khatami Generation' -
university students who turned out in droves for him - now
express regret over having legitimized the system by
participating in the elections. One Iranian businesswomen in
her 30s recently recounted how as a university student she
cajoled her four siblings into campaigning and voting for
Khatami in 1997 despite her parents' admonishment not to `sully'
her identity card by acquiring the government stamp proving she
voted. `Now,? she observed bitterly, `I hate Khatami worse than
Ahmadinejad and all the mullahs because he made me believe in a
lie.'




8. (C) Although other IRPO contacts have not evinced the same
visceral reaction, few of Khatami's past supporters that we have
spoken with seem willing to vote for him again. Two Iranian
businessmen and a businesswoman in their 30s who recalled
celebrating Khatami's 1997 victory at spontaneous parties now
describe themselves and their cohort as indifferent. None were
inclined to vote in the June election, although the
businesswoman said she would be more likely to support former
Foreign Minister and possible candidate Ali Akbar Velayati over
Khatami because as Khamenei's `right hand,' Velayati would
accomplish more as president, including improving ties with the
US. An interior designer who voted for Khatami in 1997 said he
had note voted since and had little interest in even discussing
the election. He said he now just `lived his life' without
worrying about the country's political machinations.




9. (C) In addition to the pervasive sense of disappointment
among one-time Khatami enthusiasts, many members of the
political elite point with alarm to the increased potential for
fraud this election. Unlike previous elections, this year the
two institutions charged with overseeing and administering the
electoral process - the Guardian Council and the Ministry of
Interior - are both firmly in the hands of hardliners.
According to domestic press reports, a reformist MP from Abadan
recently called attention to the `suspicious' and abrupt manner
with which the central government has been appointing new
provincial and district level governors ahead of the election.
A Tehran-based consulting firm noted these officials will play
key roles in administering the election. Moreover, in early
February the reformist newspaper Etemad-e Melli reported that
numerous experienced staff members from the Interior Ministry's
elections office were recently fired, and were expected to be
replaced by people closely connected to the current
administration.




10. (C) Though some reformers have begun sounding the alarm
about the potential for fraud, as yet there is little indication
they have a clear strategy to mitigate voter manipulation. In
November, the now-banned reformist paper Kargozaran called on
the reformist leadership to begin recruiting and training `tens
of thousands' of observers to monitor polling stations. IRPO
contacts with ties to the Khatami camp have also quietly
suggested the reformers would benefit from the presence of
international observers, although publicly making such a request
could trigger accusations from the right that the reformers are
colluding with the West.



Comment




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11. (C) Many key variables that will shape the outcome of the
race are as yet undetermined, including the final list of
candidates, which will not be issued until the Guardian Council
completes the candidate vetting process in late May. Recent
elections, to include both Khatami's first victory in 1997 and
Ahmadinejad's 2005 win, have taken pundits by surprise. Yet
Khatami's decision to enter the race, albeit reluctantly, likely
presages a more vigorous contest than would have been
anticipated if the race were limited to candidates from the
various conservative and hardline factions.




12. (C) A long-time Khatami supporter observed that while the
former president is unlikely to recapture the same mandate he
once enjoyed, he can win. According to his logic, which is
shared by other IRPO contacts, many voters will choose the small
changes the reformers can credibly promise -- better economic
management, increased personal freedoms, and a more palatable
public face for Iran to present to the world - over the prospect
of a second Ahmadinejad term. This conforms to the message we
hear repeatedly from Iranians: in 2009, pedestrian concerns
about the economy, pollution, and traffic appear to trump larger
ideological considerations.
ASGARD