IRAN'S ASHURA DAY VIOLENCE BRINGS REGIME TO CROSSROADS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 RPO DUBAI 000549

SIPDIS
NOFORN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 2034/12/28
TAGS: PGOV IR PREL
SUBJECT: IRAN'S ASHURA DAY VIOLENCE BRINGS REGIME TO CROSSROADS

REF: DUBAI RPO 547

CLASSIFIED BY: Alan Eyre, Director, DOS, IRPO; REASON: 1.4(B),(D)


1. (C) SUMMARY: On December 27 tens of thousands of 'Green Path'
oppositionists transformed the 'Ashura' religious holiday into
anti-regime and anti-Khamenei demonstrations in cities throughout
Iran, triggering the most violent confrontations with security
forces since the June 12 presidential election (reftel). Most of
the violence occurred in central Tehran's main streets and squares.
Security forces composed of Law Enforcement Forces (LEF),Basij and
'plain clothes' used batons, tear gas and at least in a few
instances firearms to disperse crowds of protestors ranging from a
few hundred to tens of thousands. Protesters also resorted to
violence, burning security officials' motorbikes and in at least
several locations driving them. Iran's state media gave
conflicting numbers of fatalities ranging from four to fifteen, and
ascribed the disturbances to 'seditionists,'anti-revolutionists and
the Monafeqin' (i.e. the MEK). The most prominent death was Mir
Hossein Mousavi's nephew, with some oppositionists claiming his
death was intentional, to increase pressure on Mousavi. During
Ashura and the following day security forces initiated a new round
of arrests of prominent reformists. Although the number of 'Green
Path' oppositionists willing to take to the streets has decreased
from the days immediately following the June election, those
remaining on the streets seem to have radicalized, and the regime
now faces a choice of either seeking accommodation or increasing
its suppression, with the latter more likely. END SUMMARY.


2. (C) On Ashura (Sunday, December 27) Tehran saw its most violent
clashes since the start of the post-election protests. In Tehran
people were out in force, mostly in central Tehran along the
north-south streets on which the major universities are located.
According to press, clusters of protesters ranged from several
hundred to tens of thousands. During the day there were many
reports of violent clashes between protesters and security forces,
and one IRPO contact in touch with people in Central Tehran called
today 'the most violent day' since the post-election protests
began(reftel).

'EVENING OF DESOLATION'

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3. (U) Traditionally in contemporary Iran the night of Ashura is
'the Evening of Desolation, ('Sham-e Qariban'),with people
gathering in public areas with lighted candles. Yesterday after
Tehran's bloody Ashura day clashes protestors announced that they
would remain in selected public squares and parks in the evening
'to continue their struggle' (reftel). According to reformist
press, as the sun set anti-riot forces and Basijis increased
deployments to most of Tehran's main squares and streets,
especially in Central Tehran along Enqelab Street, Vali Asr
Intersection and Square, Shahid Beheshti Street, Tajrish and
Mohseni Squares. There were reports of scattered clashes in Tehran
and in at least one instance of gunshots being heard, although
these encounters were not on the same scale as during the day.
Reformist websites also report that the night-time 'Allah Akbar'
shouts from Tehran rooftops were markedly more extensive than in
recent memory. In Qom, plainclothes associated with 'Ansar-e
Hezbollah' attacked and dispersed a gathering of reformist clerics.


OFFICIAL REACTION

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4. (U) While no high-level government official has yet commented on
the Ashura violence, law enforcement officials did, and official
media have already begun to 'spin' the Ashura events. On December
28 the head of the IRGC in Qom warned Mousavi, Karrubi and Khatami
that they had better 'repent and seek forgiveness from the Supreme
Leader,' or else run the risk of 'facing the same fate as deposed
former President Bani Sadr.' The IRGC-associated 'Fars'
news-service characterized the protestors as a small group of
Khatami-,Mousavi-, and Karrubi-affiliated 'seditionists' who
attacked Ashura participants in the hopes of inciting a reaction
from Iranian security and law-enforcement forces. Official and
semi-official pro-government sources also characterized the

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protestors as a small number of 'counter-Revolutionary elements and
the 'Monafeqin' (i.e. 'hypocrites-aka the MEK). Pro-government
news sources quoted an 'informed Intelligence Ministry official' as
saying 'at least ten' people associated with the MEK had been
detained. Pro-government media characterized the protestors as
engaging in wanton property destruction, assault on individuals,
and even burning the Quran, and called on Mousavi, Karrubi and
Khatami to denounce them.

DEATHS: 4, 5, 10, OR 15?

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5. (U) It is still not clear how many people died as a result of
Ashura day clashes, with numbers ranging from four to 15. Late
afternoon December 27, Law Enforcement Forces (LEF) Deputy
Commander Ahmad Reza Radan told press that during Ashura day
demonstrations there had been four deaths and more than 300 people
arrested. He claimed the LEF did not carry or use any firearms on
rioters, and that of the four reported deaths, one had fallen from
a bridge, two had been run over by cars, and the fourth was "killed
suspiciously," with government experts to investigate. He also
noted that Greater Tehran LEF Commander Rajabzadeh had been wounded
by a thrown object.


6. (U) Later that night (December 27) the Greater Tehran LEF issued
a statement in which it said that the LEF sought to make this
year's Ashura ceremonies 'as glorious as possible,' but
unfortunately a limited number of 'seditionists' 'following a
pre-arranged plan influenced by foreign media' sought to disturb
the public order by shouting 'deviationalist' slogans. Fortunately,
by acting decisively and using crowd control equipment, but with an
emphasis on not carrying or using live weapons, the LEF dispersed
the crowds and neutralized the seditionists. Five people died 'in a
suspicious manner,' their deaths being investigated by 'experts'
(NOTE: There are Internet videos of Tehranis with gunshot wounds).


7. (U) A December 28 IRIB report quoted the Intelligence Ministry
as saying that 15 people had died in the Ashura demonstrations,
'five killed by terrorists, and the other 10 associated with
counter-revolutionaries and the MEK.' A December 28 Iran news
report quoted the Iranian National Security Council as saying that
eight had died: four in Tehran and four in Tabriz. One factor
complicating an accurate assessment of those dead and wounded was
the reluctance of protestors to yield their wounded to ambulances,
for fear that they would be taken to detention centers instead of
hospitals. Indeed, there were December 28 reports of police and
intelligence officials questioning and taking pictures of the
wounded in hospitals.

MOUSAVI NEPHEW

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8. (U) The death that drew the most media attention was that of
Seyyed Ali Habibi Mousavi Khameneh, a nephew of Mir Hossein
Mousavi, who died as a result of gunshot wounds (reftel).
Government-associated press sought to portray his death as planned
by oppositionists in order to incite anti-government sentiment.
European-based oppositionist and close Mousavi friend (and former
spokesman) Mohsen Makhmalbaf issued a December 28 statement saying
that Ali Mousavi had been receiving death threats in the days
leading up to Ashura, that he was shot in the chest at a close
distance by his assailant, and that his family firmly believed that
he was killed to put pressure on Mir Hossein Mousavi. Makhmalbaf
also noted that Seyyed Ali Mousavi's corpse was taken by government
officials, and that while the stated reason was for an official
forensic examination, Makhmalbaf said the real reason was to
prevent both an impartial examination of the corpse and a burial.
According to oppositionist sites, Mir Hossein Mousavi said he would
not issue a statement concerning his nephew's death, since 'it was
no different' than the deaths of other young martyrs that day.

OTHER PROMINENT ASHURA DETAINEES

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9. (U) Many other prominent reformists/oppositionists seem to have
been 'rounded up' or beaten by intelligence/security officials on
Ashura and the day following, to include:

- Emadaldin Baghi: prominent Human Rights activist, former student
of Grand Ayatollah Montazeri and former member of Mehdi Karrubi's
campaign staff;

- Mohammad Moin, son of former reformist Presidential candidate
Mostafa Moin. Mohammad was severely beaten then taken into custody;

-Mehdi Arabshahi, one of the leaders of the pro-reformist
university student group 'Office for Consolidating Unity ('OCU' aka
'Daftar-e Tahkim-e Vahdat');

- the brother of prominent reformist (and former Interior Minister)
Abdollah Nuri, who was beaten badly by LEF in Esfahan on Ashura,
and is reportedly in critical condition;

- Ali Reza Beheshti Shirazi, director of the 'Kalameh' website
associated with Mir Hossein Mousavi;

- Mir Hossein Mousavi's senior advisor, office head, and election
staff head, all three of whom were arrested;

- Morteza Haji and Hasan Rasuli, chief members of the 'Baran
Foundation' affiliated with former President Khatami;

- Former Foreign Minister and current Secretary General of the
(banned) Freedom Movement of Iran Ebrahim Yazdi, who was taken into
custody by Intelligence officials on December 28.

OTHER CITIES

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10. (U) Outside of Tehran there were reports of clashes between
protestors and security/law enforcement forces in other major
Iranian cities, to include Najafabad (Ayatollah Montazeri's
hometown),Shiraz, Arak, Mashhad, and Ardebil. According to a
reformist website, LEF in Esfahan prevented pro-opposition mourners
from gathering in a mosque, and also surrounded the house of
prominent dissident cleric Grand Ayatollah Taheri. One report said
police announced martial law in Najafabad at 2100 hours, Dec 27,
warning people to stay in their homes. In Tabriz, oppositionist
websites reported 'at least four deaths' in Ashura day clashes.


11. (C) COMMENT: In the immediate aftermath of the June 12
election protesters called for new elections and targeted
Ahmadinejad as the problem, rather than the regime and Khamenei
directly. Opposition leaders expressed their intent to work within
the 'system' to resolve their issues. Since then however much of
the 'Green Path' opposition movement seems to have shifted its
focus to Khamenei and the regime itself, and while the numbers of
'Green Path' oppositionists who take to the streets has decreased
since June, the government's jackboot tactics seems to have
radicalized at least some oppositionist elements, as seen by
yesterday's Ashura demonstrations. Although the 'millions in the
streets' that at least one prominent opposition leader told IRPO
would materialize on Ashura never did, the turnout yesterday and
the concomitant violence certainly took the regime by surprise. As
a prominent reformist told IRPO, 'Ashura is never a good day to be
seen as an oppressor.'


12. (C) COMMENT: (CONT'D): The conventional wisdom is that Supreme
Leader Khamenei allowed the rigged Presidential election to
proceed, assuming that any popular protests could be quickly
snuffed. Now nearly seven months later, it is clear that, as
Rafsanjani has stated, there is still 'a fire that has not been
extinguished.' After yesterday's events the regime now stands at a
crossroads: it must decide whether to in some way seek compromise
with at least moderate opposition elements, or to increase
suppression. One IRPO contact, a US-based Iranian political
analyst, expects increasing pressure on Khamenei, coming at least
partially from moderate IRGC elements, to mediate a compromise. To
date however, Khamenei has rejected any compromise and has
repeatedly demanded that the opposition accept the election and

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cease its 'sedition.' Another IRPO contact, a prominent Iranian
reformist journalist, expects the regime to use the relatively long
amount of time until the next probable display of public protest on
February 11 (22 Bahman, the anniversary of the Revolution's
victory) to substantially increase suppression, including closing
those reformist newspapers still open. Up to the present Khamenei
seems to 'double down on suppression' when in doubt, and today's
new round of arrests suggest such a strategy. If the regime does
decide to continue on its current course, it remains to be seen
whether increased suppression succeeds in neutralizing the
opposition or instead further radicalizes and mobilizes it. END
COMMENT.
EYRE