IRAN RESPONDS (ADQRSELY) TO IAEA BOG RESOLUTION

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 RPO DUBAI 000514

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/30/2019
TAGS: IR PGOV PREL PARM
SUBJECT: IRAN RESPONDS (ADQRSELY) TO IAEA BOG RESOLUTION

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CLASSIFIED BY: Alan Eyre, Director, IRPO, State.
REASON: 1.4 (b),(d)

1. (C) SUMMARY: Initial IRIG reaction to the November 27 IAEA
Board of Governors' resolution came from its IAEA representative
Ali Asghar Soltanieh, who expressed 'deep concern and
disappointment,' and from the Iranian Majlis, whose members
threatened to 'review' Iran's NPT membership. Subsequently, on
November 29 the Iranian Majlis voted to have the Ahmadinejad
administration submit a plan to minimalize Iran's IAEA
cooperation. On that same day the Iranian Cabinet approved a
plan for the construction of ten 'Natanz-size' enrichment
facilities throughout Iran in hardened sites, and also said it
would 'examine' the issue of Iran itself enriching fuel to the
20 percent level needed by the Tehran Research Reactor. As of
yet no senior Iranian official has seriously bruited the idea of
NPT withdrawal as a consequence of this vote, and indeed Iranian
officials have taken pains to state that Iran will remain an NPT
member and continue to 'live up to its commitments.' Despite
this stab at projecting moderation, by its reactions an
unrepentant Iran seems to be 'doubling up' in the wake of the
IAEA vote by suggesting the possibility of even more
destabilizing actions if the West does not seek an accommodation
on the nuclear issue. END SUMMARY.




2. (U) The November 27 IAEA Board of Governors (BOG)
Resolution, viewed universally as a strong rebuke to Iran,
engendered uniform expressions of official displeasure from the
Islamic Republic. The most laconic was Expediency Council
President Rafsanjani, who on November 29 termed the BOG vote
'unjust' and called for Iran's 'active diplomacy' in
international fora to prevent these types of actions against
Iran.



SOLTANIEH: MINIMAL COOPERATION




3. (U) In November 27 press comments before the BOG vote, IRIG
IAEA Representative Soltanieh warned that an anti-Iran
resolution would 'hurt the current constructive atmosphere,'
have 'long-term consequences,' and 'cause Iran to lower its
cooperation with the IAEA to the bare minimum required by its
existing commitments.' His post-vote comments spoke of 'deep
concern and disappointment' and said the resolution both
'jeopardizes the current conducive environment' and 'poses
serious doubt.. about the good will of other parties.' [NOTE:
His more extensive November 28 prepared comments to the IAEA BOG
served mainly to summarize and repeat Iran's talking points on
suspension of enrichment, Code 3.1, the Additional Protocol;
'Alleged Studies, the Fordo Installation, and the Tehran
Research Reactor (TRR),concluding with a call for the IAEA to
immediately desist with the 'enervating and bothersome'
political discussions about Iran's peaceful nuclear program].
In press remarks to a German news service reported on November
29 by the hardline conservative 'Kayhan' newspaper, Soltanieh
said Iran would in all likelihood limit its cooperation with the
IAEA to the legal minimum and 'would not implement even one
word' of this IAEA resolution. Soltanieh termed this 'the
minimal response' Iran could take in reaction to the BOG
resolution.



MFA: STILL REMAIN WITHIN NPT




4. (U) On November 27 MFA Spokesman Mehmanparast denounced the
IAEA vote, calling it a 'fruitless.. superficial and ceremonial
gesture' with the goal of putting pressure on Iran. He added
that if Iran's basic rights as an NPT signatory are not
guaranteed based on the IAEA Safeguards, we will see no reason
to implement extra commitments vis a vis the IAEA." He did add
that Iran would continue to be an IAEA member.



MAJLIS: MINIMAL COOPERATION




5. (U) As is often the case in Iranian foreign policy, the
Majlis fulfilled its 'bad cop' role, with various Majlis

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National Security Committee members threatening to bar IAEA
inspectors and/or to withdraw Iran from the NPT. At the start
of the November 29 session, Speaker Ali Larijani said the BOG
resolution proved that America and the West didn't intend to
seek a solution through diplomacy, but instead were seeking to
use 'political trickery.' He warned the US and other P5+1
countries not to do anything that causes Iran to 'pursue another
path and seriously limit its cooperation with the IAEA.' In
subsequent November 30 comments, Larijani said that Iran wants
to pursue nuclear matters within the IAEA supervisory framework,
which implies commitment to a strategy of diplomacy. However,
'if others pursue political trickery, Iran would also definitely
change its methods.' In a November 29 statement read by Majlis
Leadership Committee member Hassan Qaffuri-Fard and reportedly
signed by over 200 representQves, the Majlis condemned the BOG
vote and requested the Ahmadinejad administration, `in light of
the hostile behavior of the P5+1 countries, to quickly submit to
the Majlis National Security Committee a program and plan to
decrease the level of Iran's IAEA cooperation, which the
Committee will then present to the Majlis as a whole.'



CABINET: WE'LL SHOW YOU: 10 MORE SITES




6. (U) On November 29 the Iranian cabinet, chaired by President
Ahmadinejad, charged the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran
(AEOI) to plan and propose ten new `Natanz-size' enrichment
facilities within the next two months. More specifically,
within the next two months the AEOI is to start work on creating
enrichment facilities at five sites already designated
throughout Iran, and to suggest suitable locations for five more
enrichment facilities. According to Ahmadinejad, given that the
current (Fourth) Five-Year Development Plan, the country must
produce fuel to produce the 20,000 MW of electricity from Iran's
power stations, and creating 10 'Natanz-size' enrichment
facilities will be an important step in this regard. He added
that Iran would need to produce 250 to 300 tons of fuel, which
would call for newer centrifuges with higher speeds.
Ahmadinejad also said that Wednesday's cabinet meeting would
discuss the question of whether Iran should itself produce the
20 percent fuel needed by the TRR. [NOTE: President Ahmadinejad
is scheduled to address the Iranian nation in a TV address
November 30, speaking on domestic and international issues].




7. (U) In press comments after the cabinet meeting, AEOI head
Ali Akbar Salehi said that the Cabinet's decision to build ten
new enrichment sites and to examine the issue of enriching fuel
to 20 percent was a "firm response to the unacceptable action of
the 5+1" in the IAEA BOG meeting. He repeated that Iran would
`remain committed to its international obligations.' Salehi
also said:



- that based on orders from the President the AEOI had already
determined five new sites, and 'fortunately, preparations have
already been made' for these sites;



- henceforth, enrichment facilities would not be in the open but
would be built in mountains, in such a manner as to be safe from
attack;



- Iran's Fifth Five Year Development Plans (scheduled to begin
in March 2010) calls for contracts to be concluded for up to
5,000 MW of atomic power, and for each 1,000 MW of power one
Natanz-size enrichment facility is needed;



- Iran didn't intend to build this many sites but Western
behavior caused the Administration to take today's actions.




8. (C) COMMENT: The essence of Iran'Qesponse to the BOG
Resolution is three-fold: to put forward the possibility of 1)

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reduced IEAE cooperation; 2) building more enrichment
facilities; 3) enriching its own fuel to levels necessary for
the TRR, i.e. approximately 20 percent (NOTE: President
Ahmadinejad's public reference to the need for newer model
centrifuges might be a fourth such response). Certainly at
first glance reduced Iranian IAEA cooperation seems a more
realistic and likely response than the other two options,
especially Iran's announcement, seemingly borne of pique, that
it will build ten new major enrichment sites in response to the
IAEA vote (NOTE: Iran might be using this IEAE vote to broach
the idea of 'ten new enrichment facilities,' so that it can
subsequently include any newly discovered facilities as part of
these ten). It also must be noted that as of yet no senior
Iranian official has seriously bruited the idea of NPT
withdrawal as a consequence of this vote, and indeed Iranian
officials have taken pains to state that Iran will remain an NPT
member and continue to 'live up to its commitments.' Despite
this stab at projecting moderation, by its reactions an
unrepentant Iran seems to be 'doubling up' in the wake of the
IAEA vote by suggesting the possibility of even more
destabilizing actions if the West does not seek an accommodation
on the nuclear issue. END COMMENT.
EYRE