IRAN: CONSERVATIVE IN-FIGHTING ALIVE AND WELL

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 RPO DUBAI 000513

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/25/2019
TAGS: PREL PGOV PARM IR
SUBJECT: IRAN: CONSERVATIVE IN-FIGHTING ALIVE AND WELL

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CLASSIFIED BY: Alan Eyre, Director, Iran Regional Presence
Office, Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b),(d)

1. (C) SUMMARY: Three months into President Ahmadinejad's second
term, the dominant ruling faction in Iran (''Osulgarayan,' aka
'Principlist') remains divided by competition for power and
resources. At its core are personal rivalries and the settling
of political scores but there are also broader philosophical
differences over domestic and foreign policy. Fallout from the
infighting between the two Principlist main camps -- political
allies of Ahmadinejad versus the so-called "pragmatic
conservatives" primarily associated with Tehran Mayor Mohammad
Baqer Qalibaf and Majlis Speaker Ali Larijani -- includes the
likely scuttling of the Tehran Research Reactor deal,
unprecedented attempts by the government to shut down
conservative newspapers associated with Larijani and Qalibaf, a
move by Ahmadinejad to wrest control of Tehran's metro from the
Tehran Municipality, and a bruising battle in the Majlis over
the implementation of Ahmadinejad's subsidy reform plan.
Larijani's recent public defense of Expediency Council chair
Ayatollah Rafsanjani also suggests the pragmatic conservatives
remain willing and able to counter Ahmadinejad's attempts to
consolidate political power. It is likely that both Principlist
factions will seek support both from Supreme Leader Khamenei,
and, perhaps more importantly, from the IRGC. END SUMMARY.




2. (C) Iran's dominant political faction, the conservative
'Principlists' ('Osulgarayan') came into being in the latter
years of the Khatami administration as a reaction to the
reformist 'Second of Khordad' Movement,' which it saw as a
threat to the founding principles of the Islamic Revolution. It
swept into power starting with the 2003 Council elections, the
2004 Majlis elections and finally the 2005 Presidential
elctions. However, like most Iranian political movements,
success encouraged its fissiparous tendencies, and now it has
two major factions, one clustered around President Ahmadinejad
and the other led by Majlis Speaker Ali Larijani, Tehran Mayor
Qalibaf and Expediency Council Chairman Mohsen Rezai, all of who
ran against Ahmadinejad in the 2005 Presidential election.




3. (C) The IAEA-sponsored proposal to provide fuel for the
Tehran Research Reactor is the most high-profile victim of the
deep divisions among Iran's ruling conservatives. Deputy Majlis
Speaker Mohammad Reza Bahonar, a close Larijani ally, launched
an immediate public attack on the deal on October 18. Actors
from across Iran's political spectrum soon followed suit,
expanding on Bahonar's condemnation of the potential
breakthrough with the West, terming it as a trick to deprive
Iran of its LEU.




4. (C) On November 11, Ahmadinejad took an apparent swipe at
Qalibaf by proclaiming his administration's intent to take over
control of Tehran's metro system from the Tehran Municipality.
Expansion of the metro system, seen as key to alleviating
Tehran's legendary traffic snarls, is both politically sensitive
and involves control of a construction budget worth more than
six billion dollars, according to press reports. Qalibaf
quickly returned fire, attributing the metro expansion delays to
the failure of Ahmadinejad's administration to deliver promised
funding, with Ahmadinejad Majlis critics quickly pushing through
a proposal to fund the project from Iran's foreign exchange
reserves. An IRPO contact who used to work for Qalibaf noted
that the rivalry between Ahmadinejad, who preceded Qalibaf as
Tehran mayor, dates back to at least 2005 when the little-known
Ahmadinejad defeated Qalibaf in the presidential election.




5. (C) In another thinly-veiled attack by Ahmadinejad against
his main rivals, on November 23 the government's Press
Supervisory Board banned Tehran Municipality's newspaper
Hamshahri, purportedly for publishing a tourist advertisement
for a Baha'i temple in India. The move followed reports from
the editors of Khabar, a pro-Larijani paper, that it would
suspend its operations due to unspecified government-origin
"political pressures." Though virtually all of Iran's reformist
publications have been closed down or heavily censured, the
unprecedented attack on Iran's largest conservative newspaper
caused an immediate backlash, with one Tehran City Council
members publicly citing examples of pro-Ahmadinejad publications
that had published the same ad. Due to intervention by the
Judiciary branch, the paper resumed publication November 24
after just one day's suspension.




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6. (C) The protracted debate of how to implement the subsidy
reform plan and control of the anticipated USD 30 billion annual
savings provides additional insight into intra-Principlist
skirmishing. Though it appears Ahmadinejad will get his
signature plan through the Majlis, the pragmatic conservatives,
who dominate the Majlis Principlist faction, have successfully
altered the timeline for implementation and blunted
Ahmadinejad's attempt to give his government unchecked access to
the savings. The legislative skirmishes became so heated that
at one point Ahmadinejad threatened to withdraw the bill
completely rather than accept Majlis modifications to the plan.




7. (C) In an increasingly rare public defense of Ahmadinejad's
top target Ayatollah Rafsanjani, Larijani lauded the Expediency
Council head during November 23 remarks at an awards ceremony,
terming him a "pillar of the system." Rafsanjani and his family
have been under increasing pressure in recent months, mostly
from Ahmadinejad allies. Hardline conservatives have been
calling for Rafsanjani's son Mehdi Hashemi to stand trial and
criticizing Rafsanjani directly. Larijani called such criticism
unwarranted and noted Ayatollah Khomeini's deep support for
Rafsanjani. (COMMENT: Although during the speech Larijani
praised both Rafsanjani and Ahmadinejad, his support for
Ahmadinejad was more perfunctory, and Iranian media seized upon
his comments regarding Rafsanjani, suggesting an ongoing
tactical alliance between Rafsanjani and Larijani. END COMMENT.)




8. (C) COMMENT: Despite having effectively driven reformists
from Iran's political playing field since the presidential
election, tensions among the remaining conservative political
elites remain high. The robustness of the "pragmatic
conservative" camp within the Principlist faction indicates that
Ahmadinejad has made little progress consolidating his power
vis-`-vis his many enemies within the conservative camp.
Likewise, however, lingering fallout from Ahmadinejad's
"victory" at the polls has not tempered his willing to attack
perceived rivals. It is likely that both Principlist factions
will seek support both from Supreme Leader Khamenei, and,
perhaps more importantly, from the IRGC. END COMMENT.
EYRE