IRAN REGIONAL PRESENCE OFFICE - WINDOW ON IRAN - FEBRUARY 3,

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 RPO DUBAI 000051

NOFORN
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 2/3/2019
TAGS: PGOV PINR SOCI IR
SUBJECT: IRAN REGIONAL PRESENCE OFFICE - WINDOW ON IRAN - FEBRUARY 3,
2009

REF: LONDON 127

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CLASSIFIED BY: Ramin Asgard, Director, Iran Regional Presence
Office - Dubai, DOS.
REASON: 1.4 (b),(d)

1. [S/NF] Election Update - Rumors of Ahmadinejad's Delusions
May Hurt His Chances, Khatami Poised to Enter, Velayati May Be
Compromise Choice: Several of our Iran and Dubai based contacts
have noted Ahmadinejad is facing a major reelection challenge,
and that only the Supreme Leaders' active support keeps his
reelection hopes on track. This support may waver for a number
of reasons, however, and may end entirely. According to one
well-connected Dubai-based source, a rumor is spreading that
Ahmadinejad has been telling private audiences that he is the
main pillar of the Islamic Republic, not the Supreme Leader.
This source noted that, if this is true or the rumor takes root,
the Supreme Leader may temper or suspend his support for
Ahmadinejad. Former President Khatami, meanwhile, has
reportedly decided to run in the elections, although he has made
no formal announcement. While Khatami likely enjoys strong
support from reformists, women and youth, according to a Dubai
based Iranian businessman, regime insiders and some outsiders
recall the Khatami period as a difficult and ultimately
disappointing period which most are not eager to repeat.
Speaking bluntly, one retired IRIG official noted that it
ultimately came down to Khatami lacking any street-level cadres
capable of battling the massive forces of the hardline Ansar-e
Hezbollah thugs, the Basij, and other "pressure groups" that
ruthlessly suppress dissent on behalf of regime hardliners.
With both candidates flawed, multiple contacts tell us that
consensus is building for former FM Ali Akbar Velayati to come
forward as a compromise candidate. Velayati currently serves as
the foreign policy advisor to the Supreme Leader, and is viewed
as "relatively moderate" by reformists. Contacts described
Velayati as "acceptable to all parties," "tractable," and less
flatteringly - "lacking guts", a charge also at times leveled
against Khatami. Comment: A Velayati presidency under these
conditions may see the office of the Presidency diminish in
importance, with the Supreme Leader's Office and or the security
establishment absorbing key parts of the President's mandate.




2. [C/NF] US-Iran Exchanges Should Continue, But In Other
Direction: A Dubai based Iranian businessman and educator
related to Ayatollah Shahroudi, the head of Iran's judiciary,
told IRPO Officer that despite the recent setbacks on exchanges,
such engagement should continue. He made a point to affirm his
continued support for cultural engagement, despite recent IRIG
claims that such programs were merely part of a USG "velvet
revolution" project, adding "we wouldn't be meeting if those
claims were serious." He noted that Iranian circles opposed to
better ties between Americans and Iranians have clamped down on
cultural diplomatic engagement due to anxiety about possible
impacts on their domestic political fortunes. This official's
recommendation was to continue exchanges, but to focus on more
exchanges from the US to Iran, which could help dispel doubts,
empower advocates of cultural engagement inside Iran, and
generate broad good will towards the US within Iran. Comment:
We can expect at least some elements in Iran to counter our
efforts at engagement just as some work to counter other US
policies which Iran's leaders feel threaten their interests. If
engagement is going to work, it will need to become more
transparent and more bidirectional, and as we have suggested
before, would greatly benefit from a non-governmental bilateral
coordinating mechanism.




3. [S/NF] Alaei Brothers Reportedly "Well Treated": This same
source noted that in discussions with Judiciary officials, they
claimed that IVLP alumni Drs. Arash and Kamiar Alaei have been
treated reasonably well during their imprisonment, have not been
harshly interrogated or tortured, and have been allowed to
receive family visits. This would not have been the case if the
IRIG thought they were truly dangerous, he noted. He suggested
this was a good sign, and speculated that they could be released
well before their full sentences had been served. Note: This
information appears to contradict statements from the brothers'
mother.




4. [C/NF] Crackdown on Women's Rights Activists Just One Part
of IRIG's Politicization of Social Issues: A long-time Iranian
civil society activist described the various organizations that
comprise the contemporary women's movement as 90%
"charity-focused" and 10% "rights-focused." As the advocates of
expanded rights for women have coalesced around the One Million

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Signature Campaign in recent years, hardline authorities have
grown increasingly wary of the "secular" nature of many of the
activists, which they view as a potential threat to their rule
and the stability of the system. But the activist explained
that since the election of Ahmadinejad, the government has
consistently pushed civil society organizations operating in
many fields, not just women's rights, underground by
politicizing their activities and their motives. She
illustrated her point with a personal anecdote about a
meditation and poetry class she attends in Tehran. Though no
aspect of the class, the teacher, or the students is at all
political in the conventional sense, they feel compelled to meet
in secret and take measures to prevent the authorities from
learning about the class. In her words, "now even reciting
Hafez" is risky. Comment: As this example illustrates, the
broad and continuing IRIG crackdown on civil society has spread
public anxiety to many organized group activities - even one as
innocuous as poetry/meditation groups. As many contacts have
told us, the MOIS modus operandi is to monitor "suspicious"
activity, but only act against civil society figures once they
starting "organizing." For this reason, Iranians are
particularly wary of organizing collectively - recalling
demonstratively harsh regime actions of the past - even if their
activities are wholly apolitical.




5. [C/NF] IRGC Journal Predicts Bleak Future for U.S.-Iran
Relations: This week's edition of Sobh-e Sadeq, a weekly
journal published by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps,
carries an editorial assessing that there are only three
potential scenarios for bilateral relations under the Obama
administration: 1) continuation of the status quo, 2) further
deterioration of the relationship, and 3) a "false start" in
which the United States will press for engagement as a tactical
maneuver, but ultimately find itself unable to accept a
fundamental shift in the relationship because its policy is
dictated by "other interests" in the Middle East. The piece
asserts that the U.S. needs improved relations with Iran, but
that Iran has little to gain from rapprochement at this time.
An IRPO contact who until several months ago worked closely with
the IRIG observed that Iran's leadership feels emboldened after
its "victories" in Gaza and Lebanon, and likely no longer feels
that they face an imminent militarily threat from the U.S. or
Israel. Comment: The IRGC is just one - albeit a powerful one -
of many power centers that comprise the political landscape in
Iran. While many hardline political figures, including
President Ahmadinejad, have publicly questioned the sincerity of
the new administration's commitment to engaging diplomatically,
the IRGC appears to be trying to shape policy decisions in Iran
to prevent engagement, a path they likely view as detrimental to
their interests.




6. [C/NF] IRIB Anchor Dismisses Alleged Bias, Notes Economic
Issues Attract Most Attention: An IRIB news anchor during a
conversation with IRPO Officer dismissed reformers' complaints
of official media bias. He instead insisted that during past
elections, IRIB has been ordered to provide all candidates with
equal coverage and treat them fairly. Aside from knowing the
regime's red lines and abiding by them, he claimed no government
interference in his work. He said the Supreme Leader's direct
control over IRIB prevented interference from other government
entities. The anchor also hosts a listener call-in show and
said that his program elicits the most calls when it addresses
economic issues, which now constitute about 40 percent of the
show's broadcasts. Comment: The anchor's insistence of fair
media treatment and no official interference is at odds with
Iranian reformers' allegations of systematic bias against their
candidates and the comments of a former Press TV employee, who
alleged official monitoring (see reftel). Although the Supreme
Leader's control of IRIB may shield it from other government
entities, IRIB is still susceptible to influence from the
Supreme Leader's office.




7. [U] Window on Iran is a classified, weekly product providing
Washington policy community and Iran watcher highlights of key
developments on Iran. It is produced by the Iran Regional
Presence Office - Dubai. Please direct any questions/comments
to: Kay McGowan (mcgowanka2@state.sgov.gov
) or Charlie Pennypacker
(pennypacker@state.sgov.gov

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).
ASGARD