Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09RPODUBAI50
2009-02-02 14:47:00
SECRET
Iran RPO Dubai
Cable title:  

IRIG SEES U.S. EXCHANGES AS INTENT ON SOFT OVERTHROW

Tags:  PREL PGOV PHUM SCUL IR 
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VZCZCXRO0897
RR RUEHDIR
DE RUEHDIR #0050/01 0331447
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
R 021447Z FEB 09
FM RPO DUBAI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0329
INFO RUEHDIR/RPO DUBAI 0327
IRAN COLLECTIVE 0327
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 RPO DUBAI 000050 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 2/2/2019
TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM SCUL IR
SUBJECT: IRIG SEES U.S. EXCHANGES AS INTENT ON SOFT OVERTHROW

REF: 2008 IRPO 70

CLASSIFIED BY: Ramin Asgard, Director, Iran Regional Presence
Office, Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b),(d)

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 RPO DUBAI 000050

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 2/2/2019
TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM SCUL IR
SUBJECT: IRIG SEES U.S. EXCHANGES AS INTENT ON SOFT OVERTHROW

REF: 2008 IRPO 70

CLASSIFIED BY: Ramin Asgard, Director, Iran Regional Presence
Office, Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b),(d)


1. (C) Summary: Since September, every International Visitor
Leadership Program (IVLP) group from Iran has cancelled its
travel to the United States, often at the last minute. Our
access to participants is limited, but some have told us
explicitly that they have been refused permission to travel or
coerced into withdrawing from the program. The IRIG's suspicion
of these programs has been present from the start, but the
recent heightened measures to prohibit Iranians' participation
represents an active escalation in their position. Charges
leveled by the IRIG against exchange programs have lumped into a
broader `conspiracy' including NGOs, academia, minority rights
activists, and others, aimed at fomenting a `soft overthrow' of
the IRIG. Despite these setbacks, however, exchanges remain an
effective way to engage Iran and its people, and IRPO will work
closely with the Department to explore ways to continue these
vital programs. End Summary.

EXCHANGES STOPPED
--------------


2. (C) Since late 2006, more than 200 Iranian visitors have come
to the United States through a series of exchanges sponsored by
the USG. Topics for these exchanges have been purposefully
apolitical to avoid enflaming Iranian suspicions. With a few
exceptions (Reftel),participants in these programs have told us
that various ministries, such as the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, Ministry of Health, Ministry of Education, and even
elements in the Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS),
have supported exchanges as a way to engage the United States.
President Ahmadinejad and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs have
publicly stated their support for exchanges between America and
Iran. IVLP Alumni have also told us that these programs are
instrumental in increasing partnerships and understanding
between Iranians and Americans.


3. (C) Since September 2008, however, we have had to cancel
programs in maternal health, child development, breast cancer
awareness and historical research, all just days before the

group's departure, and in one case, with two participants
already in Dubai. Earlier this fall, participants were more
circumspect in discussing reasons for their sudden change of
mind. What we have ascertained is that participants often were
contacted by unidentified Iranian officials or Ministry of
Intelligence and Security (MOIS) officers and told not to
participate, sometimes with threats to their employment.


4. (C) In early January, participants in the historical research
program were informed that they required permission from a newly
formed MFA commission set up to vet exchanges with the United
States. The MFA denied their request, and we have not been able
to develop further information about the commission and the
scope of its authority. One participant who dealt with the MFA
told us, however, that the travel ban was subject to review in
two months. (NOTE: We learned Jan. 28 that an IVLP group on
substance abuse treatment, which assured us it had permission to
travel, cancelled its trip, citing the inability of one
participant to receive a visa before the group's scheduled
departure. We do not know if this was the only factor or if the
IRIG influenced its decision.)

CONSPIRACIES AND PLOTS
--------------


5. (C) This crackdown appears to be part of broader IRIG worries
of public discontent. Over the past several weeks, Iranian
officials have increased pressure on activists such as Shirin
Ebadi, closed reformist newspapers, and repeatedly sounded the
alarm of `velvet revolution.' Observers have suggested that this
crackdown may be an effort to exert control over civil society
so as not to appear weak in anticipation of negotiations with
the U.S., an effort to divert public attention from the
country's economic problems and other domestic failures, or a
real sense of vulnerability among ruling circles prior to
upcoming presidential elections.


6. (C) Whatever the reason, the IRIG has chosen to focus its
attention on what it believes are U.S. efforts intended to
remove the regime. The head of MOIS' counterintelligence
department said Jan. 19 that his agency had broken a spy ring
centered around U.S. cultural exchange programs and intent on a
`soft overthrow' of the IRIG. The Iranian official claimed that
the U.S. conspiracy involved the CIA, AIPAC, IREX, the Woodrow
Wilson Center and the Soros Open Society Foundation and targeted
Iranian professionals and elites. He implicated IRPO and other
Iran Watcher posts directly and named specific USG officials in
describing U.S. machinations. The counterintelligence official
named Arash Alaei, an alumni of an IVLP program, and his brother
Kamyar, both well-known HIVAIDs researchers, as two of four

DUBAI 00000050 002 OF 002


Iranians arrested for espionage. Arash and Kamyar were
sentenced to six and three years in prison, respectively for
their participation in this `plot.'


7. (C) Separately, one IRPO contact with access to Iranian
officials told us that Iranian security officials believed that
U.S. intelligence, working through an American representative of
the National Academy of Sciences, as well as other U.S.
institutions and NGOs, sought to organize espionage networks in
Iran. They believed that the Alaei brothers were part of this
network.


8. (C) IRIG efforts to halt exchanges appear to extend only to
groups with an official USG connection, although it seems to
have produced a chilling effect. Individual Iranian scholars
invited for fellowships at U.S. universities, Iranian sports
teams competing or training in the U.S. and U.S. groups
traveling to Iran generally have had little if any problem. The
recent visit of six U.S. university presidents to Iran received
extensive positive coverage in the Iranian press. Iranians
participating in non-USG exchanges in the U.S. have told us they
were nervous about possible attention from MOIS, however.

COMMENT
--------------


9. (C) The IRIG makes no distinction between our exchange
programs and what it believes is an on-going U.S. effort to
undermine it. The comments by the counterintelligence official
suggest that it will continue to see any effort to engage the
Iranian people without the involvement of the IRIG as
interference in its internal affairs; however, continued success
of sports diplomacy and the creation of the IRIG commission on
exchanges suggest that the IRIG has not completely closed the
door on exchange programs. What it does indicate is that the
IRIG has strong suspicions about them that will have to be taken
into account if IVLP exchanges and other efforts in cultural
diplomacy are to go forward. Despite these setbacks, however,
exchanges remain an effective way to engage Iran and its people,
and IRPO will work closely with the Department to explore ways
ASGARD