IRAN REGIONAL PRESENCE OFFICE - WINDOW ON IRAN - JANUARY 27,

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NOFORN
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 2/2/2019
TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR IR
SUBJECT: IRAN REGIONAL PRESENCE OFFICE - WINDOW ON IRAN - JANUARY 27,
2009

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CLASSIFIED BY: Ramin Asgard, Director, Iran Regional Presence
Office - Dubai, DOS.
REASON: 1.4 (b),(d)

1. [U] This January 27, 2009 edition of Window on Iran was sent
out on that date via classified e-mail.




2. [S/NF] More on Russia-Iran Security Ties: In a follow up
discussion with a former IRGC general regarding Russian security
cooperation with Iran, he explained that Russia saw Iran as a
"joint-venture" partner in extending its influence into the
Middle East. He noted that Iran's position was more advanced
than simply that of an arms purchaser, however, citing the
Russian acquiescence to an Iranian demand to provide a T-72 tank
factory in the late 90s (while he was still in the IRGC). For
their part, the Russians wished to tie Iranian military
procurement into Russian systems, making any move away difficult
and increasing Russian influence on Iran. IRPO officer asked
specifically whether the S-300 system deliveries had gone
forward. The general replied that by now they were likely to
have been delivered quietly, either through any number of ships
at a Caspian port or on a Russian heavy transport aircraft with
Ukrainian cooperation. Russian-Iran security cooperation, he
added, is not directly aimed at the US, but as Russia sees close
ties with Iran as a means to project influence and gain access
to warm water port facilities, they have strong incentives to
prevent the US from improving its ties with Iran and probably
displacing its influence. For these reasons, he concluded,
Russia continues to provide Iran a range of diplomatic and
security favors - the S-300 and the Bushehr reactor being the
most salient examples - to keep this important security
relationship intact.




3. [S/NF] Supreme Leader's South Africa Connection? According to
a scion of the Taleghani family (Ayatollah Mahmoud Taleghani was
a key figure in Islamic opposition to the Shah),Supreme Leader
Khamenei's sons Mojtaba and Mostafa have invested heavily
(estimated in tens of billions USD) over the past year in
various development projects in South Africa. This point shed
light on another well-placed IRPO contact's repeated references
a few weeks ago to former South African President Nelson
Mandela's possible role as a credible US-Iran intermediary.
Comment: While our primary source suggested investment was in
"heavy industry, " IRPO has no further information on the type
and amount of investment. As noted earlier in WOI (01/13/09),
Mojtaba Khamenei is a principal gatekeeper to the Supreme Leader
and was recently appointed as the Supreme Leaders Office point
person on US-Iran relations.




4. [S/NF] A Different Khatami?: Later in the same discussion, as
the topic turned to the upcoming presidential election,
Taleghani's grandson cautioned against mistaking today's Khatami
with the Khatami of 1992 (when he resigned as Minister of
Culture) or 1999 (first term as President starts) or 2005
(second term concludes). He recounted a recent meeting with
Khatami, where Khatami said that despite perceptions to the
contrary, he struggled strenuously to support civil society and
democratic freedoms inside Iran, but was unable to overcome the
resistance of the Supreme Leader. "Every time I left a meeting
with Khamenei, I was soaked in sweat, "Khatami reportedly said.
Now, this source continued, Khatami was a "determined democrat."
In fact, he added softly after scanning the vicinity to see who
might be listening, "he no longer supports the principle of
velayat-e faqih. "




5. [S/NF] Pourmohammadi Considering a Run - Rafsanjani's Chips
Across the Board: Former Interior Minister (2005-2008) Hojjat
ol-Islam Mustafa Pourmohammadi has reportedly begun exploring a
run for the presidency. Pourmohammadi currently heads the State
Inspectorate Office (SIO). According to an Iranian businessman
just returning from a visit to Iran, the "real power" behind
Pourmohammadi is IRGC Brigadier General Mohammad Zolghadr, who
is considered the "political brain of the IRGC." Zolghadr was
Pourmohammadi's deputy at the Ministry of Interior. If
Pourmohammadi runs, said this businessman, hardliners will
likely shift their support to Pourmohammadi because of their
hatred of AN. Our contact described Pourmohammadi as Hashemi
Rafsanjani's "servant." Meanwhile, AN fired Zolghadr after
Zolghadr told a convention of governors that the U.S. threat to
Iranian security should be taken seriously. AN objected
strongly and tried to cast the U.S. as too weakened to still

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pose a real danger to Iran. Pourmohammadi resigned after AN
fired Zolghadr because firing his deputy was taken as a direct
affront. Comment: Pourmohammadi and Zolghadr together represent
a blending of intelligence and IRGC forces; a very formidable
combination, not just electorally, but also in terms of their
ability to maintain stability. If Rafsanjani makes his support
available to Pourmohammadi, it will mean he has lent his
considerable influence to powerful challengers to AN from the
left (Mousavi),center (Khatami),and right (Pourmohammadi). It
also means that AN will almost certainly lose a core
constituency - the IRGC and Basij - to rivals far more
well-regarded by both the leadership and the rank and file of
these organizations.




6. [C] Rising Fears of Electoral Fraud in Advance of June 12
Presidential Election: An Iranian political analyst reported
that Tehran political elites are increasingly concerned about
the regime's ability to manipulate votes, given that both bodies
responsible for administering and supervising the electoral
process, the Interior Ministry and the Guardian Council, are
currently controlled by hardliners. He noted that presidential
elections in 2001 and 2005 were run by an Interior Ministry that
was in the hands of reformists; during this period, voter
manipulation was generally confined to the final stages of the
vetting process overseen by the Guardian Council. In the
upcoming election, however, both institutions will be dominated
by conservatives, leading to fears that not only will the
Guardian Council severely limit the candidates able to run for
president, but that the Ministry of Interior will permit (or
possibly engineer) large-scale fraud if deemed necessary.
Comment: These concerns about the potential for electoral fraud
track with the reformist idea to call for UN observers, as
discussed in last week's WOI (01/20/09).




7. [S/NF] Shirin Ebadi Departs Iran for Trip to the U.S.:
According to a founding member of the One Million Signatures
Campaign and close associate of Shirin Ebadi, the Nobel laureate
left Tehran January 25 for Paris, where she will spend three
days before continuing on to the United States. The source also
said that in "the next few days" a group of Ebadi's supporters
will publish a new website with more details of the January 1
mob attack on her office, including photos of the vandalized
wall that was spray painted with "Shirin Ebadi = America."
According to the activist, the intended message of the
IRIG-orchestrated harassment is clear: challenges to the order
are unacceptable and no one in Iran is untouchable.




8. [C] Getting Liquor Is Easier than Getting Credit: Iranian
contacts have told us consistently that liquor, banned movies,
and other contraband are easily obtainable in Iran. One
Iranian-American businessman who travels frequently to Iran told
us that he has never had trouble getting alcohol delivered to
his door with just a phone call, with deliveries usually made by
a family with young children to throw off suspicion. Iranians
are finding that international credit is not so accessible, he
told us. Our contact said that Iranian businessmen seeking
letters of credit to import British goods were unable to obtain
letters of credit from British banks because of sanctions. With
no where else to turn, they were reportedly paying a 30 percent
fee to brokers in Dubai to arrange credit for Western imports.
Comment: These increased costs were being passed on to consumers
to the extent possible, but the lack of accessible credit is
making it harder and harder for private businesses to stay
afloat, while those with governmental connections continue to
finance their operations with government loans.




9. [U] Window on Iran is a classified, weekly product providing
Washington policy community and Iran watcher highlights of key
developments on Iran. It is produced by the Iran Regional
Presence Office - Dubai. Please direct any questions/comments
to: Kay McGowan (mcgowanka2@state.sgov.gov
) or Charlie Pennypacker
(pennypacker@state.sgov.gov
).
ASGARD