IRAN'S DOMESTIC POLITICS PREVENTING IAEA ACCORD

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 RPO DUBAI 000472

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/3/2019
TAGS: IR PGOV PREL PARM
SUBJECT: IRAN'S DOMESTIC POLITICS PREVENTING IAEA ACCORD

REF: A) DUBAI RPO 466, B) DUBAI RPO 462, C) DUBAI RPO 459, D) DUBAI RPO 456

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CLASSIFIED BY: Alan Eyre, Director, IRPO, State.
REASON: 1.4 (b),(d)

1. (C) SUMMARY. After initial vague expressions of Iranian
support for the outcome of the October 19-21 Vienna nuclear fuel
negotiations, a rising tide of domestic opposition to the IAEA
deal from across the Iranian political spectrum has led official
Iran to distance itself from the draft agreement. As such,
after continued stumblings in its public comments concerning the
IAEA proposal to provide fuel to the Tehran Research Reactor, on
November 2 both IRIG IAEA Ambassador Soltanieh and FM Mottaki
announced that Iran wanted to discuss the proposal further. As
one prominent Iranian political analyst noted, the Ahmadinejad
administration has so politicized and ideologized the nuclear
issue that elite backing of any deal that involves any Iranian
compromise is problematic. Therefore, much of the current
Iranian criticism of the IAEA proposal can be seen simply as a
function of the desire of Ahmadinejad's political opponents to
cause him trouble. Additionally, the non-transparent manner in
which Iran has conducted its nuclear diplomacy has raised
concerns among Iranian political elites about 'trusting the
West' to deliver on its fuel commitments. Finally, Israeli and
Western public expressions of support for this proposal have
further strengthened Iranian policymakers' perception that the
IEAE proposal is primarily a 'trick' to deprive Iran of its own
enriched uranium. As such, given the very real and very broad
domestic political opposition to the IAEA deal as currently
outlined, it is unlikely Iran will sign on to the deal without
substantive, or at least face-saving, changes. END SUMMARY.




2. (U) According to official Iranian press, on November 2 both
IAEA Representative Soltanieh and FM Mottaki stressed the need
for another round of IAEA 'technical meetings' to address Iran's
concerns over the IAEA proposal to provide fuel for the Tehran
Research Reactor (TRR):



SOLTANIEH: Referring to his June 2 letter to ElBaradei
requesting TRR fuel, IRIG IAEA Representative Ali Asghar
Soltanieh said Iran was ready to participate at the earliest
possible opportunity in a technical and specialized meeting in
Vienna under IAEA auspices for considering Iran's technical
concerns about the draft IAEA proposal, especially concerning
fuel delivery guarantees. Emphasizing that based on Articles
One and Two of its charter the IAEA must act on Iran's
humanitarian and peaceful request, Soltanieh said Iran was
ready, under IAEA supervision to purchase fuel from any
supplier, as it did 20 years ago when it bought it from
Argentina. The key point is a guaranteed secure provision of
fuel, given Iran's lack of trust due to previously paying for
fuel it did not receive. Soltanieh said now is an important
time and an historical opportunity for the IAEA to act according
to its charter and for fuel producers to show their good
intentions and political will for technical cooperation for this
humanitarian project under IAEA supervision.



MOTTAKI: FM Mottaki told press that Iran has three options for
TRR fuel: 1) buying 20 percent enriched fuel; 2) enriching
Iran's own fuel to the 20 percent level for TRR use; 3)
providing some of Iran's own low enriched uranium to other
countries for enrichment to the 20 percent level. Iran has
technical and economic concerns about the IAEA proposal, which
it has mentioned to the IAEA and which it will address in a new
round of technical discussions.



IAEA PROPOSAL: DEADER THAN VAUDEVILLE?




3. (C) In Iran's highly factionalized and polarized political
atmosphere, it seems one topic has united politicians from all
points of the political spectrum: the current IAEA proposal for
providing the Tehran Research Reactor (TRR) with fuel is
unacceptable (reftel),due largely to its stipulation that Iran
send abroad 1200 kilograms of its own enriched uranium. Some of
the more recent comments include the following:



MOUSAVI ('Green Path' Opposition Leader): On October 28,
defeated Presidential candidate Mir Hosssein Mousavi
characterized Iran's nuclear discussion as 'surprising,' saying
that the arrangements arrived at would squander the achievements

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of 'thousands of Iran's scientists' if implemented and if not
implemented would lay the groundwork for more sanctions against
Iran. He also condemned the Ahmadinejad government for accusing
'dedicated children of the Revolution' of being disloyal and
pro-West while it itself is now `bowing down in front of
America' in these nuclear negotiations.



- JUDICIARY HEAD LARIJANI (Conservative): On November 1
Judiciary Head Hojjatoleslam Sadegh Larijani told press that
Iran should 'think hard' about sending its uranium abroad, since
doing so doesn't seem to be in Iran's benefit and since advanced
countries are obligated under the NPT to provide fuel to Iran.



- DEPUTY SPEAKER ABU TORABI (Pragmatic Conservative): On
November 2 Majlis First Deputy Speaker Hojjatoleslam Mohmmad
Hassan Abu Turabi Fard said that nuclear fuel-producing
countries were obligated to provide fuel to Iran, that
preconditions for providing this fuel were "unacceptable," and
that Iran "must not give any concessions" to any country in a
position to provide fuel to TRR.



COMBATANT CLERICS (Traditional Clerical Conservative): In an
October 27 statement, the influential conservative 'Combatant
Cleric Association'(aka 'Ruhaniyat') warned Iranian officials to
be careful of "current tricks for emptying our [fuel] reserves."



MAJLIS MINORITY FACTION (Reformist): On November 2 the spokesman
for the Majlis minority (i.e. Reformist) 'Imam's Line' faction
told press that Iran should not surrender to the wishes of the
West and the P5+1 by allowing fuel enrichment for the TRR to
happen outside of Iran in third countries like Russia and
France, and that it would be preferable for Iran to buy the TRR
fuel.




4. (U) After initial vague expressions of Iranian support at the
close of the October 19-21 Vienna negotiations, this rising tide
of domestic opposition to the IAEA deal from all parts of the
Iranian political spectrum has caused official Iran to distance
itself from the draft agreement. Prior to the November 2
statements by Mottaki and Soltanieh, on October 30, Iran's
official news service had quoted an 'informed official as saying
that Tehran in fact had not sent and would not send any "answer"
to the IAEA concerning the proposal. However, Tehran would
welcome the continuation of the Vienna negotiations were they to
take into consideration "Iran's technical and economic
interests." This 'informed official' made any expression of
Iranian opinion on the IAEA proposal conditional to the
negotiations continuing. This article also cited Iran's 'basic
red lines' as an equivalent and simultaneous exchange of its own
low enriched uranium for the 20 percent enriched uranium.



ZIBAKALAM: POLITICIZED PORTFOLIO DOOMS CONSENSUS




5. (U) According to one prominent Iranian political analyst, the
series of contradictory statements from Tehran reflect Iranian
officials' confusion as to how to deal with the West on the
nuclear issues. In an October 31 article titled, 'Confusion
over the Nuclear Negotiations Due to the Administration's
Ideological Outlook,' prominent political scientist Sadegh
Zibakalam (whose views are often associated with those of former
President Rafsanjani) said that the IAEA deal on the table is in
Iran's interest, since it allows Iran to achieve its main goal
of continued enrichment on Iranian soil. Concerns about
'guarantees' are bootless, since Iran's deal would be with the
IAEA, not Western countries. In the unlikely event that the
IAEA didn't fulfill its commitments, the IAEA could get away
with this 'theft' of Iranian uranium only once and afterwards
Iran could contend in international fora that it has gone the
distance in confidence-building measures.




6. (U) However, Zibakalam says that the Ahmadinejad
administration has so politicized the nuclear issue that

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domestic backing of any deal is unlikely - "when it was decided
there would be compromises between Iran and the IAEA and P5+1
countries, Ahmadinejad and his extremist 'Principlists' realized
that they had become prisoners of the propaganda that they have
unleashed against Reformists over the last four years."
Zibakalam contends that before Ahmadinejad, Iran pursued an
astute non-ideological 'muddling through' nuclear policy which
sought to keep the nuclear file at the IAEA and the
international community, UNSC and the EU not aligned together
against Iran. However, Ahmadinejad changed this policy, and
instead of forming a nuclear policy that advanced Iran's
national interests, he politicized the nuclear issue, using it
as a weapon against his domestic enemies both among the
reformists and also those aligned with former President
Rafsanjani. This policy change even led to Ahmadinejad's crowd
implying charges of treason to those preceding him in their
stewardship of the nuclear file, to include pro-Rafsanjani
figures such as former nuclear negotiator Hossein Mousavian and
former SNSC head Hassan Ruhani. However now that that
Ahmadinejad has decided for a variety of reasons to reduce
tensions with the West and to seek some type of nuclear
accommodation, he is a prisoner of his own extremist rhetoric,
which he finds played back at him by his political opponents.




7. (C) COMMENT: There is a Persian term called "a goldsmith's
war" ('jang-e zargari') , which connotes a false argument
between two parties in order to gull a third. Some have
speculated that the widespread Iranian political opposition to
the IAEA proposal is such a ruse, orchestrated by Iran in order
to strengthen its bargaining position. This is unlikely, and it
is far more probable that due to the intensely polarized
political atmosphere prevalent in Tehran engendered by President
Ahmadinejad, in conjunction with his having politicized and
ideologized the nuclear issue itself, any deal engineered by
Ahmadinejad's negotiating team that entails any perceived
Iranian compromise would be subject to partisan attack.
Therefore, much of the current criticism of the IAEA proposal
can be seen as a function of the desire of Ahmadinejad's
political opponents to cause him trouble. Additionally, the
non-transparent manner in which Iran has conducted its nuclear
diplomacy has raised concerns about 'trusting the West' to
deliver on its fuel commitments. Finally, Israeli and Western
public expressions of support for this proposal have further
strengthened Iranian policymakers' perception that the IAEA
proposal is primarily a 'trick' to deprive Iran of its own
enriched uranium. A case can be made, based on press analysis
and anecdotal information gleaned by IRPO, that while currently
adverse to a general US-Iran rapprochement, Supreme Leader
Khamenei is open to the idea of reaching an agreement with the
US on the nuclear issue. Certainly the prevalent Iranian
domestic political consensus is that President Ahmadinejad seeks
such a nuclear deal. But although it is possible that the
Supreme Leader could condone the agreement as it stands and end
the debate, given his own weakened political status that is
unlikely. Therefore, given the very real and very broad
domestic political opposition to the IAEA deal as currently
outlined, it is unlikely that Iran will sign on to it without
substantive, or at least face-saving, changes. END COMMENT.
EYRE