TEHRAN NUCLEAR FUEL DEAL DRAWING DOMESTIC POLITICAL FIRE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 RPO DUBAI 000459

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/26/2019
TAGS: PGOV PREL IR PARM
SUBJECT: TEHRAN NUCLEAR FUEL DEAL DRAWING DOMESTIC POLITICAL FIRE

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CLASSIFIED BY: Alan Eyre, Director, IRPO, State.
REASON: 1.4 (b),(d)

1. (C) SUMMARY: In an October 26 press conference Iranian
Foreign Minister Mottaki said Iran would "soon" be announcing
its decision on the IAEA proposal to exchange stockpiles of its
own enriched uranium in exchange for smaller amounts of more
highly enriched uranium to be used by the Tehran Research
Reactor (TRR). However, many Iranian political figures are
speaking out against the IAEA-sponsored draft proposal, with
most of the public criticism coming from mainstream
conservatives, to include Majlis Speaker Larijani, Deputy
Speaker Bahonar, and Expediency Council Secretary Rezai. Much
of the criticism centers both on Iran having to exchange large
amounts of its enriched uranium in exchange for the 20 percent
enriched fuel, and on the lack of guarantees. All Indications
are that Iran's leadership might be having second thoughts about
the IAEA deal, partially due to what it perceives as the deal's
enthusiastic reception in the West and in Israel, partially due
to genuine strategic concerns, and partially due to political
opposition to Ahmadinejad. Ultimately however the Supreme
Leader will make the call, and it is unclear to what extent his
deliberations will be influenced by this ongoing public debate
among the ruling conservative elites. END SUMMARY.




2. (U) In an October 26 press conference Iranian Foreign
Minister Mottaki said Iran would "soon" be announcing its
decision on the IAEA proposal for Iran to exchange stockpiles of
its own enriched uranium in exchange for smaller amounts of more
highly enriched uranium to be used by the Tehran Research
Reactor (TRR). According to Mottaki, Iran would either seek to
buy the fuel from abroad, as it has done previously, or it would
provide a smaller amount of its own uranium, which it doesn't
need currently, for enrichment outside the country, as outlined
in the IAEA proposal.




3. (U) Mottaki's statement comes against growing domestic
criticism of the IAEA proposal, largely from the ruling
'Principlist' (aka "Osulgarayan") conservative faction, with the
preponderance of criticism coming from what can be termed the
pragmatic wing of this faction, to include the following:



- BAHONAR: On October 22 Majlis First Deputy Speaker Mohammad
Reza Bahonar said the IEAE is obligated to provide fuel to the
TRR and that Iran having to provide its 3.5 percent enriched
uranium in order to receive 20 percent enriched fuel was
'unacceptable.'



- LARIJANI: On October 24 Majlis Speaker Ali Larijani said there
is no legal or logical justification for the West to insist on
taking Iran's enriched uranium in exchange for providing it
fuel, and that there are no guarantees that the West will live
up to whatever commitments it made.



- BORUJERDI: Majlis National Security and Foreign Policy
Commission Head Ala'eddin Borujerdi told press on October 24
that although Iranian officials have not yet made any decisions
and that the final decision lay with the Supreme Council for
National Security, he thought the best option was to purchase
TRR fuel from abroad, as it did from Argentina previously.



- REZAI: On October 25 Expediency Council Secretary Mohsen Rezai
said the TRR needs 30 kilograms of 20 percent enriched fuel so
that it can continue functioning for at least the next 20 years.
An amount of 280 - 350 kilograms of 3.5 percent enriched
uranium can provide the needed TRR fuel for the next 20 to 25
years, and therefore there is no need for Iran to send more than
350 kilograms of 3.5 percent enriched fuel to Russia.




4. (U) Additionally, former Atomic Energy Organization of
Iran(AEOI) President Reza Amrollahi, a centrist affiliated with
former President Rafsanjani, said in an October 24 ILNA
interview that he questioned whether it made sense for Iran "to
give up all its enriched uranium in exchange for receiving
[only] 30 kg of 20 percent enriched uranium after a two-year
wait." Amrollahi claimed that that only 300 kilograms of

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Iranian fuel would be needed to make this 30 kilograms of 20
percent enriched fuel, so "where is the rest [i.e. of the 1,000
kg of Iran's 3.5 percent enriched fuel to be exported] going,
and what guarantees do we have for getting this 20 percent
enriched fuel?" He added that given that the TRR's remaining
operational life was no more than 15 years, getting fuel for
this reactor wasn't worth all the risk.




5. (U) In addition to statements by prominent conservatives,
articles in various pragmatic conservative websites are also
calling the proposed nuclear deal into question:

- An October 23 Tabnak article, "Iran Rejecting A Nuclear Swap
and Keeping its Uranium," said that 'safekeeping Iran's produced
uranium within Iran is an important matter, of which Iranian
government officials must remain aware."



- An October 25 piece on the pragmatic conservative 'Ayandeh
News' website quoted a 'senior nuclear official' as saying that
"the goal of the P5+1.. is to steal the enriched uranium that is
the result of Iran's four years of enrichment.. our nuclear
diplomats must not be fooled by the manipulations of the other
side.. Unfortunately our national media and some prominent
individuals seem to believe that American and Europe have given
up on their original and basic goal, which is to deprive Iran of
access to nuclear technology.. the embrace of this plan by
Israel and by Iran's enemies shows that providing 80 percent of
Iran's enriched uranium is in a manner the destruction of Iran's
deterrence and winning card.. it is possible that after giving
up this concession, the other side will refrain from giving its
reciprocal concessions but will instead increase pressure for
more concessions from Iran."



- Another October 25 Ayandeh newspiece cites a statement by the
UK spokesman Martin Day in an interview with "al-Ahram
al-Arabiya" that "Iran is agreeing to the West's proposal due
to fear of new sanctions," while an October 24 Ayandehnews piece
quotes an Israeli Deputy Defense Minister as saying that "this
agreement shows to what extent Iran is susceptible to world
pressure."




6. (U) The closest to an "IRGC viewpoint" in the Iranian press
came in an October 26 article from the IRGC's weekly "Sobh-e
Sadegh" newspaper, "The Vienna Meetings and the Necessary
Caution," which said that the Vienna meetings were a success for
Iran in that they essentially "officially recognized" Iran's
right to enrich on its own soil, and also essentially removed
the Iran nuclear program from the UNSC agenda. However, US
enmity towards Iran is more fundamental than the current issues,
and Iran's success in Vienna should not blind it to the reasons
for US actions, which is to use a combination of "shrewd
diplomacy and shrewd sanctions" to control Iran and create
conditions whereby it can impose its will on Iran and change
Iranian behavior. In a related vein, an October 24 'Kayhan'
story quoted an 'informed official' as saying that "one thing is
clear and that is that Iran will never give up its strategic
reserve [of enriched uranium]."




7. (U) There have been no noticeable public utterances of
support for the deal by prominent officials. However, some
pro-Ahmadinejad news sites have sought to characterize the
Vienna meetings in a triumphal light, to include an October 25
IRNA story, "The Vienna Meetings: A Triumph for Iran Nuclear
Diplomacy and a Defeat for Israeli Meddling," and an October 26
story in the pro-Ahmadinejad "Rajanews," claiming that "senior
officials in the Zionist regime and in the US government are
strongly criticizing the Vienna discussions and their results" (
i.e. the implication being that Iran got the better of the
deal).




8. (C) A US-based Iranian political analyst who closely follows
the nuclear issue told IRPO that according to his diplomatic
sources inside Iran, "Supreme Leader Khamenei is having second
thoughts.. apparently people are a bit taken aback with the
enthusiastic support the deal is getting in the West and in

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Israel." This analyst also pointed out that "this [ie. the
nuclear negotiations] has not been handled well domestically,
and the charges of Iran selling out are coming from all
corners.. a lot of the questions are justified because people
don't know the details."




9. (C) COMMENT: Clearly the proposal put forward by IAEA
Director General El-Baradei at the conclusion of last week's
Vienna meetings is drawing serious criticism from many Iran's
conservative elite. Some of this criticism is born of Iranian
unfamiliarity with "win-win" type thinking and a belief that any
sign of weakness will invite further Western pressure, as well
as seeing Western public expressions of enthusiasm for this deal
as somehow indicative of Iran being 'fooled' in Vienna. Some
opposition is indeed borne of legitimate concern about the
parameters of the deal, especially given the Iranian
administration's lack of public transparency as to what has been
happening in Geneva and Vienna. Finally, a significant part of
this opposition is purely political in nature, as opponents to
President Ahmadinejad seek to cause political trouble for him by
calling into question a deal that his national security team was
involved in putting together. Ultimately however, the Supreme
Leader will make the call, and it is unclear to what extent his
deliberations will be influenced by this ongoing public debate
among conservative elites. END COMMENT.
EYRE