IRAN: AHMADINEJAD'S MAJLIS SUPPORT LIMITED

C O N F I D E N T I A L RPO DUBAI 000435

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/13/2019
TAGS: PGOV IR
SUBJECT: IRAN: AHMADINEJAD'S MAJLIS SUPPORT LIMITED

CLASSIFIED BY: Alan Eyre, Director, Iran Regional Presence
Office, DOS.
REASON: 1.4 (b),(d)

1. (C) SUMMARY: Two early October incidents illustrate both the
continuing gulf between the Majlis and President Ahmadinejad and
Ahmadinejad's failure to garner support among the Majlis'
Principlist faction, the conservatives who dominate the
legislature. On October 6 an Ahmadinejad ally failed in his bid
to displace Majlis Speaker Larijani as head of the Majlis'
Principlist faction, handily losing the vote among Majlis
conservatives. The remainder of the faction's leadership, all of
whom have been vocal critics of the President, was also
re-elected. Separately, at least 190 Majlis deputies, as well
as most of the Majlis leadership, did not show up for an October
8 consultation meeting with Ahmadinejad. The meeting had been
intended to increase coordination between the government and the
Majlis. Taken together, the events indicate that Ahmadinejad's
relationship with the Majlis and his support therein remains
weak. END SUMMARY.



Ahmadinejad's Majlis Support Limited




2. (C) Two early October incidents demonstrate the continuing
gulf between the Majlis and the Ahmadinejad government, and
Ahmadinejad's lack of support even among the Majlis'
conservative majority. On October 6 the Majlis' Principlist
faction held elections for its internal leadership, pitting
Ahmadinejad's allies in the Majlis against incumbent and Majlis
speaker Ali Larijani. In the lead-up to the vote Ahmadinejad's
allies made several complaints regarding Larijani's conservative
credentials. To cite but one example, Mashhad MP Javad Karimi
Qoddusi complained that Larijani had worked on behalf of Mir
Hossein Mousavi's presidential campaign and was an opponent of
Ahmadinejad. He said Larijani had disobeyed the Supreme
Leader's instructions by appointing committees to investigate
aspects of the post-election unrest. Another Ahmadinejad
supporter suggested the Principlist faction would change its
internal bylaws to prevent the same person from being both
Majlis speaker and leader of the faction. (COMMENT: The dispute
between Larijani and Ahmadinejad is longstanding and
Ahmadinejad's allies have repeatedly attempted to diminish
Larijani's influence and role in the Majlis, to no avail. END
COMMENT.)




3. (C) Larijani's primary challenger for the position was
Morteza Aqa-Tehrani, an MP from Tehran and one of Ahmadinejad's
loyal Majlis supporters. The vote among the factions' central
committee was not close. Larijani was re-elected with 24 votes;
Aqa-Tehrani received seven votes. Additionally, the faction's
deputy positions went to Mohammad Reza Bahonar and Hojjatoleslam
Mohammad Hassan Abutorabifard, both of whom are vociferous
Ahmadinejad critics. In a likely attempt to spin the
embarrassing defeat, an Ahmadinejad ally said afterwards that
the vote would not create a fissure within the Principlist
faction but warned 'if the activity of Principlist faction
continues as it had the past, remaining part of the faction
would not be useful.'




4. (C) Separately, reformist and opposition media reported that
on October 8 the majority of Majlis deputies did not attend a
consultation meeting with Ahmadinejad. Ahmadinejad had proposed
the meetings following his re-election as a means to improve
coordination with the Majlis. The meeting started an hour late
due to the absence of 190-220 of the 290 deputies. (NOTE:
Different publications reported different numbers of attendees.
END NOTE.) Majlis speaker Larijani, the vice speakers, and
other notable conservative members of parliament were also
absent.




5. (C) Comment: Ahmadinejad's relationships with the Majlis and
conservatives within the Majlis majority remain poor, as they
were for the duration of Ahmadinejad's first term. Although it
is unclear how the gulf between Ahmadinejad and the Majlis will
affect the president's legislative priorities, the tension at
least is indicative of the continuing animosity toward
Ahmadinejad among Iran's elite, to include much of his own
political 'Principlist' faction.

EYRE