IRAN: P5+1 TALKS A NATIONAL SUCCESS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 RPO DUBAI 000424

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/8/2019
TAGS: PREL PROP PARM PGOV IR
SUBJECT: IRAN: P5+1 TALKS A NATIONAL SUCCESS

REF: A. A) RPO DUBAI 398

B. B) RPO DUBAI 407

DUBAI 00000424 001.2 OF 002


CLASSIFIED BY: Alan Eyre, Director, Iran Regional Presence
Office, Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b),(d)

1. (C) Summary: Iranian officials continue to give positive
assessments of the outcome of the October 1 Geneva P5+1 meeting.
Statements by Iranian officials, as well as editorial
commentary by state and semi-official media, have focused on
these themes: The negotiations were conducted under Iran's
proposed framework, enriched fuel for Iran's research reactor
and access to the second enrichment facility near Qom are being
undertaken in conjunction with the IAEA, and any contact with
the United States was in the context of "clarifying" Iran's
proposal. The IRIG's self-congratulatory line is more likely
intended for domestic consumption rather than jibes at the US
and itsP5+1 partners, and in general, the IRIG's statements,
especially those on the U/S Burns-Jalili meeting, seem to be
purposefully low key and non-confrontational. End Summary.




2. (C) Iranian officials and state media editorials have been
consistent in their characterization of the P5+1 meeting in
Geneva, following talking points established prior to and
deployed immediately after the meeting (refs A and B). Review
of Iranian press indicated that the Iranians' key talking points
are that talks were conducted according to the IRIG's September
proposed framework and that Iran is continuing its cooperation
with the IAEA while denying linking this cooperation the Geneva
meeting.



Characterizing Geneva

--------------


3. (SBU) Following an October 7 cabinet meeting, President
Ahmadinejad reiterated that the Iranian framework was the basis
for the negotiations and said he was pleased with the
cooperation shown by both sides. Calling the Geneva meeting a
step forward, he said "We hope that with this same viewpoint and
same manner we move in a direction for positive joint
cooperation in the world for solving basic problems; this is our
viewpoint and we are moving in this direction."




4. (SBU) During an October 5 press conference, Foreign Ministry
Spokesman Hassan Qashqavi called the Geneva meeting a "national
success" for Iran and added that the talks were constructive and
forward-looking . As National Security Council Secretary Saeed
Jalili did in his October 2 post-negotiation press conference,
Qashaqavi said October 5 that Iran's nuclear rights had not been
discussed in Geneva but rather the talks had focused on Iran's
proposal given to the P5+1. On October 4, conservative website
'Rajanews,' affiliated with President Ahmadinejad, posted
extensive coverage of Jalili's post-negotiation press conference
and on Jalili's comments about Iran asserting its rights and
calling for global nuclear disarmament. On another point in
the conservative spectrum, the website 'Tabnak,' affiliated with
Expediency Council Secretary and former presidential candidate
Mohsen Rezaei, ran a flattering portrayal of Jalili as the
consummate diplomat upon Jalili's return from Geneva.



The Nuclear Issue

--------------




5. (SBU)Iranian officials have welcomed the possibility of
obtaining fuel for the Tehran research reactor and continue to
assert that they have gone above and beyond in fulfilling
notification requirements related to the second nuclear
enrichment facility near Qom. Ahmadinejad said October 7 that
the fuel proposal had been raised before the Geneva meeting and
welcomed the upcoming October 19 meeting in Vienna to discuss
what the Iranians continue to describe as a fuel purchase rather
than an agreement to have Iranian uranium enriched outside the
country.




6. (SBU) During IAEA Director Mohammad ElBaradei's October 4
trip to Tehran, Iran's Atomic Energy Organization Chief Ali
Akbar Salehi hailed Iran's cooperation with the IAEA , according
to 'ISNA.' Salehi again noted that Iran had notified the IAEA
of the second enrichment plant at Qom earlier than required in

DUBAI 00000424 002.2 OF 002


keeping with its interpretation of Code 3.1. He said Iran had
agreed to provide inspectors access to the facility, and that
Iran would attend the October 19 meeting with France, Russia and
the United States on the transfer of fuel for Iran's research
reactor. Although ElBaradei raised Iran's obligation to report
the Qom facility prior to construction, Salehi, and separately
Ahmadinejad, both said that Iran did not agree with that
interpretation and that it was no longer applicable after Iran
suspended its cooperation under the Additional Protocol, due to
the UNSCR passing its resolutions against Iran.



The Bilateral Meeting

--------------




7. (SBU) Iranian officials have been more circumspect over the
meeting between Jalili and U/S Burns. Alluding to the US,
Ahmadinejad said October 7 that the behavior of "some countries
was better than we had seen before, i.e. it seemed to us that
the logic of justice and respect to others is slowly taking hold
and expanding and serves as a good basis for interaction."
Although some Iranian officials have claimed no meeting took
place, Jalili's deputy Ali Bagheri confirmed the meeting during
an October 4 interview with 'ISNA' but attempted to minimize its
significance. He characterized the meeting as a further, short
discussion of Iran's negotiation framework. FM spokesman
Qashqavi said the same during his press briefing, adding it was
a lunch-time opportunity "to raise other vague issues."



The Editorials

--------------




8. (SBU) Hardline Kayhan, whose editorial stance is closely
associated with the Supreme Leader's office, in an editorial
this week portrayed the outcome as an Iranian diplomatic
victory that overcame a campaign of lies orchestrated by two or
three Western countries in the guise of diplomacy. Kayhan noted
that Iran had rebuffed all attempts to force suspension of its
enrichment program, and instead, turned the negotiation into
discussion of global disarmament. Likewise, semi-official Fars
News, seen as reflecting the views of Iran's intelligence and
security services, in an October 4 story contended that Western
media had disingenuously reported developments in Geneva to
appear that Iran had made concessions to the West, when in fact,
allowing inspections at Qom and securing fuel for the reactor in
Tehran were Iranian initiatives outside the framework of the
Geneva meeting.



Comment

--------------




9. (C) At its most basic, the Iranian message coming out of
Geneva is that Iran made no concessions to the West. To the
contrary, as the IRIG is spins it, Geneva demonstrated that
Iran's diplomacy has brought recognition of its growing
importance on the international stage. Much of that is
obviously aimed at a domestic audience in line with IRIG
long-standing claims that Iran is a power ascendant and with
Ahmadinejad's desire to restore some of his lost popularity by
declaring a foreign policy success. At the same time, the
reluctance to acknowledge the agreements on the nuclear issue
and the bilateral meeting with the US, especially the vehement
editorial in Kayhan, indicates that the IRIG may be worried that
appearing weak in the face of the international community may
embolden critics at home.
EYRE