Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09RPODUBAI362
2009-08-31 14:11:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Iran RPO Dubai
Cable title:  

IRAN'S JUDICIARY CHANGES - LESS THAN MEETS THE EYE

Tags:  PGOV PHUM PREL IR 
pdf how-to read a cable
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RHMFISS/USCENTCOM CCJ5 - PERSONAL FOR MACDILL AFB FL
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RUEHAD/AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI IMMEDIATE 0398
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 RPO DUBAI 000362 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 8/31/2019
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREL IR
SUBJECT: IRAN'S JUDICIARY CHANGES - LESS THAN MEETS THE EYE

DUBAI 00000362 001.2 OF 002


CLASSIFIED BY: Alan Eyre, Director, Iran Regional Presence
Office, DOS.
REASON: 1.4 (b),(d)
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 RPO DUBAI 000362

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 8/31/2019
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREL IR
SUBJECT: IRAN'S JUDICIARY CHANGES - LESS THAN MEETS THE EYE

DUBAI 00000362 001.2 OF 002


CLASSIFIED BY: Alan Eyre, Director, Iran Regional Presence
Office, DOS.
REASON: 1.4 (b),(d)

1. (C) Summary: Since taking over the Judiciary in mid-July,
Hojjatoleslam Sadeq Larijani has taken steps seemingly designed
to assuage ongoing public anger over the government's brutal
treatment of detainees and opportunistic persecution of the
hardliners' political foes. Foremost among these steps are
creating a commission to investigate the government's response
to post-election unrest, and high-profile personnel changes to
include removing the powerful Tehran chief prosecutor, Saeed
Mortazavi, and appointing former Intelligence Minister Mohsen
Ejaei as his deputy. These steps have been touted by some
oppositionists as a 'retreat' by Supreme Leader Khamenei, to
whom Larijani answers, and interpreted in the western press as
calculated moves to balance Ahmadinejad and the hardliners.
However, a closer look reveals the changes are likely more
tactical and superficial than strategic and substantive: the
Tehran prosecutor was actually promoted to a higher position
after being removed; and the commission established to
investigate the government's response to the unrest is composed
of men with long professional histories of egregious human
rights abuses. End Summary.




2. (C) Much attention has been given to Sadeq Larijani's August
29 dismissal of Tehran Public and Revolutionary Prosecutor Saeed
Mortazavi, one of the most infamous conservative hardliners
responsible for crushing reformist opposition in the last
decade, whose name is on many of the bills of indictment in the
latest show trials. However he was hardly thrown under the bus,
as one day after he was removed from his position Larijani
appointed him as Deputy National Prosecutor General, a position
that putatively outranks his former one. Mortazavi, who gained
notoriety for his alleged personal involvement in detainee
abuses over his six-year tenure, is considered very close to
Khamenei but has also been a staunch ally of Ahmadinejad, and
has aggressively wielded his authority to silence reformist
papers and prosecute government critics.




3. (SBU) Also on August 29, Larijani issued a decree
establishing a three-man commission to conduct a "fair, firm and
swift" examination of the government's post-election conduct in
order to identify and, if necessary, punish official misconduct.
The three-person panel, including Prosecutor General
Hojjatoleslam Mohsen Ejaei and Judiciary deputy chief
Hojjatoleslam Ebrahim Raisi, is to report directly to Larijani.
The commission will begin its work by looking into the
allegation of detainee abuse outlined in a report submitted to
the government by Mehdi Karroui earlier this month.




4. (C) COMMENT: Larijani's appointment of Mortazavi belies the
supposition that he is in any way 'housecleaning' the Judiciary
of extremist hardliners, and more likely indicates a tactical
re-arrangement of personnel to placate both aggrieved
conservative elites and also popular sentiment. Similarly, his
creating a commission to look into the government's handling of
cases related to the unrest and to "continuously supervise" the
prosecutors and trials is likely more of a public diplomacy
strategy than a sincere effort to hold officials accountable for
abuses. The panel's membership, which includes Ebrahim Raisi,
who co-chaired the Tehran "Death Commission" during the 1988
massacre of political prisoners, suggests the hardliners have
little to fear from the group's mandate, and it is unlikely that
this group's findings will do more than finger a few scapegoats.




5. (C) COMMENT (CONT): Just as it is too early to discern
Larijani's goals or relative influence within the system,
attempts to infer meaningful change to the government's current
trajectory based on his actions are similarly premature. One
IRPO contact, a Dubai-based Iranian analyst, noted that as with
most government positions in Iran, the power within the
Judiciary is vested in the person and his place within the vast
interlocking network of competing and cooperating patronage
systems rather than the job title itself. Outgoing judicial
chief Ayatollah Shahroudi was seen as more independent and less
subservient to Khamenei than his predecessor, and it is widely
thought that Khamenei installed Mortazavi as Tehran Public and
Revolutionary Prosecutor to more fully implement his will within
the Judiciary. As such, during Shahroudi's tenure Mortazavi ran
a virtually independent fiefdom within the Judiciary. It could
well be that given Larijani's greater presumed subservience to
Khamenei, plus Mortazavi's increasingly toxic reputation, it was

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time to find him another, lower-profile position in the
Judiciary. END COMMENT.
MCGOWAN