Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09RPODUBAI348
2009-08-24 14:58:00
CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN
Iran RPO Dubai
Cable title:  

IRAN: IN CABINET AHMADINEJAD CHOOSES LOYALTY AND IDEOLOGY

Tags:  PREL PGOV IR 
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 RPO DUBAI 000348 

NOFORN
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 8/24/2019
TAGS: PREL PGOV IR
SUBJECT: IRAN: IN CABINET AHMADINEJAD CHOOSES LOYALTY AND IDEOLOGY
OVER EXPERIENCE

DUBAI 00000348 001.2 OF 002


CLASSIFIED BY: Alan Eyre, Director, Iran Regional Presence
Office, DOS.
REASON: 1.4 (b),(d)
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 RPO DUBAI 000348

NOFORN
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 8/24/2019
TAGS: PREL PGOV IR
SUBJECT: IRAN: IN CABINET AHMADINEJAD CHOOSES LOYALTY AND IDEOLOGY
OVER EXPERIENCE

DUBAI 00000348 001.2 OF 002


CLASSIFIED BY: Alan Eyre, Director, Iran Regional Presence
Office, DOS.
REASON: 1.4 (b),(d)

1. (C) SUMMARY: President Ahmadinejad's nominees for his
second-term cabinet showcase his preference for loyalty over
expertise, as most clearly have longstanding ties to the
President. Although most of the 21 these nominees generally
lack significant experience for their respective ministries,
Ahmadinejad seems to have positioned several nominees for their
current promotion by installing them as deputy ministers over
the past few years in their designated fields. Also noteworthy
are the IRGC ties of nominees for the key Defense, Intelligence,
and Interior Ministries. These 'power ministry' nominations
probably reflect the increasing role of the IRGC in internal
security, however, media depictions of a cabinet slate
'dominated' by the IRGC overstates the case, as most of the 21
nominees do not have such ties. The Majlis is now reviewing the
nominees and has complained many nominees lack experience and
more generally that Ahmadinejad failed to consult with the
Majlis prior to announcing his nominations. A few nominees
probably will not be approved, although the Majlis could well
feel pressure from Supreme Leader Khamenei to avoid embarrassing
Ahmadinejad (and weakening the executive branch) at a time when
Iran feels under severe international scrutiny. Votes on the
nominees are scheduled to begin next week. END SUMMARY.



Cabinet Nominees Loyal to Ahmadinejad




2. (C) In two live television interviews Ahmadinejad introduced
his cabinet selections and the criteria for their selection. In
addition to promoting their putative professional
qualifications, Ahmadinejad made clear that their support for
his agenda was a key component for the nominees' selection.
Toward this end, many Iran observers have noted that all former
cabinet members who objected to his thwarted promotion of ally
Rahim Esfandiar Mashaie to First Vice President were not
retained. In their place, Ahmadinejad has nominated mostly
individuals to which he has longstanding ties. Some have ties to
Ahmadinejad from his time as Tehran Mayor, were appointed by

Ahmadinejad as Governor Generals or deputy ministers, have
vocally supported the President over the past few years, and/or
have assisted in his election campaigns.




3. (C) Although some nominees do have an IRGC background, they
do not dominate the proposed slate. Defense Ministry nominee
Brigadier General Ahmad Vahidi has served in a variety of IRGC
roles, most notably in the Qods Force, and Intelligence Minister
nominee Heydar Moslehi and Interior Ministry nominee Mostafa
Mohammad Najjar share an IRGC pedigree. These are critical
ministries and the nominations probably do reflect the
increasing role of the IRGC in internal security. However, most
of the other nominees have not had prominent positions with the
IRGC or Basij. As such, media analysis characterizing the
proposed cabinet as indicative of an 'IRGC takeover' probably
overstates the case - rather, the nominees' ideologically
affinity with and loyalty to Ahmadinejad and not their ties the
IRGC or Basij appear to be a more important factor in their
selections. In contrast to an increase in IRGC affiliation,
Ahmadinejad nominated the minimum number of clerics possible:
one (NOTE: Iran's law requires that the Intelligence Minister be
a cleric. This low number of clerics could well reflect
Ahmadinejad's disregard for the clerical class as a whole.)




4. (C) Knowledgeable observers inside and outside Iran have
also faulted Ahmadinejad for his nominees' dearth of relevant
experience. In particular, the nominee for the Oil Ministry
Seyyed Masud Mirkazemi has been singled out. Mirkazemi is the
current Commerce Minister, has strong ties to the IRGC and
involvement in defense and logistics planning, but has no
apparent background in the oil industry. Other nominees seem
similarly ill-suited to their positions, though Ahmadinejad
perhaps has tried to undercut such arguments by naming several
deputy ministers to head the organization they now serve. The
proposed Ministers of Agriculture, Commerce, Education, and
Communications and Information Technology fall into this
category but have only limited experience. Although five of the
nominees are incumbents, only one, Foreign Affairs Minister
Mottaki was an original member of Ahmadinejad's 2005 cabinet.
The others were installed between 2006 and 2008, often with
minimal prior experience.

DUBAI 00000348 002.2 OF 002





Reactions to the Nominees




5. (C) Ahead of Ahmadinejad's announcement of the nominees,
Majlis members complained about the President's lack of
coordination, and seemed eager to voice their frustration by
immediately criticizing several of the picks. A Majlis Deputy
Speaker even predicted that "at least four or five" of the
nominees would not be approved. The prediction makes sense
given that in 2005 four of Ahmadinejad's picks were rejected by
the Majlis and a few of his ministers were subsequently
impeached during their tenures (Comment: Prior to Ahmadinejad it
was it was rare for cabinet nominees to fail to win Majlis
approval at the start of a Presidential term). At the same time,
an IRPO contact with former Majlis experience cautioned against
taking the current Majlis grumblings over the nominees too
seriously, suggesting that the Majlis decisions on the nominees
are typically made at the last minute as a result of
behind-the-scenes horsetrading. Also, several previous
Ahmadinejad nominees initially criticized for lack of executive
or managerial experience have ultimately prevailed, eventually
earning the Majlis' vote of confidence.




6. (C) Other Majlis members, taking their cue from some senior
clerics, have questioned Ahmadinejad's nomination of three women
as ministers of Education, Health, and Welfare. A member of the
Majlis clerical faction said that two Grand Ayatollahs had
concerns regarding the suitability of females to serve as
ministers. Additionally, some Friday Prayer leaders last week
attacked Ahmadinejad for his selection of the women. The
relevant experience of the women has also been questioned, and
as such, Majlis votes against the three may reflect concerns
about their lack of experience as much as concerns about their
gender.




7. (C) The international reaction to Brigadier General Vahidi's
nomination to the Defense Ministry-due to the Interpol arrest
warrant for his role in the bombings in Argentina in 1994-will
probably have little consequence. A Majlis deputy remarked that
the international outcry only made Vahidi's confirmation all the
more likely. It is quite possible that the nominee for the
Ministry of Science, Research, and Technology could also have
trouble traveling abroad. In a March 2008 interview, nominee
Kamran Daneshju said he had been barred from entering the
European Union due to his deportation from the UK while a
student during the Salman Rushdie affair.




8. (C) COMMENT: Although several of the nominees will be
thoroughly roughed up in the process and a few even possibly
rejected, the Majlis will also feel pressure from certain
quarters to approve the nominees and, in the case of the key
ministries, the nominees are probably pre-approved by Khamenei.
An August 23 lead editorial in the IRGC official "Sobhe Sadegh"
weekly newspaper, for instance, suggested that the Majlis err on
the side of goodwill when deliberating on the nominees in order
to avoid 'playing into the enemy's hands.' Quite likely Supreme
Leader Khamenei, in the wake of the popular unrest and
dissension among the elite, prefers that these hearings not
become a platform to vent Majlis frustration with Ahmadinejad.
END COMMENT.
EYRE