Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09RPODUBAI331
2009-08-12 12:18:00
SECRET
Iran RPO Dubai
Cable title:
IRAN REGIONAL PRESENCE OFFICE DUBAI: WINDOWN ON IRAN-AUGUST
VZCZCXRO0551 RR RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHKUK RUEHTRO DE RUEHDIR #0331/01 2241218 ZNY SSSSS ZZH R 121218Z AUG 09 FM RPO DUBAI TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0489 INFO RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC RUEIDN/DNI WASHINGTON DC RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC RUMICEA/USCENTCOM INTEL CEN MACDILL AFB FL RUEHDIR/RPO DUBAI 0490
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 RPO DUBAI 000331
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 8/12/2019
TAGS: PGOV PREL ECON EAGR SOCI TSPL IR
SUBJECT: IRAN REGIONAL PRESENCE OFFICE DUBAI: WINDOWN ON IRAN-AUGUST
12, 2009
DUBAI 00000331 001.2 OF 002
CLASSIFIED BY: Timothy Richardson, Acting Director, Iran
Regional Presence Office, Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b),(d)
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 RPO DUBAI 000331
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 8/12/2019
TAGS: PGOV PREL ECON EAGR SOCI TSPL IR
SUBJECT: IRAN REGIONAL PRESENCE OFFICE DUBAI: WINDOWN ON IRAN-AUGUST
12, 2009
DUBAI 00000331 001.2 OF 002
CLASSIFIED BY: Timothy Richardson, Acting Director, Iran
Regional Presence Office, Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b),(d)
1. (S) Shahroudi's Term Approaches its End: An IRPO contact with
indirect access to senior Iranian officials told us that
Judiciary Chief Ayatollah Mahmoud Hashemi Shahroudi was leaving
his office frustrated that he had been unable to make
significant changes to strengthen Iran's justice system.
Shahroudi will step down August 15 after 10 years in the post.
Although Shahroudi is no reformer, he has maintained the
independence of the judiciary, especially when the Ahmadinejad
administration overstepped its bounds, and more recently in
ordering release of many of those arrested in post-election
protests. Our contact told us that during a vigorous debate
with one of Shahroudi's relatives over election fraud,
Shahroudi's relative maintained that the election had been fair
and in support of his argument disclosed that Shahroudi had even
voted for Mousavi because of Ahmadinejad's reckless regard for
the law. Comment: Shahroudi has given no public indication that
he has supported the opposition, but this anecdote does raise
the possibility that Mousavi's unsuccessful efforts to find some
judicial remedy to the election results indicated that the
opposition saw Shahroudi as at least impartial, and perhaps even
sympathetic to its claims.
2. (C) Contacts Paint Wide-ranging Election Day Picture: Eight
weeks after the election, IRPO contacts from Dubai and Iran
unanimously maintain that Ahmadinejad benefitted from a rigged
election, but we are no surer now of the scale of the fraud or
its mechanism than we were on June 13. We have not heard a
consistent narrative about the election, nor any corroborating
evidence that would conclusively support one version over
another. Some recount how many first-time voters turned out to
oppose Ahmadinejad and claim Mousavi won nearly 60 percent of
the vote while others, even participants in the post-election
protests, believe Ahmadinejad actually won the election but by a
much smaller margin than the official tally. We have heard both
that the IRIG made up the ballot numbers on the spot after
realizing Mousavi was winning and also that the fraud was an
elaborate scheme initiated weeks in advance, with fake ballots
filled out ahead of time, hidden in Pakistan to prevent their
discovery, and flown back to Iran the night of the election to
replace the real ballots. Given that our contacts generally
reflect a narrow segment of the population, the rumors
circulating among the broader population probably are even more
fabulous and contradictory. IRPO considers the wide-ranging
theories notable for two reasons. First, the various versions
of the truth underscore the difficulty in ascertaining what
actually happened during election day in large part because of
the absence of independent Iranian media and restrictions
immediately placed on the hundreds of foreign reporters
accredited to cover the elections. And as long as this
government is in power, it is unlikely we will ever get a
complete account of what happened. Second, the failure of a
consistent, compelling narrative to develop among those opposed
to Ahmadinejad's re-election perhaps reflects the nature of the
opposition itself. The multitude of theories suggest the
opposition movement is loosely organized and informed more by
rumors spread by word of mouth and Twitter feeds. Without a
strong leadership that can make its case based on facts and
focus its message to refute the government's elaborate
conspiracies of Western interference, the opposition will
continue to struggle in maximizing domestic and international
support for its efforts.
3. (C) Election Changes View of Iranian Nuclear Program: A young
Iranian woman from Shiraz in Dubai seeking refugee status in the
West (see RPODubai 327 for a description of her situation)
commented that like all Iranians, she supports her country's
right to nuclear power. However, she attached a notable caveat:
she no longer trusts Iran's leadership to wield nuclear power
responsibly and currently does not support the program. She
said that although her sentiments are unique, when she explains
her argument to other Iranians, they now agree with her.
Comment: Clearly, a woman seeking refugee status is biased
against her government; her views should not be considered
representative of the Iranian population writ large, as she said
herself. However, the fraudulent presidential election and the
IRIG's violent repression of the post-election protests have
diminished the government's legitimacy among significant chunks
of the Iranian people, perhaps leaving many willing to
reconsider their support for Iran's nuclear program.
4. (C) Professor Says Effects of Drought Still Lingering~: An
DUBAI 00000331 002.2 OF 002
assistant professor of climatology at Imam Khomeini University
said that Iran's aquifers and rivers are still below what they
should be after years of drought. As a result, agriculture is
still suffering. His account is consistent with recent press
reports regarding Iran's reduced water tables and rising beef
prices due to the drought's effects on cattle herd sizes.
Comment: The professor is traveling to the US to research the
effects of climate change on Iran's climate and the likelihood
of more frequent droughts. His trip, along with a recent
exchange program on soil and water conservation for Iranian
agriculture experts, suggest that irrigation and water
management can be area of collaboration between American and
Iranian scientists or the USG and IRIG directly as a means to
build trust in non-political areas.
5. (C)~and Describes Importance of Western Research to
Promotion: He said that in order to become a full professor, it
was necessary to spend a year doing research in a prominent
Western university. He rattled off several US universities that
he deemed worthy and noted that some universities in the UK and
Australia are also sufficient. He said this list and the
necessity of such time abroad was more an unwritten rule rather
than official policy. Imam Khomeini University, which is
providing financial support while he is in the US, offers such
research sabbaticals to faculty members as a reward for
research. The assistant professor described a point system
based largely on written research by which faculty can earn the
opportunity to do research abroad. In contrast to some reports
that Iranian academics need separate government authorization to
do research abroad, the professor said that only approval from
one's university is necessary. Comment: The system for
research abroad creates incentives for Iranian professors to do
ever more research and seems to be one area where Western
influence and cooperation is welcome, at least as long as it
fits the government's objectives in pushing Iran's level of
science and technological development forward.
RICHARDSON
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 8/12/2019
TAGS: PGOV PREL ECON EAGR SOCI TSPL IR
SUBJECT: IRAN REGIONAL PRESENCE OFFICE DUBAI: WINDOWN ON IRAN-AUGUST
12, 2009
DUBAI 00000331 001.2 OF 002
CLASSIFIED BY: Timothy Richardson, Acting Director, Iran
Regional Presence Office, Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b),(d)
1. (S) Shahroudi's Term Approaches its End: An IRPO contact with
indirect access to senior Iranian officials told us that
Judiciary Chief Ayatollah Mahmoud Hashemi Shahroudi was leaving
his office frustrated that he had been unable to make
significant changes to strengthen Iran's justice system.
Shahroudi will step down August 15 after 10 years in the post.
Although Shahroudi is no reformer, he has maintained the
independence of the judiciary, especially when the Ahmadinejad
administration overstepped its bounds, and more recently in
ordering release of many of those arrested in post-election
protests. Our contact told us that during a vigorous debate
with one of Shahroudi's relatives over election fraud,
Shahroudi's relative maintained that the election had been fair
and in support of his argument disclosed that Shahroudi had even
voted for Mousavi because of Ahmadinejad's reckless regard for
the law. Comment: Shahroudi has given no public indication that
he has supported the opposition, but this anecdote does raise
the possibility that Mousavi's unsuccessful efforts to find some
judicial remedy to the election results indicated that the
opposition saw Shahroudi as at least impartial, and perhaps even
sympathetic to its claims.
2. (C) Contacts Paint Wide-ranging Election Day Picture: Eight
weeks after the election, IRPO contacts from Dubai and Iran
unanimously maintain that Ahmadinejad benefitted from a rigged
election, but we are no surer now of the scale of the fraud or
its mechanism than we were on June 13. We have not heard a
consistent narrative about the election, nor any corroborating
evidence that would conclusively support one version over
another. Some recount how many first-time voters turned out to
oppose Ahmadinejad and claim Mousavi won nearly 60 percent of
the vote while others, even participants in the post-election
protests, believe Ahmadinejad actually won the election but by a
much smaller margin than the official tally. We have heard both
that the IRIG made up the ballot numbers on the spot after
realizing Mousavi was winning and also that the fraud was an
elaborate scheme initiated weeks in advance, with fake ballots
filled out ahead of time, hidden in Pakistan to prevent their
discovery, and flown back to Iran the night of the election to
replace the real ballots. Given that our contacts generally
reflect a narrow segment of the population, the rumors
circulating among the broader population probably are even more
fabulous and contradictory. IRPO considers the wide-ranging
theories notable for two reasons. First, the various versions
of the truth underscore the difficulty in ascertaining what
actually happened during election day in large part because of
the absence of independent Iranian media and restrictions
immediately placed on the hundreds of foreign reporters
accredited to cover the elections. And as long as this
government is in power, it is unlikely we will ever get a
complete account of what happened. Second, the failure of a
consistent, compelling narrative to develop among those opposed
to Ahmadinejad's re-election perhaps reflects the nature of the
opposition itself. The multitude of theories suggest the
opposition movement is loosely organized and informed more by
rumors spread by word of mouth and Twitter feeds. Without a
strong leadership that can make its case based on facts and
focus its message to refute the government's elaborate
conspiracies of Western interference, the opposition will
continue to struggle in maximizing domestic and international
support for its efforts.
3. (C) Election Changes View of Iranian Nuclear Program: A young
Iranian woman from Shiraz in Dubai seeking refugee status in the
West (see RPODubai 327 for a description of her situation)
commented that like all Iranians, she supports her country's
right to nuclear power. However, she attached a notable caveat:
she no longer trusts Iran's leadership to wield nuclear power
responsibly and currently does not support the program. She
said that although her sentiments are unique, when she explains
her argument to other Iranians, they now agree with her.
Comment: Clearly, a woman seeking refugee status is biased
against her government; her views should not be considered
representative of the Iranian population writ large, as she said
herself. However, the fraudulent presidential election and the
IRIG's violent repression of the post-election protests have
diminished the government's legitimacy among significant chunks
of the Iranian people, perhaps leaving many willing to
reconsider their support for Iran's nuclear program.
4. (C) Professor Says Effects of Drought Still Lingering~: An
DUBAI 00000331 002.2 OF 002
assistant professor of climatology at Imam Khomeini University
said that Iran's aquifers and rivers are still below what they
should be after years of drought. As a result, agriculture is
still suffering. His account is consistent with recent press
reports regarding Iran's reduced water tables and rising beef
prices due to the drought's effects on cattle herd sizes.
Comment: The professor is traveling to the US to research the
effects of climate change on Iran's climate and the likelihood
of more frequent droughts. His trip, along with a recent
exchange program on soil and water conservation for Iranian
agriculture experts, suggest that irrigation and water
management can be area of collaboration between American and
Iranian scientists or the USG and IRIG directly as a means to
build trust in non-political areas.
5. (C)~and Describes Importance of Western Research to
Promotion: He said that in order to become a full professor, it
was necessary to spend a year doing research in a prominent
Western university. He rattled off several US universities that
he deemed worthy and noted that some universities in the UK and
Australia are also sufficient. He said this list and the
necessity of such time abroad was more an unwritten rule rather
than official policy. Imam Khomeini University, which is
providing financial support while he is in the US, offers such
research sabbaticals to faculty members as a reward for
research. The assistant professor described a point system
based largely on written research by which faculty can earn the
opportunity to do research abroad. In contrast to some reports
that Iranian academics need separate government authorization to
do research abroad, the professor said that only approval from
one's university is necessary. Comment: The system for
research abroad creates incentives for Iranian professors to do
ever more research and seems to be one area where Western
influence and cooperation is welcome, at least as long as it
fits the government's objectives in pushing Iran's level of
science and technological development forward.
RICHARDSON