IRAN: SUPREME LEADER-AHMADINEJAD TUSSLE OVER NOMINEE BRINGS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 RPO DUBAI 000301

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 7/27/2019
TAGS: PGOV PHUM IR
SUBJECT: IRAN: SUPREME LEADER-AHMADINEJAD TUSSLE OVER NOMINEE BRINGS
CONSERVATIVE DISARRAY INTO THE OPEN

DUBAI 00000301 001.2 OF 003


CLASSIFIED BY: Timothy Richardson, Acting Director, Iran
Regional Presence Office, Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b),(d)

1. (C) Summary: Supreme Leader Khamenei's intervention in a
dispute among conservatives over President Ahmadinejad's pick
for first vice president has further strained his status as the
unchallenged arbiter of Iranian politics. Though Ahmadinejad
did ultimately bow to the Supreme Leader's directive to remove
Mashaei as vice president, Khamenei's victory was proved
glaringly hollow by Ahmadinejad's decision to circumvent his
critics by declaring Mashaei to be his chief of staff.




2. (C) Summary cont.: In the midst of the Mashaei drama, which
has thrown Ahmadinejad's cabinet into disarray, the government
was also compelled for the first time since the election to
publicly acknowledge the death of a demonstrator while in
custody. The brutal beating death of the son of an
establishment figure has led many once-quiescent conservatives
to publicly question the government's handling of the unrest and
call for an investigation into the detainees' treatment --
stances that echo the demands of Mousavi, Karrubi and
Rafsanjani. Perhaps in response to these challenges, the
Supreme Leader's backers have resorted to issuing a flurry of
statements of support that seem to highlight, rather than
minimize, division among the establishment. Amid declarations
that "202 Majles members" and "the majority of the Assembly of
Experts" support the views of the Supreme Leader, the
Revolutionary Guards stand out as a glaring exception to this
sense that cohesion among the conservative establishment is
fraying. In our view, events of the past week suggest that the
Supreme Leader's political maneuverability is diminished, and he
is ever more reliant on the IRGC. End summary.



Mashaei's "Resignation" Exposes Disarray Among Conservatives




3. (C) On July 25, Esfandiar Rahim Mashaei announced that he "no
longer considered himself to be first vice president," as
Ahmadinejad grudgingly bowed to the Supreme Leader after digging
in his heels and enduring nine days of withering criticism from
conservative politicians and senior clerics who had immediately
-- and very publicly -- objected to Ahmadinejad's elevation of
his friend (and relative by marriage) to first vice president.
Though conservatives ostensibly object to Mashaei for a 2008
comment viewed as "soft" on Israel and for his attendance at an
"un-Islamic" cultural event in Turkey, an editorial in a
newspaper affiliated with the radical hardliner Ayatollah Mesbah
Yazdi criticized him for overstepping the boundaries of a layman
by speculating publicly on theological issues such as religious
pluralism. Other non-clerical figures in the principlist camp
lamented the appointment as an indication that Ahmadinejad
intends to staff his office and cabinet with his inner coterie
at the expense of consensus figures. When Ahmadinejad held his
ground, Khamenei sent a directive to Ahmadinejad advising him to
undo the appointment; remarkably, Ahmadinejad only yielded after
the Supreme Leader's handwritten letter, sent five days earlier,
was published by the state media, thus forcing Ahmadinejad's
hand. To add insult to injury, Ahmadinejad simply reassigned
Mashaei as his chief of staff.




4. (C) Following the Mashaei resignation, Ahmadinejad abruptly
dismissed his Minister of Intelligence July 26 while the
Minister of Culture reportedly resigned amid reports the
President was trying to force him out. Both men objected to the
Mashaei appointment and walked out of a cabinet meeting last
week following a well-publicized argument with Ahmadinejad. It
is unclear if Ahmadinejad consulted with Khamenei before sacking
the two ministers; appointments to these ministries are
generally coordinated with, if not mandated by, the Supreme
Leader. According to Iran's constitution, Ahmadinejad's entire
cabinet now requires parliamentary review; however, it is
unclear if the Majles has the authority or political will to
initiate such a challenge before Ahmadinejad is inaugurated for
his second term on August 5.



Detainee Death Further Undermines Conservative Unity




5. (C) In the midst of the Mashaei drama, the establishment has
also been forced to reckon with the consequences of its

DUBAI 00000301 002.2 OF 003


repression of demonstrators with the case of Mohsen Ruholamini,
the 25-year-old son of a prominent conservative who was arrested
in street demonstrations on July 9 and died several days later,
apparently as a result of wounds inflicted after he was taken to
Evin Prison. Ruholamini's father, a doctor who is described in
the press as a senior advisor to defeated presidential candidate
and former Revolutionary Guards chief Mohsen Rezai, appears to
be well respected, both personally and professionally, by IRIG
heavyweights such as the (Supreme Leader-appointed) head of all
state broadcasting as well as numerous principlist MPs. These
friendships transcended the fagade of conservative unity and
resulted in a full-fledged funeral for Ruholamini in a large
mosque in Tehran -- the first public ceremony for a demonstrator
permitted by the government -- and elicited statements of
unequivocal condemnation from conservative Majles members who
until now had remained silent on the issue of the abuse of
detainees, heretofore described as "rioters" by government
hardliners.




6. (C) Perhaps sensing momentum on this issue, reformist
opposition leaders were quick to try to leverage Ruholamini's
violent death, issuing a flurry of statements building on
Rafsanjani's July 17 call for the release of prisoners detained
since the election. The day of Ruholamini's funeral, which was
attended by many government officials (including a
representative of the Supreme Leader),Mousavi and Karroubi sent
a letter to the Interior Ministry requesting a permit to hold a
commemoration ceremony for the other individuals killed since
the election. According to state-affiliated media, the
reformers promised the ceremony, scheduled for July 30 to mark
the fortieth day of the demonstrators killed on June 20 (among
them the now-iconic Neda Soltan),would include only Koranic
recitations and all participants will be silent throughout the
event.




7. (C) The outcry over the treatment of detainees is also
spilling over into the issue of forced confessions, specifically
whether or not such confessions should be broadcast on state
television. Majles members are now debating the issue, with
many conservatives openly coming out against the idea, thereby
coming down on the side of the argument held by the Mousavi and
Rafsanjani camp. One Majles deputy, in a swipe at the security
services, suggested that if such confessions were aired, then
there should also be inquiries into how they were obtained.




8. (C) With cracks among the conservative establishment
seemingly widening over Ahmadinejad's appointments and the abuse
of detainees, Khamenei's supporters are trying to muster public
proof of fealty to the Supreme Leader. In recent days state
institutions have responded to Khamenei's pleas for unity by
releasing press statements awkwardly proclaiming that "202
Majles members" and the "majority of the Assembly of Experts"
support the Supreme Leader. While clearly intended to showcase
the idea that Khamenei retains the preponderance of support
among conservative figures, the declarations themselves expose a
public dissention among the establishment that few would have
thought possible just weeks ago.



IRGC Remains Solidly Behind Khamenei




9. (C) The Revolutionary Guards' top leaders are the noteworthy
exception to this trend. While conservative cohesion is visibly
fraying in many of Iran's key institutions, the IRGC leadership
is going to great lengths to highlight its unwavering support
for the Supreme Leader and the political structure he sits atop.
The IRGC used the occasion of Guards Corps Day on July 26 to
highlight its support for the Supreme Leader and trumpet its
role in safeguarding the Revolution. Although inflated rhetoric
typically accompanies such events, the IRGC's role in
suppressing the post-election demonstrations and its emergence
as the central pillar supporting Khamenei gives their comments
additional weight, particularly as divisions emerge among
hardliners. A senior IRGC commander this weekend praised
Khamenei's role in undermining the plots against the country and
attributed the armed forces' success in defusing the plots to
the recommendations and guidelines of the Leader. Separately,
an IRGC statement lauded Khamenei and condemned the

DUBAI 00000301 003.2 OF 003


post-election conduct of certain "influential political
figures." And in playing up its role as the Revolution's
pre-eminent guarantor, IRGC Commander Jafari said the Guard
Corps is the "sole armed and organized supporter" of the
Revolution and maintained their ability to take on "soft
political, cultural, and economic threats."


Comment




10. (C) Though politics in Iran are notoriously factionalized,
Khamenei previously had been able to play such divisions to his
advantage; now, however, the divisions seem to be a weakness for
the Supreme Leader. Khamenei has tried to portray the election
unrest as merely a family squabble and has used praise, threats,
and pleas to re-forge unity, or at least its fagade, to little
avail. Ahmadinejad's public delay in heeding Khamenei's order to
drop Mashaei -- and his subsequent installation as advisor and
chief of staff -- further undermined the Supreme Leader.
Meanwhile the reformers continue to defy Khamenei's orders to
move on from the election dispute and in fact seem to be gaining
traction among some conservatives over the emotive issue of
detainees. By throwing his weight behind Ahmadinejad during the
election, the Supreme Leader's political maneuverability has now
been diminished and it appears he is ever more reliant on the
IRGC.
RICHARDSON