Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09RPODUBAI273
2009-07-02 13:52:00
SECRET
Iran RPO Dubai
Cable title:  

IRAN ELECTION AFTERMATH: OPPOSITION ATTACKS GOVERNMENT'S

Tags:  PREL PGOV IR 
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ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 021352Z JUL 09
FM RPO DUBAI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0445
INFO RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUEIDN/DNI WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RUMICEA/USCENTCOM INTEL CEN MACDILL AFB FL
RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE
RUEHAD/AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI IMMEDIATE 0368
RUEHDIR/RPO DUBAI 0446
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 RPO DUBAI 000273 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 7/2/2019
TAGS: PREL PGOV IR
SUBJECT: IRAN ELECTION AFTERMATH: OPPOSITION ATTACKS GOVERNMENT'S
LEGITIMACY

DUBAI 00000273 001.2 OF 002


CLASSIFIED BY: Timothy Richardson, Acting Director, Iran
Regional Presence Office, DOS.
REASON: 1.4 (b),(d)
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 RPO DUBAI 000273

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 7/2/2019
TAGS: PREL PGOV IR
SUBJECT: IRAN ELECTION AFTERMATH: OPPOSITION ATTACKS GOVERNMENT'S
LEGITIMACY

DUBAI 00000273 001.2 OF 002


CLASSIFIED BY: Timothy Richardson, Acting Director, Iran
Regional Presence Office, DOS.
REASON: 1.4 (b),(d)

1. (C) Summary: The Guardians Council formally certified
Ahmadinejad's landslide reelection on June 29, theoretically
closing the door to any further challenges of the results.
Nevertheless, the key opposition leadership figures
categorically rejected the verdict and vowed publicly to fight
on, outlining plans to form a commission to petition the
judiciary to dismiss the results. Though Mousavi continues to
exhort his supporters to demonstrate peacefully, he has not
issued specific calls for mass civil disobedience that would
challenge the state security forces' ability to maintain order.
Rather, Mousavi and his allies appear to be focusing their
efforts on attacking the legitimacy of a second Ahmadinejad
government. This psychological warfare is likely intended to
further isolate Ahmadinejad's government, both at home and
abroad, while continuing to exacerbate fissures within the
clerical and political elite. A spate of public criticism of the
election and the government's conduct by clerical figures,
coupled with signs that known adversaries of Ahmadinejad within
the government have maintained their stature within the system,
indicate that though the streets are quiet for now, the power
struggle at the top is far from over. End summary.



2.(C) Since the initial announcement of Ahmadinejad's landslide
win, which Supreme Leaders Khamenei quickly endorsed in a
statement issued the day after the election, the government has
maintained that all complaints regarding the election must be
channeled through the Guardians Council (GC). With varying
degrees of steadfastness, the three defeated candidates have
rejected this process, arguing that the GC is not an impartial
arbiter and can not credibly investigate complaints against the
process. Mir Hossein Mousavi and Mehdi Karroubi have gone so
far as to publicly accuse the GC of having played a role in the
fraud.




3. (C) Nevertheless, the GC pressed on, giving the government an
ongoing "legal process" to deflect criticism and buy time. On
June 29, however, this process ended as the GC certification of

essentially the same results first announced by state media the
day after the June 12 election. According to Iran's Election
Law, there are no other legal avenues available to the aggrieved
candidates to pursue their complaints.




4. (C) The main opposition figures - Mousavi, Karroubi and
former President Khatami - swiftly and categorically rejected
the GC's verdict in near-simultaneous public statements deeming
the election and the subsequent Ahmadinejad second term
"illegitimate." In a statement issued July 1, Mousavi deemed
the election illegitimate, detailed government improprieties
before, during and after the election, and made sweeping demands
of the state, including the release of political prisoners and
the end of the repression of civil society. The typically
soft-spoken Khatami accused the government of committing a
"velvet revolution against the people," while the print edition
of Karroubi's newspaper was shut down after he opened a
condemnation of the election with a Koranic verse implying the
death of the Islamic Republic. The three men have vowed to
fight on and announced their intent to form a special committee
to challenge the election in the judiciary. It is unclear,
however, on what basis they can do or whether the judiciary
would be any more open to hearing their complaints. (Note:
Conservative media reported this week that Sadegh Larijani,
brother of Majles speaker Ali Larijani, will soon replace
Ayatollah Shahrudi as head of the judiciary.)




5. (C) Despite the fiery rhetoric and Mousavi's exhortations to
his followers to continue to peacefully demonstrate, he has not
issued a specific call for collective action on a scale that
would disrupt everyday life in Iran. With limited ability to
communicate or organize, and in the face of the state's ability
to effectively suppress or pre-empt significant demonstrations,
the key opposition figures appear to have little ability to
mobilize the masses. Instead, they appear to be conducting
psychological warfare against the government, specifically
attacking the legitimacy of the next Ahmadinejad government,
rather than fomenting mass civil disobedience. While this
approach may not inspire the public, by continuing to issue
statements he does keep the issue alive at a popular level. That
said, Mousavi seems to have shied away from a head on

DUBAI 00000273 002.2 OF 002


confrontation and his overarching aim is likely intended to
exacerbate fissures within the governing elite and prevent the
forces that have effectively vanquished the reformers from
cementing their monopoly on political power.




6. (C) There has been much speculation about the machinations of
Iran's clerical community in the aftermath of the election. The
tainted election prompted reports that Assembly of Experts
Speaker Rafsanjani was attempting to marshal support in that
body to challenge Khamenei's primacy in the country. The
ultimate results of Rafsanjani's efforts are unknown and his
only public statement to date was a typically (and almost
certainly intentionally) ambiguous statement. In recent days
there has been a slight uptick in public reports of senior
clerics expressing their frustration, albeit obliquely, with the
election's aftermath. For example, Grand Ayatollah Safi
Golpayegani, former secretary of the GC, said that "We should
have acted in a way that these issues would not have come up.
We should have moderated our positions and opinions. " And
mid-ranking cleric (and son of a revered late Grand Ayatollah),
Hojjat ol-Eslam Hadi Ghaffari, directly criticized Khamenei, a
significant breach of Iran's red lines. Because the clergy are
theoretically a pillar of the Islamic Republic, public dissent
by respected clerical figures is more costly for the government
than criticism emanating from secular political figures.
However, the clerics were largely opposed to Ahmadinejad ahead
of the election and their sentiments seem to have had little
effect with Khamenei.




7. (C) Comment: Nearly three weeks after the election that
sparked widespread popular unrest and exposed deep fissures
within the ruling political and clerical elite, and between the
government and the public, a political compromise that would
satisfy the defeated candidates and their supporters remains
improbable. Mousavi and his allies have seemingly lost the
ability use public pressure to force the government to change
course and instead are trying to sow doubt about the legitimacy
of the government among the political and clerical elite. Their
strategy risks further backlash from Khamenei and Ahmadinejad -
elements within the government and conservative media continue
to set the stage for Mousavi's defiance to be punished - and
probably ensures that the highly polarized environment in Iran
will continue.
RICHARDSON