IRAN'S ELECTION: ACADEMICS HIGHLIGHT IMPORTANCE OF FRIDAY

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 RPO DUBAI 000255

NOFORN
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 6/18/2019
TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM IR
SUBJECT: IRAN'S ELECTION: ACADEMICS HIGHLIGHT IMPORTANCE OF FRIDAY
PRAYER DEMONSTRATIONS

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CLASSIFIED BY: Kathleen A. McGowan, Acting Director, Iran
Regional Presence Office, DOS.
REASON: 1.4 (b),(d)

1. (S/NF) Summary: Five Iranian academics seeking visas in Dubai
spoke with IRPO regarding the unfolding drama in Iran. They
consider the demonstration coinciding with Supreme Leader
Khamenei's Friday Prayers to be the most important rally yet
because the demonstrators will have the opportunity show
Khamenei the scale of the support for Mir Hossein Mousavi. The
group thinks Khamenei receives limited information from his
handlers. They also maintain that it is possible, even likely,
for Khamenei to abandon Ahmadinejad in order to defuse the
crisis. They think the demonstrators are targeting Ahmadinejad
and not Khamenei, suggesting that the demonstrators are not as
revolutionary as some media reports portray. They do not expect
Mousavi to compromise, which points to a more protracted affair
if their sense of Khamenei is wrong.




2. (S/NF) The four professors and one PhD student of philosophy
and religion are from throughout Iran; two professors are from
universities in Qom, one was from Mashhad, and another from
Tehran. The student was also from Tehran. All spoke freely
about the election and its aftermath. They all seemed to be
Mousavi supporters and the PhD student had attended one of his
demonstrations. They arrived in Dubai yesterday, June 17. End
Summary.



Friday's Prayers a Critical Opportunity to Enlighten Khamenei




3. (S/NF) In Tehran, the academics believe that the protests are
still gathering momentum and that the Friday demonstration to
coincide with Khamenei's delivery of the Friday Prayers is the
most important yet. They maintained Khamenei receives little
information from his handlers and does not appreciate the scale
of the support for Mousavi. (Note: Other IRPO contacts have also
suggested that Khamenei is not fully aware of Mousavi's
support.) They consider the opportunity for Mousavi's partisans
to turn out en masse and show their support for Mousavi to be
critical in convincing Khamenei to reverse course.




4. (S/NF) The academics said protests are occurring throughout
the country in larger urban areas. The IRIG can more easily
control smaller cities and towns and, as such, there have not
been many protests there. Qom has been relatively quieter; one
of the Qom professors said the youth in Qom tend to support
Ahmadinejad but whereas those older support Mousavi. When asked
about the alleged strike to have taken place earlier this week,
they appeared confused. One responded that Mousavi had not
officially called for a strike and was not likely to do so
because the Mousavi camp is advocating calmer, peaceful forms
are resistance.




5. (S/NF) Word of mouth remains the demonstrators most effective
means of communication. Of course, they said, Facebook and the
internet are important, but telephones are working and people
are talking. Paper messages, noting demonstrations, are also
important.



Khamenei to Blink First?




6. (S/NF) The professors think the resolution of the situation
will depend on the nature of Khamenei's compromise. They still
consider it possible, even likely, for Khamenei to abandon
Ahmadinejad. When asked who the protests are targeting, they
responded that replacing Ahmadinejad remains the goal.
Ahmadinejad, they said, has a degree of support among the
religiously devout and the lower classes, but were Khamenei to
withdraw his support, so too would many of the President's
backers.




7. (S/NF) They do not anticipate, however, that Mousavi will
compromise. They consider Mousavi to be a much stronger figure

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than former President Khatami and noted that during the 1980s,
Mousavi was able to get the best of Khamenei. They now maintain
that Mousavi is becoming very powerful.




8. (S/NF) None of the academics had heard or seen anything of
Rafsanjani, though all assumed he was heavily involved behind
the scenes. One of the professors described Rafsanjani as the
only person who could control the movement. They also noted
that Ahmadinejad's presidency was the result of the feud between
Rafsanjani and Khamenei. The academics did not place much
significance on the role of the clerics. They said even though
most clerics were opposed to Ahmadinejad, they were also
conservative, and beyond encouraging people to vote, were
unlikely to intervene further in political matters. The
academics also downplayed the rumored Assembly of Experts
meeting, suggesting that there would not be an official meeting.



Applause for President Obama's Comments




9. (S/NF) All said that President Obama had struck the right
balance in his comments on the protests and agree that the USG
should allow Iranians to sort out the problem for themselves.
They did not recommend changing course. At the same, they
support USG condemnation of violence against demonstrators.
(Note: They mentioned having heard that Voice of America was
encouraging Iranians to take part in the evening roof-top chants
of "Allah-u Akbar. ")



Comment:




10. (S/NF) The movement described by the academics seems less
radical and less revolutionary than some accounts in the media
portray the situation. If focusing on Ahmadinejad and not
Khamenei, the demonstrators do not appear to seek the downfall
of the Islamic Republic. The academics' sense that Mousavi did
not call for a strike in the bazaars and is unlikely to do so
also supports this notion. If true, this would give Khamenei
more maneuvering room to defuse the situation. Khamenei could
compromise without fatally wounding his own standing. Still,
their sense that Khamenei is not an active player in the
unfolding drama and is being misled by his handlers seems a
touch naove and is clearly not shared by all involved. The
Supreme Leader's rivals, Rafsanjani chief among them, are also
more likely to see any compromise as a sign of weakness, as is
the Supreme Leader. That, coupled with the academics faith in
Mousavi's fortitude, points to a more protracted affair. End
comment.
MCGOWAN