Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09RPODUBAI245
2009-06-11 13:19:00
SECRET//NOFORN
Iran RPO Dubai
Cable title:  

IRAN'S ELECTION: URBAN VOTERS MOBILIZING TO OUST

Tags:  PREL PGOV IR 
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VZCZCXRO6395
OO RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHKUK RUEHTRO
DE RUEHDIR #0245/01 1621319
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 111319Z JUN 09
FM RPO DUBAI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0430
INFO RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RUEIDN/DNI WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUMICEA/USCENTCOM INTEL CEN MACDILL AFB FL
RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE
RUEHAD/AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI IMMEDIATE 0353
RUEHDIR/RPO DUBAI 0431
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 RPO DUBAI 000245 

NOFORN
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 6/11/2019
TAGS: PREL PGOV IR
SUBJECT: IRAN'S ELECTION: URBAN VOTERS MOBILIZING TO OUST
AHMADINEJAD

DUBAI 00000245 001.2 OF 002


CLASSIFIED BY: Ramin Asgard, Director, Iran Regional Presence
Office, DOS.
REASON: 1.4 (b),(d)
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 RPO DUBAI 000245

NOFORN
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 6/11/2019
TAGS: PREL PGOV IR
SUBJECT: IRAN'S ELECTION: URBAN VOTERS MOBILIZING TO OUST
AHMADINEJAD

DUBAI 00000245 001.2 OF 002


CLASSIFIED BY: Ramin Asgard, Director, Iran Regional Presence
Office, DOS.
REASON: 1.4 (b),(d)

1. (S/NF) Summary: The overwhelming last-minute mobilization of
the urban vote will likely lead to President Ahmadinejad's
defeat, as many Iranians who typically stay home on election day
now view Friday's election as a rare chance to exert some
influence over the direction of their country. IRPO contacts
and a growing body of analysis now predict that even if Mousavi
cannot take the election in the first round on June 12, he will
almost certainly defeat Ahmadinejad in a two-man race a week
later. Ahmadinejad retains support in the provinces and key
institutions such as the Basij, but his ability to manipulate
the vote will likely be constrained by high voter turnout and
the advocacy of senior establishment power-brokers determined to
prevent Ahmadinejad's re-election. Rafsanjani's "warning" to the
Supreme Leader that an Ahmadinejad victory could undermine the
Islamic Republic itself, while undoubtedly self-serving, is also
likely true. Ahmadinejad, a polarizing figure within Iran long
before this heated campaign season, has become a virtual
lightning rod. Neither his supporters nor his many opponents
will take defeat at the polls well. End summary.



Mousavi Surges Ahead




2. (S/NF) There is growing consensus among Iranian political
analysts and IRPO contacts that Mir Hossein Mousavi will win
Iran's tenth presidential election on June 12, either in the
first round or after a run-off with President Ahmadinejad on
June 19. Though Ahmadinejad retains his core support in the
provinces, the shift in conventional wisdom follows a week of
voter mobilization in Tehran and other cities, overwhelmingly in
favor of Mousavi. Many IRPO contacts are invoking the 1979
Islamic Revolution to describe the level of excitement and
engagement of Iranian society this week, and most of our
interlocutors are now predicting participation levels of 70 or
even 80 percent, similar to the turnout that swept Khatami into
office in 1997.




3. (S/NF) Two other candidates, the reformist Mehdi Karroubi and
the conservative Mohsen Rezai, remain in the race; Karroubi is

expected to draw votes from both Mousavi and Ahmadinejad while
Rezai, a co-founder of the Revolutionary Guards, will primarily
take Ahmadinejad voters. In the event of a run-off between the
top two candidates, Mousavi will likely benefit from growing
disenchantment with Ahmadinejad following a polarizing campaign
period.



The Fraud Factor




4. (S/NF) The level of fraud remains a key factor in determining
the outcome of the race; however, there are signs that
Ahmadinejad's ability to cheat may have been eroded over recent
days. In particular, the predicted large turnout will be a
significant check against the effects of fraud. In addition, it
is clear that there will be intense scrutiny of the process,
both by Ahmadinejad's electoral opponents as well as by the
senior establishment figures he publicly branded as corrupt
during the now-famous televised debate with Mousavi and
subsequent campaign events.




5. (S/NF) Public awareness of the potential for fraud is also
very high: a leading chant by Mousavi supporters captures the
sentiment: "if there is no cheating, Mousavi will be president;
if there is cheating, there will be a riot." (Note: It rhymes in
Farsi.) A letter from Ministry of Interior employees alleging
that radical Ayatollah Mesbah-Yazdi explicitly sanctioned
changing votes in favor of Ahmadinejad and outlining the
potential ways in which the Ahmadinejad campaign could cheat has
circulated widely among Iranians.




6. (S/NF) Similarly, Rafsanjani's open letter to the Supreme
Leader asking him to take "effective measures" to counter
Ahmadinejad's "lies" or risk losing the "system's credibility

DUBAI 00000245 002.2 OF 002


and the sympathy of the people" has run in numerous media
outlets inside Iran. The letter was followed by news reports
today of a three-hour meeting between Khamenei and Rafsanjani.
Rafsanjani is quoted as describing the encounter as "one of my
most productive meetings with the Leader of the Islamic
Revolution," an indication he believes Khamenei has taken on
board the potential consequences of an overtly fraudulent win by
Ahmadinejad. Earlier today the Mousavi camp also leaked a
letter from the candidate to Khamenei in which he referenced
"reports indicating that a number of Guards and Basij have been
interfering in the election" and noting the "concerns of the
people" about such activities.



Either Likely Scenario Could Spark Unrest




7. (S/NF) Similar to the campaign period itself, which has been
punctuated by personal attacks and the massive mobilization of
voters across Iran's fractured society, the outcome of the
election is likely to be polarizing. Either of the probable
outcomes - a Mousavi win in the first or second round, or the
re-election of Ahmadinejad tainted by the perception of fraud -
will, at a minimum, spark a struggle over verification of the
results. There are signs that both camps are setting the scene
to contest the results, with Ahmadinejad supporters also
alleging malfeasance by his opponents' camps and laying down
unrealistically high bench marks of the number of votes
Ahmadinejad should in a fair contest. Social unrest is also
possible given the conviction among large swaths of society now
that Ahmadinejad can not win fairly; conversely, Ahmadinejad has
portrayed himself as a champion of disenfranchised Iranians and
a potential martyr at the hands of a corrupt establishment. His
supporters are not likely to take defeat well.




8. (S/NF) Comment: Though strong anecdotal evidence supports an
eventual Mousavi win, the depth of Ahmadinejad's reservoir of
support among rural and working class voters, as well as the
role of the Revolutionary Guards, remain open questions.
Supreme Leader Khamenei will no doubt play a key role in
determining the transparency of this election and managing the
political fall-out once the results are in. The importance he
and other leaders attach to the credibility of this election -
which they view as an endorsement of the system by the people -
likely trumps his personal preference for a particular candidate.
ASGARD