IRAN ELECTION SCENESETTER: PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE LIST

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 RPO DUBAI 000217

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 5/20/2019
TAGS: PGOV PREL KDEM IR
SUBJECT: IRAN ELECTION SCENESETTER: PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE LIST
ANNOUNCED, OFFICIAL CAMPAIGN PERIOD UNDERWAY

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CLASSIFIED BY: Ramin Asgard, Director, Iran Regional Presence
Office, DOS.
REASON: 1.4 (b),(d)
1.(C) Summary: The Guardians Council-approved list of four
candidates eligible to stand in Iran's June 12 presidential
election included no surprises. President Ahmadinejad remains
the man to beat, but is the object of persistent and withering
criticism from his three rivals, particularly for his poor
stewardship of the economy and for exacerbating Iran's
international isolation. Mir Hossein Mousavi, the 1980s prime
minister whose candidacy is fueled in great part by former
president Khatami's endorsement, is viewed as Ahmadinejad's
strongest rival. However, the outspoken former Majles Speaker
Mehdi Karrubi showed well in the 2005 election and has drawn the
support of many well-known reformers. The fourth candidate,
former Revolutionary Guards Commander Mohsen Reza'i, is not
expected to win a substantial number of votes, but his
participation exposes rifts within the conservative elite and
gives other prominent principlists cover to not publicly support
Ahmadinejad.




2. (C) Summary (cont.): If all four candidates stay in the race,
they are likely to split the vote sufficiently to require a
second round of voting on June 19. A two-man race -- in which
only one opponent would benefit from the likely substantial
anti-Ahmadinejad vote -- could leave the incumbent vulnerable.
Though vote manipulation will likely favor Ahmadinejad and he is
presumed to be the preferred candidate of Supreme Leader
Khamenei, Iran's leadership places great importance on the
appearance of electoral propriety; it is unlikely Ahmadinejad
would be able to steal the election outright, nor that Khamenei
would be able to deliver the election to him.



Candidate Announcement Brings Some Clarity to Iranian Election

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3. (C) The Guardians Council (GC) certified the candidacies of
the election's four leading figures: President Mahmoud
Ahmadinejad, former Prime Minister Mir Hossein Mousavi, former
Majles Speaker Mehdi Karrubi, and former IRGC Commander and
current Expediency Council Secretary Mohsen Reza'i. None of the
other 471 people who registered to contest the election met the
GC's interpretation of the constitution's eligibility definition.




4. (C) The challengers for the presidency have roundly
criticized Ahmadinejad for the confrontational spin he has put
on Iranian foreign policy and especially for his mismanagement
of the economy. However, on the matters of greatest concern to
the USG, namely the nuclear issue and engagement with the USG,
the contenders differ only marginally from Ahmadinejad.
Mousavi, Karrubi, and Reza'i all reject out of hand an
enrichment suspension and applaud the achievements of Iran's
nuclear scientists. Their general support for the status quo is
both an acknowledgment of popular sentiment -- advocating
suspension is not tenable under current conditions -- as well as
the Supreme Leader's recognized primacy regarding the nuclear
issue. All the candidates have similarly fallen in line behind
Khamenei regarding engagement with the USG; each has voiced some
variation of the Supreme Leader's Nowruz address wherein he said
rhetorical change is not enough, they want to see US conduct
towards Iran change. Moussavi, Karrubi and Reza'i have, however,
noted the importance of ending Iran's international isolation
and have suggested a more realist and less ideological tilt to
their likely foreign policy in their comments.




5. (C) Even on the economy, where high inflation and rising
unemployment have made Ahmadinejad an easy target, his opponents
have largely asserted that they favor better or more efficient
management. None of the challengers has outlined an economic
agenda for structural reform of the state-dominated economy;
rather, they have tried to highlight Ahmadinejad's erratic
approach to economic policy and personnel decisions and the
perception that he has squandered Iran's oil windfall of recent
years. Mousavi, deriding the President's failure to deliver on
his 2005 campaign promises, observed that "social justice does
not mean the equal distribution of poverty" in one such attack.
Yet despite being a focal point of the candidates' rhetoric,
the election does not portend the dramatic changes needed to

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improve Iran's economy.




6. (C) Where the challengers do differ with Ahmadinejad is
their tone and in this regard, they have taken steps to distance
themselves from Ahmadinejad's rhetoric. Mousavi has spoken of
initiating a policy of "ditente" with the rest of the world;
Karrubi criticized Ahmadinejad's denial of the Holocaust and
called the President's inflammatory remarks a favor to Israel;
even Reza'i, a conservative and former IRGC commander, said Iran
under Ahmadinejad is heading toward an "abyss " and should
"neither pursue passivity or adventurism." All three men seek
to be regarded as a competent manager capable of repairing the
damage incurred during Ahmadinejad's tenure.



The Candidates

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7. (C) President Ahmadinejad remains the candidate to beat: he
has an incumbent's advantages of media coverage and control of
Iran's coffers, and support from key institutions charged with
overseeing the election. Still, his re-election is not a
foregone conclusion and two questions define his electoral
prospects: his standing with Supreme Leader Khamenei and his
reservoir of support in the provinces. Despite Khamenei's
public assurances that he has only "one vote," many still worry
that he will tilt the system in favor of Ahmadinejad. Khamenei
raised such fears in a recent speech when his description of his
ideal candidate sounded similar to Ahmadinejad. However, the
description was generic enough to match other candidates as
well.




8. (C) Ahmadinejad's support base includes radical hardliners
who approve of the president's defiance of the international
community, and the urban and rural poor, who identify with
Ahmadinejad's piety and simple lifestyle. With the hardline
vote relatively assured, the president is depending on getting
the same provincial support he received in 2005 to win. In the
last election, Ahmadinejad's promises of "social justice" were a
key to his victory. He repeatedly returned to such themes
during his provincial trips, making grand promises of economic
development everywhere he went. However, many of his promises
remain unfulfilled and the economy has faltered, leaving his
degree of support in the provinces an unknown.




9. (C) Former Prime Minister Mousavi has emerged as the leading
challenger to Ahmadinejad. Out of politics since the 1980s,
Mousavi says he is returning to the fray because "things are not
going well in this country." He is counting on a coalition of
the youth and those that fondly remember his stewardship during
the Iran-Iraq war. While on the one hand championing human
rights, the rule of law, and disbanding the "Morals Police," he
has adopted the color green for his campaign to highlight his
religious pedigree (Note: The title "Mir" is a rarely used term
synonymous with "Seyyed," designating a descendant of the
prophet) and is running on a promise to return Iran to the "pure
values" of the Islamic Revolution. Trying to bridge the
difference, Mousavi maintains he is running as an independent;
that said, nearly all of the leading reformist organizations
back him.




10. (C) According to our contacts, however, Mousavi is not a
charismatic campaigner. His challenge -- shared by all in the
anti-Ahmadinejad camp -- will be to draw out the urban vote. In
recent national elections, voter participation in the provinces
has outpaced turnout in urban areas, where the president is
least popular. Without a strong turnout, Mousavi will be hard
pressed to overcome Ahmadinejad's inherent advantages. Mousavi,
though initially reluctant to be lumped in with Khatami as a
reformer, eventually yielded to Khatami's star power and the two
have been campaigning together and Khatami is shown prominently
on Mousavi's campaign posters.



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11. (C) Regime stalwart and 2005 presidential candidate Mehdi
Karrubi returns to the fray determined to avenge his bitter, and
perhaps fraud-tainted, defeat four years ago. When the polls
closed Karrubi stood in second place in the vote and in position
to join Expediency Council Chairman Rafsanjani in a runoff only
to wake up the next day to find himself in third place, behind
Ahmadinejad and out of the runoff. But despite his strong
showing in the first round in 2005, Karrubi now is viewed mostly
as a foil to the other candidates, but whether he draws more
votes from Ahmadinejad or Mousavi is unclear. Karrubi is an
economic populist, promising cash payments and oil shares to
Iran's population, putting him in direct competition for voters
who support Ahmadinejad's populism. He also champions human
rights and the rights of Iran's ethnic minorities (Note: Karrubi
is from the Lur ethnic minority),issues that Mousavi is trying
to make his own. Perhaps tellingly, reformers have repeatedly
requested Karrubi to withdraw in favor of Mousavi, a request he
repeatedly denies.




12. (C) Former IRGC Commander and Expediency Council Secretary
Mohsen Reza'i was the last of the four to announce his bid and
only did so after months of publicly trying to find a candidate
to head a so-called unity government. When no one else emerged,
he announced his own candidacy. Reza'i, a conservative, is
banned from international travel because of an Interpol red
notice stemming from his allegedly involvement in the 1994
bombing of a Jewish center in Argentina. As in 2005, when he
withdrew two days before the election, Reza'i has little chance
of winning the election; his candidacy though highlights the
disdain of many in the principlist factions for President
Ahmadinejad. There is speculation that various conservatives
and rivals to Ahmadinejad are assisting Mousavi's campaign.
Reza'i's presence has allowed other prominent principlists to
avoid endorsing a candidate because two conservatives are in the
field.



What to Look For

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13. (C) The government's announcement of the official candidates
signals the start of the election's official campaign period.
The campaign period runs until June 10, just ahead of the June
12 election. Although the candidates have effectively been
campaigning for months, the designated period will carry much
more official media coverage. The state-run media has announced
six debates between the candidates as well as individual Q&A
sessions. The candidates themselves have promised press
conferences; Ahmadinejad, for example, will be holding separate
press conferences for domestic and international press later
this month to officially launch his re-election bid.




14. (C) The media environment to date and in the run up to the
election is a point of contention among the candidates.
Ahmadinejad's opponents have complained about bias in the
state-run media, accusing Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting
(IRIB) of exaggerating Ahmadinejad's accomplishments and
providing extensive coverage to his provincial trips. However,
The IRIB is under Supreme Leader Khamenei's control and its
chief asserts the IRIB is impartial. Perhaps to illustrate that
point, the IRIB recently cancelled an interview with Ahmadinejad
and did not cover a provincial speech. The president's backers
have also complained that IRIB managers favor Mousavi. Still,
Ahmadinejad, as president, will probably command a greater share
of the coverage during the month-long official campaign period
-- a significant advantage because most Iranians, particularly
rural populations, still receive their news from IRIB. The
candidates are embracing new media venues to attract voters,
such as Facebook, but only a small segment of the population is
savvy enough to use such technology and it is unlikely to
overcome Ahmadinejad's traditional media advantage.



Potential for Fraud

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15. (C) There are also allegations that Ahmadinejad will benefit
from fraud in the election. Iranian elections are not free and
fair; but beyond the Guardian Council's vetting -- this year
471 candidates were rejected -- the nature of electoral
malfeasance and its significance is hard to gauge. Fears of
fraud have increased this year because the GC and the Ministry
of Interior, which oversee and carry out the election, are both
aligned with Ahmadinejad. Guardians Council Secretary Janati
recently made pointed comments supporting Ahmadinejad's
re-election and Interior Minister Mahsuli, the president's
campaign manager in 2005, was appointed to his post last fall.




16. (C) The GC certifies the results of the election and
invalidates district votes they deem irregular. As such, the GC
can throw out or alter results in particular districts. Karrubi
and his campaign spokesman in 2005 accused the GC of this sort
of tampering in particular districts. The Ministry of Interior,
for its part, has control over the ballot boxes, giving rise to
concerns for their protection/sanctity. All the candidates are
allowed to station observers at each voting station, but the
candidates likely do not have the staff to send representatives
to all the polling booths.




17. (C) The losing candidates in 2005 also complained about the
mobilization of the Basij, the IRGC's militia, on behalf of
Ahmadinejad. Basij members are thought to constitute much of
Ahmadinejad's base and are expected to support the President
again.




18. (C) The election will in all likelihood see some degree of
fraud and many such accusations. Still, the IRIG and Khamenei
look to Iranian elections to validate the legitimacy of the
regime. In the run up to the election Khamenei and his minions
will repeatedly exhort Iranians to the polls in order to
showcase the strength of the regime and "neutralize the enemies'
plots." They do not want the who should also provide a check,
if only a small one, against widespread fraud. election to be
seen as a farce, which likely limits their willingness to
overtly meddle. And although the IRIG does not permit the
presence of foreign election observers, Iran has accredited
nearly 200 foreign journalists



Comment:

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19. (C) Iranian foreign policy and nuclear program are, to a
large extent, dictated by Supreme Leader Khamenei and the
Supreme National Security Council as a function of Iran's
perceived national interests. However, the president can affect
foreign policy by force of his "bully pulpit," as we have seen
both for the positive (Khatami) and the negative (Ahmadinejad).
The election does not portend dramatic changes in Iranian
policies of greatest concern to the U.S., but a new tone and new
face for Iran, if Ahmadinejad is defeated, will strengthen the
voices inside the country who favor pragmatism over
confrontation.
ASGARD