Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09RPODUBAI174
2009-04-16 15:11:00
SECRET//NOFORN
Iran RPO Dubai
Cable title:  

IRAN'S PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION: AN INSIDER ASSESSES THE

Tags:  PGOV PREL IR 
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FM RPO DUBAI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0393
INFO RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUEIDN/DNI WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE
RUMICEA/USCENTCOM INTEL CEN MACDILL AFB FL
RUEHAD/AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI PRIORITY 0323
RUEHDIR/RPO DUBAI 0394
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 RPO DUBAI 000174 

NOFORN
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 4/16/2019
TAGS: PGOV PREL IR
SUBJECT: IRAN'S PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION: AN INSIDER ASSESSES THE
CURRENT STATE OF PLAY

DUBAI 00000174 001.2 OF 003


CLASSIFIED BY: Ramin Asgard, Director, Iran Regional Presence
Office, DOS.
REASON: 1.4 (b),(d)
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 RPO DUBAI 000174

NOFORN
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 4/16/2019
TAGS: PGOV PREL IR
SUBJECT: IRAN'S PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION: AN INSIDER ASSESSES THE
CURRENT STATE OF PLAY

DUBAI 00000174 001.2 OF 003


CLASSIFIED BY: Ramin Asgard, Director, Iran Regional Presence
Office, DOS.
REASON: 1.4 (b),(d)

1. (S/NF) Summary: A prominent political scientist from Tehran
assesses that moderate presidential contender Mir Hossein
Mousavi has - at least in theory - the constituency to win, but
that his ability to defeat the incumbent Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in
the June 12 election will depend largely on his ability to get
out the vote. He described a complicated relationship between
President Khatami, whom he sees regularly, and Mousavi, who
seems not yet to have decided how to manage the considerable
assets and potential drawbacks associated with using Khatami's
star power on the campaign trail. The political scientist also
pointed to a "softening" of Supreme Leader Khamenei's once-overt
support for Ahmadinejad as the reformers and moderates' greatest
achievement so far in the run-up to the poll. He said that most
reformers now believe that Khamenei is "comfortable" with the
prospect of a Mousavi presidency, and that although he might
personally prefer another Ahmadinejad victory, he is now less
likely to "push the system hard" in favor of Ahmadinejad. End
summary.




2. (S/NF) Dr. Hadi Semati (please protect),a prominent
political scientist affiliated with the University of Tehran and
the Center for Strategic Research, the Expediency Council's
think tank, and with extensive experience on US policy circles,
shared his views on the current state of play in Iran's upcoming
presidential election. IRPO Officers met with Semati on April
15 for a wide-ranging discussion of domestic Iranian issues and
US-Iran relations.



Mousavi Keeping His Distance from Khatami




3. (S/NF) Dr. Semati met alone with former President Khatami
soon after he ended his presidential candidacy mid-March in
favor of former Prime Minister Mir Hossein Mousavi. According
to Dr. Semati, Khatami's publicly stated rationale for the
decision to end his campaign should be taken at face value.
Khatami emphasized that he truly believed Mousavi could more
effectively govern in the current political climate, and he did
not want the moderate vote to be diluted by competing

candidates. He added though that Khatami expressed irritation
with Mousavi's decision to announce his own candidacy just two
weeks after Khatami formally entered the race. According to
Semati, Khatami told Mousavi directly that he preferred that
Mousavi run and would not enter the race if he intended to
stand. Khatami told Semati that Mousavi's response at the time
was that he would decide in May. In Khatami's opinion, a May
announcement would have been much too late in the cycle,
prompting him to go ahead and enter the race on his own. Semati
observed that despite Khatami's unhappiness over the sequencing
of events, he was ultimately relieved to be able to withdraw
with a "clear conscience."




4. (S/NF) Dr. Semati observed that Mousavi now faces a dilemma
regarding how to best make use of Khatami's endorsement and
support. As yet, Mousavi has not asked Khatami directly to
actively campaign on his behalf. And according to Semati,
although Mousavi needs Khatami's overt help to garner name
recognition, particularly among the youth, Mousavi has not yet
come to that conclusion himself. Semati opined that Mousavi
appears to believe he can win by himself and that aligning
himself too overtly with Khatami would undermine his ability to
capture conservative votes. In Semati's view, this is a risky
course because while he believes Mousavi has, "in theory," the
constituency to win the election, the outcome of the election
will depend entirely on voter participation. If Mousavi can
mobilize to deliver high voter turnout, he will win; conversely,
if participation is low, Ahmadinejad will likely prevail.




5. (S/NF) Dr. Semati said that despite the fact that Mousavi
has not directly appealed to Khatami for help, many of the
former president's key lieutenants are actively, but quietly,
engaging on behalf of Mousavi's candidacy. According to Semati,
more than 80,000 volunteers nation-wide were enlisted over the
past year in anticipation of a Khatami candidacy in response to
Ahmadinejad's capacity to effectively mobilize the Basij - a
lesson the moderates "learned the hard way" in 2005. Though

DUBAI 00000174 002.2 OF 003


there will be no formal announcement, Semati said this
organization is being "activated" for Mousavi as most leading
reformers see him as their best hope to unseat Ahmadinejad.
Semati also noted that whereas presidential candidate Karroubi
has some big names backing him - most notably, former Tehran
Mayor Gholamhossein Karbaschi, and former Khatami-era cabinet
members Mohammad Ali Abtahi, Abbas Abdi, Ataollah Mohajerani,
and Mohammad Ali Najafi - Mousavi is starting to pull in the
main moderate political organizations, such as Kargozaran and
the Association of Combatant Clerics. That these organizations
are lining up behind Mousavi is important, although Semati noted
that Karroubi's constellation of famous reformist faces from the
Khatami era is "potentially problematic" for Mousavi.



The Karroubi Factor




6. (S/NF) Dr. Semati assessed that Karroubi would likely draw
as many, if not more, votes away from Ahmadinejad as from
Mousavi because his principal appeal to voters will be his
populist economic proposal to distribute Iran's oil wealth to
the people via a still-undefined plan to somehow issue shares
directly to the citizenry. Semati also observed that while
Karroubi is making "bolder" promises than Mousavi in terms of
opening Iran's political structure to greater competition, most
moderates don't "take him seriously." According to Semati,
Karroubi is proposing systemic reforms that he can't possibly
deliver within the framework of contemporary Iranian politics.
While such reforms have some appeal to voters, given the
"national trauma" associated with the failure of the Khatami
administration to institute such measures, Semati believes that
Karroubi is not "taken seriously" by most politically-active
moderates. It was precisely this reasoning that led Khatami to
throw his weight behind Mousavi, a "revolutionary who has
evolved" as opposed to Karroubi, in Semati's opinion. Mousavi,
he noted, will be careful about managing expectations and
therefore will be able to deliver more of what he promises.



Khatami's Withdrawal "Softened" the Supreme Leader




7. (S/NF) Dr. Semati believes that Khatami's decision to
withdraw from the election has already delivered an important
victory to moderates: a "softening" of Supreme Leader Khamenei's
overt support for Ahmadinejad. Semati said that most reformers
now believe that Khamenei is "comfortable" with the prospect of
a Mousavi presidency, and that although he might personally
prefer another Ahmadinejad victory, he is now less likely to
"push the system hard" in favor of Ahmadinejad.




8. (S/NF) Semati further noted that the leadership is currently
"firmly" in control and that there is reluctance, even among the
"hard core reformers" for any sort of dramatic change to Iran's
system of government. At least, Semati said, Khamenei can keep
the Revolutionary Guards and more radical fringe elements of the
body politic in check. Khamenei does respond to pressure,
particularly when it comes from both within and outside of the
system. If Ahmadinejad fails to win re-election, Semati
predicted, it will ultimately be due to the fact that he has
made himself a virtual "outsider" by antagonizing so many
powerful elements within the governing clique. Semati believes
Khamenei considers Ahmadinejad's hard-line presentation of
Iran's foreign policy successful, but that he is also aware of
the president's "disastrous" management of the economy and other
domestic policy issues. Comfortable that Mousavi will not cross
any red lines, Khamenei is prepared to allow for reasonable
competition within the system.



This Election Matters




9. (S/NF) Dr. Semati observed that while it is difficult to
predict how the outcome of this election will impact relations
between the U.S. and Iran, the consequences domestically are

DUBAI 00000174 003.2 OF 003


quite clear. A second Ahmadinejad government would only hasten
Iran's brain drain, including among the "intellectual elite" -
the political class who comprise what remains of the Reform
Movement. Semati also predicted that a renewed mandate for
Ahmadinejad would be the death knell of the remaining qualified
technocrats in government. Like other IRPO contacts, he
anticipates that participation in this election will exceed that
of the 2005 race, but not reach the 80 plus percent during the
Khatami.




10. (S/NF) Comment: Dr. Semati offers well-informed
perspective on the election in general and relations between
Khatami and Mousavi in particular. However, his insider's view
is limited by the fact that he has no direct ties to
Ahmadinejad's inner circle or other conservative elements within
the system. In fact, he was told directly by Khatami just one
year ago that he is on a "velvet revolution list" maintained by
hardliners due to his 2007 fellowship at the Wilson Center and
his efforts to get Haleh Esfandiari released. Furthermore, Dr.
Semati was perhaps overly dismissive of the prospect of another
viable candidate emerging, given the increasingly frequent
signals that former IRGC commander Mohsen Rezai may throw his
hat in the ring as a compromise candidate. Dr. Semati
emphasized, however, a point we have heard repeatedly from
Iranian interlocutors: electoral politics in Iran is essentially
"inside baseball" until the last couple of weeks of the cycle
when the list of qualified candidates is released by the
Guardians Council. Nevertheless, past elections have shown that
both wrangling at the top and building momentum among voters are
key facors in determining the final outcome. End comment.
ASGARD