Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09RPODUBAI162
2009-04-07 14:51:00
SECRET//NOFORN
Iran RPO Dubai
Cable title:  

IRAN REGIONAL PRESENCE OFFICE -- WINDOW ON IRAN -- APRIL 7,

Tags:  PREL PGOV PHUM PREF ECON EAGR IR 
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FM RPO DUBAI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0382
INFO RUEHAD/AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI 0312
RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE
RUEIDN/DNI WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RUMICEA/USCENTCOM INTEL CEN MACDILL AFB FL
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL 0026
RUEHUNV/USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA 0028
RUEHDIR/RPO DUBAI 0383
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 RPO DUBAI 000162 

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 4/7/2019
TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM PREF ECON EAGR IR
SUBJECT: IRAN REGIONAL PRESENCE OFFICE -- WINDOW ON IRAN -- APRIL 7,
2009

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CLASSIFIED BY: Timothy Richardson, ActingDirector, Iran Regional
Presence Office, Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b),(d)
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 RPO DUBAI 000162

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SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 4/7/2019
TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM PREF ECON EAGR IR
SUBJECT: IRAN REGIONAL PRESENCE OFFICE -- WINDOW ON IRAN -- APRIL 7,
2009

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CLASSIFIED BY: Timothy Richardson, ActingDirector, Iran Regional
Presence Office, Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b),(d)

1. (S/NF) Update on Roxana Saberi: Two separate IRPO contacts
have asserted that Roxanna Saberi is part of a political
struggle over IRIG relations with the US. One of them, a friend
of Saberi who works for BBC Farsi, said that Saberi was taken by
elements in the Ministry of Intelligence and Security who want
to prevent rapprochement between Iran and America. She told us
that elements in the Ministry of Justice were working for
Saberi's release. Our other contact, who has indirect access to
senior IRIG officials, partially corroborated that information.
He described Saberi as a "political pawn," and confirmed that
the Ministry of Justice has sought her release. He added,
however, that even if she is released from Evin Prison soon, she
would not yet be allowed to leave Iran. Iranian sources told
our contact that part of the obstacle for her release was that
she had been uncooperative and defiant during interrogations,
and interrogators were refusing to sign off on her release. He
urged us to try to pass a message to Saberi to remain calm and
appear cooperative. Our contacts' sources also suggested that
the USG maintain a very low profile in this case, in his words,
"go lights out," to give sympathetic forces in Iran time to
resolve it quietly. Comment: The comments from these two
sources further support our view, voiced in the March 31 WOI,
that there are spoilers actively working to obstruct any
improvement in US-Iran ties. The broader issue of how the IRIG
should respond to any US overture remains highly contentious
within Iran, so much so that those who are supportive of
engagement are reluctant to raise their profile and be seen as
too sympathetic to the US.




2. (S/NF) Qalibaf to Become the Compromise Candidate? According
to an IRPO contact with sources in Iran, Supreme Leader Khamenei

has assented to Tehran Mayor Mohammad Qalibaf entering the
presidential race as a compromise candidate. Our contact's
sources claimed that Qalibaf would receive support from
reformist candidate and former Majles Speaker Mehdi Karroubi,
who would drop out in favor of Qalibaf. There have also been
apparent contacts between Qalibaf and Mir Hussein Mousavi over a
Qalibaf candidacy, but Mousavi has not indicated whether he
would abandon his campaign or not. Qalibaf is also said to be
gathering supporters within the IRCG and other security
ministries in preparation for announcing his bid. Our contact
emphasized that Qalibaf would be a serious candidate who wants
to establish a relationship with the US, as is indicated by the
Tehran Municipality's interest in buying American agricultural
products for distribution before the election. Comment: All of
the speculation that has been building on the emergence of a
compromise candidate, be it Qalibaf or someone else, may end on
April 14, when former IRGC Commander Mohsen Rezai has said that
the so-called "national unity" candidate will be announced. In
the interim, rumors and contradictory information about the
intentions of potential candidates and the preferences of the
Supreme Leader will no doubt dominate conversation in Iranian
political circles. For example, although just this week Qalibaf
himself stated publicly that he was not planning to run in this
election, speculation that he would present a formidable
challenge to Ahmadinejad continues.




3. (S/NF) Iran Supreme Court Member Says Sadeq Larijani to be
Next Judiciary Chief: Supreme Court member Reza Hatami Marbini
confidently predicted Ayatollah Sadeq Larijani will be the next
Judiciary Chief after Ayatollah Hashemi-Shahrudi's term ends
this summer. Marbini, in Dubai to apply for a visa, said
Larijani has already begun attending conferences to learn how
the judiciary works. Ayatollah Larijani, a member of the
Guardians Council and Majles speaker Ali Larijani's brother, has
been rumored to be under consideration for the post. In
January, a leading advocate to end juvenile executions in Iran
deemed Ayatollah Larijani's appointment likely. She complained
to IRPO that she was uncomfortable with Larijani's possible
appointment because his legal views are unknown. Whereas she
considers Shahrudi a good man but ineffective, she termed
Ayatollah Larijani "very political."




4. (C/NF) UNHCR Worker Predicts Hard(er) Times Ahead for
Afghans in Iran: An Iranian employee of the UNHCR in Tehran
told IRPO that he expects Afghans in Iran to come under

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increasing pressure in coming months as the effects of the
slowdown in construction in major cities becomes more
pronounced. He explained that the construction boom of recent
years had been the primary source of employment for Afghans in
Iran, and that construction companies overwhelmingly prefer to
hire Afghans, who are regarded as hard workers and are not
covered by Iran's rigorous labor protection laws. The UNHCR
protection officer predicted that the IRIG will be hard pressed
to deal with the looming crisis as increasing numbers of illegal
economic migrants enter from Afghanistan at the same time as
their employment opportunities are dwindling. He also observed
that many in the IRIG believe their support for Afghan refugees
over the years has been underappreciated by the international
community, but cautioned that any goodwill gestures to help
Iran's capacity to deal with the refugee and migrant community
should be channeled "indirectly" to Iran through the UN.
Otherwise, the initiative is likely to be met with "suspicion"
by the IRIG. He also noted that long-term policy pertaining to
refugees and illegal migrants is set by the Supreme National
Security Council, although implementation typically falls to the
Ministry of Interior and the Ministry of Labor. Comment: These
observations track what we've been hearing from other sources
about a significant rise in the number of Afghans attempting to
find work in Iran or be trafficked through Iran to destinations
in Turkey and continental Europe.




5. (C/NF) BBC Farsi Finding a Receptive Audience: Market
researchers from BBC's Persian TV in Dubai told us that they are
pleased with the initial positive reactions to the channel.
Focus groups and other research among Iranians visiting Dubai
during the Nowruz holiday indicated that the channel is
attracting a large viewership that appreciates its objective
reporting and transparency. Viewers also related well to the
use of Farsi speaking reporters recently brought to London from
Iran. Their research also indicated that the channel was
drawing many younger viewers and that a significant portion of
them were watching via the Internet.




6. (C/NF) One of the researchers, who had been tracking reaction
to the President's Nowruz message by BBC Persian viewers, said
BBC's audience's response was unprecedented in the television
channel's short history and dominated the Iranian blogosphere
for days. Audience reaction was so immediate and supportive
that the atmosphere in the newsroom had been electric, she said.
Comment: Our BBC interlocutors were obviously pleased and noted
that the detail focus groups provided in commenting on the
channel indicated they were attentively watching in Iran. BBC
will share the research with IW watcher in London and VOA.




7. (C/NF) Filmmakers on Mohammad Ehsani's Arrest; Reflections on
IVLPs: Two IRPO contacts acquainted with documentary filmmaker
Mohammad Ehsani confirmed that he has been jailed since July.
One of our sources, who participated in the IVLP program with
Ehsani, said that the group had come under MOIS scrutiny before
it left Iran last year. They were "advised" not to travel to
the US but not prevented from leaving. When they returned, many
were interrogated, and our contact, who helped organize the
program, was banned from leaving Iran for six months. The group
was unsure what had happened to Ehsani, and several months
passed without contact from him following their return. It was
only recently that they received the news that he had been
arrested and placed in Evin prison. They said Ehsani had spoken
publicly of his work with the Asia Society in making a film an
even claimed he intended to make a film financed with USG funds,
which is likely what led to his arrest. Our filmmaker contacts
were supportive of further cooperation among Iranian and
American filmmakers, as have our other film industry contacts.
They cautioned however, that USG-sponsored exchanges and partner
organizations, especially the Meridian International Center,
were under heavy scrutiny. They suggested working indirectly
with universities and other organizations with no direct ties to
the USG, as well as keeping groups to four members or less so as
to attract less MOIS attention. Comment: From this and other
conversations, we are seeing certain similarities in the cases
of IVLP's who attract MOIS attention. Being seen as an
organizer working closely with the USG, or claiming to get USG

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funding, and affiliations with NGOs perceived as having close
ties to the Bush Administration appear to be common
characteristics in the cases of the Alaeis, Ehsani, and Silva
Hartounian.




8. (SBU) Iranian Appellate Court Upholds Alaei Brothers'
Conviction: BBC Persian reported April 7 that an appellate court
has affirmed the six and three year sentences given to Arash and
Kamyar Alaei, respectively. According to their defense
attorney, the court's decision was rendered within one day of
receiving their case files and had come two days before the
beginning of the Nowruz holiday.




9. (C/NF) Iranian Sociologist Comments on Development
Challenges and Ethnic Relations: Chief Editor of the Iranian
Journal of Sociology, Farhang Ershad, met recently with IRPO
Conoff and said that he considers Iran's still prominent clan
and kinship networks a significant obstacle to the country's
development. He complained that appointed Iranian officials
will staff their offices from those among their kinship
networks, to the detriment of the country. Separately, he
commented on the linkages between Persians and Iran's various
ethnic groups. He said that although intermarriage between
Arabs and Persians in Khuzestan is normal, Iran's Arab
population is generally the farthest removed from the Persian
mainstream. Ershad, a professor at Shahid Chamran University in
Khuzestan, said fewer Arabs live in Tehran because they speak
Arabic and have difficulty communicating in Farsi. When
questioned about the Baloch, he agreed that their integration is
also quite weak but admitted that he did know as much about the
Baloch. Perisan-Kurd and Persian-Azeri ties are better,
particularly in Tehran, though he said the mountains separating
the Kurdish and Azeri regions from the rest of the country leave
the two groups somewhat isolated. Ershad also explained with
some amusement that Persians enjoy telling jokes at the
minorities' expense and said Lurs in particular are singled out.
Comment: Persians account for roughly 50% of the Iranian
population and the minority populations, though generally
quiescent, are likely less amused with what they consider
Persian chauvinism and the jokes at their expense. Iranian
Azeris protested for several days in May 2006 following the
publication of an offensive cartoon in a state-owned newspaper.
RICHARDSON