IRAN'S ELECTION - KHATAMI DEPARTS, MOUSAVI ENTERS TO

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 RPO DUBAI 000122

NOFORN
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 3/17/2019
TAGS: PGOV PINR KDEM IR
SUBJECT: IRAN'S ELECTION - KHATAMI DEPARTS, MOUSAVI ENTERS TO
CHALLENGE AHMADINEJAD

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CLASSIFIED BY: Ramin Asgard, Director, Iran Regional Presence
Office - Dubai, DOS.
REASON: 1.4 (b),(d)

1. (C/NF) Summary: Former president Khatami's decision to
withdraw from Iran's upcoming presidential race in favor of
former Prime Minister Mousavi will help consolidate the moderate
vote, strengthening the challenge to Ahmadinejad. Mousavi,
following a twenty-year absence from Iran's political scene, is
hoping to capitalize on his sterling revolutionary credentials
and reputation as an honest, effective manager. Khatami's
endorsement should increase his visibility, particularly among
voters too young to remember Mousavi's tenure as prime minister
during the 1980s. Mousavi, though embraced by the reformist
camp, appears to be emphasizing competence, personal integrity,
and a promise to adhere to the country's laws and constitution
rather than running in order to further a particular ideological
agenda. Though his election would likely portend greater social
freedom and a less confrontational presentation of Iran to the
outside world, he has stated that he remains firmly committed to
defending Iran's "sovereignty" and lauds the country's
"irreversible accomplishments" in nuclear technology as a prime
example of the Islamic Revolution's righteousness. Iranian
elections are notoriously difficult to predict, and key elements
- including the final list of candidates and the effect of
Mousavi's historically contentious relationship with Supreme
Leader Khamenei - remain unclear. However, it is reasonable to
surmise that a Mousavi candidacy actively supported by Khatami
will present a formidable challenge to Ahmadinejad, whose grip
on power seemingly rests on Khamenei's support. End summary.




2. (C/NF) Former president Mohammad Khatami announced his
withdrawal from the race for Iran's tenth presidential election
with a March 17 statement on his campaign website Yaari News in
which he also pledged to support former prime minister Mir
Hussein Mousavi, who publicly announced his own candidacy March

10. By exiting the race, Khatami is making good on earlier
pledges to reduce the number of viable reformist candidates so
as to avoid splitting the moderate vote. While the reasoning
behind his decision is currently subject to robust speculation
across Iran's political spectrum, the move undoubtedly reflects
Khatami's personal ambivalence about running for office again
and his determination to see incumbent President Ahmadinejad
defeated.




3. (C/NF) Whatever the rationale, Khatami's withdrawal and
subsequent endorsement will be a significant boon to Mousavi's
candidacy, especially if Khatami is able to deliver substantial
numbers of young voters to Mousavi. The 67-year old former
prime minister (1981-89) returned to public politics after a
twenty-year absence March 10 by officially announcing his
candidacy for Iran's tenth presidential election with a promise
to return Iran to the "pure Islamic values" envisioned by former
Supreme Leader Khomeini. While little is known about Mousavi's
current views on specific policy issues, he is generally
favorably regarded, especially by older Iranians who remember
him as an honest, capable manager during the Iran-Iraq War. As
a result of his long absence from the public political scene
however, he lacks the name recognition of Khatami or incumbent
president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, particularly among Iran's youth.
(Note: The minimum voting age in Iran is 15. Voters between 15
and 30 years of age comprise about half of the country's
eligible voters.)




4. (C/NF) Admirers of Mousavi claim that his withdrawal from
political life in 1989 further burnished his image among many
Iranians, who view him as "untainted" and "uncorrupted" in
comparison with many contemporary political figures who are seen
as having personally profited from their government positions.
He is also admired by older Iranians who remember his
willingness to stand up to now Supreme Leader Ayatollah
Khameini, who served as president during much of Mousavi's
tenure as prime minister. Numerous IRPO contacts have been
quick to draw this distinction between Khatami and Mousavi,
contrasting the former president's perceived weakness vis-`-vis
Khamenei and other hardline elements of the regime with the
collective memory of Mousavi's willingness as prime minister to
challenge and/or circumvent then-president Khamenei.


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5. (C/NF) In recent public comments, including a speech at the
University of Tehran earlier this month and the announcement of
his candidacy, Mousavi played up these attributes, signaling
that his campaign will focus on his dated but proven record of
managerial competence and personal integrity. In a thinly
veiled critique of Ahmadinejad, Mousavi assailed government
officials prone to using "illegal means" and circumventing the
country's laws and constitution to achieve their goals, no
matter how well intentioned. Not only are such actions a
violation of public trust, he asserted while announcing his run
for office, but also a "denial of common sense." With such
comments, Mousavi is attempting to capitalize on the
increasingly loud chorus of critics of Ahmadinejad's management
of the economy and alleged misappropriation of a billion
dollars' worth of oil revenue, even from former allies in the
Majles.




6. (C/NF) Mousavi is also trying to undermine Ahmadinejad's
appeal through "guilt by association" with repeated attacks on
his previous and current interior ministers -- the former was
forced from office for faking a doctoral degree from Oxford and
the latter, former Revolutionary Guard Commander Sadeq Mahsouli,
is known as the "billionaire general." In an effort to
highlight his own revolutionary credentials, in multiple recent
public statements Mousavi has referenced his friendships with
highly respected IRGC commanders killed during the Iran-Iraq War
and contrasted their sacrifices with Mahsouli and others who
have "abused their positions of public trust" to enrich
themselves and their families at the expense of the Iranian
people. To further bolster his argument that he best represents
the true values of the Islamic Revolution, he frequently draws
attention to his humble lifestyle. Supporters have been quick
to highlight biographical details that illustrate Mousavi's "man
of the people" appeal: he has lived in Naziabad, a poor district
in South Tehran that was heavily bombarded by the Iraqis during
the war, since the 1980s; after his tenure as prime minister he
returned to private life as a painter and architect; none of his
three children has tried to capitalize on their family name, etc.




7. (C/NF) Despite Mousavi's generally positive reputation,
middle income and wealthy Iranians are quick to recall his
war-time nickname "Mister Coupon" for the rationing system
imposed during shortages in the 1980s. Although Iranians
opinion leaders generally speculate that his policy views have
"evolved" since the revolutionary period, his recent statement
include frequent references to the need to form a proper
"Islamic economy," merging populist and socialist-like economics
with national underpinnings in another direct challenge to
Ahmadinejad for lower-income voters. During a February press
conference, Mousavi pointed to a "Buy America" clause in the
U.S.'s economic stimulus package as an example of how
governments should act in the national interest "even if the
rules violate WTO safeguards."




8. (C/NF) Reformers have embraced Mousavi as one of their own,
despite the fact that he was apparently not involved in the
intellectual origins of the movement in the mid-90s. A recent
editorial in the reformist daily Etemad cited Mousavi's "belief
in the supremacy of law" as the most important trait binding him
to the reform movement. Multiple IRPO contacts have cautioned
against assuming that Khatami and Mousavi are ideologically
interchangeable, however. One well-established IRPO contact
observed that while a Mousavi presidency would likely witness
the return to an era of greater freedom of expression
domestically and a less confrontational external approach, he is
a staunch nationalist who remains committed to the goals of the
Islamic Revolution as interpreted by Ayatollah Khomeini.
Indeed, during the announcement of his candidacy Mousavi pointed
to Iran's "irreversible achievements" in developing nuclear
technology in the face of Western opposition as a prime example
of Iran's ability to "succeed on its own."



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9. (C/NF) Perhaps the most important unanswered question about
Mousavi is the current state of his relationship with Supreme
Leader Khamenei. While the leader does not select the winner
per se, he can exercise significant influence over the final
outcome, particularly in a relatively close election.
Conventional wisdom holds that Khamenei still harbors resentment
of Mousavi from their unusually public political rivalry in the
1980s and would likely be unwilling to allow someone with the
fortitude to challenge him attain the presidency. Yet, despite
his withdrawal from political life twenty years ago, Mousavi has
been repeatedly appointed to the Expediency Council since 1989,
an indication that while perhaps not an ally of Khamenei, he is
still a member of the regime establishment and has not crossed
any red-lines with the Supreme Leader.






10. (C/NF) Comment: Iranian elections are notoriously difficult
to predict and internal maneuvering up to and through the
Guardians Council vetting process in late May will no doubt
alter the political landscape in advance of the June 12
election. Khatami's withdrawal and endorsement of Mir Hussein
Mousavi, however, provides a significant boost to the
reform-oriented, moderate camp. The reformers in 2005 were
unable to unite behind a single candidate; if they can do so
behind Mousavi, their electoral prospects would certainly
increase. Khatami, if he campaigns for Mousavi, can help
increase the former Prime Minister's name recognition among
Iranian youth. Mousavi too has impeccable revolutionary
credentials and his past ties to Khomeini will make it difficult
for the Guardian Council to reject his qualifications-a scenario
IRPO contacts deem unlikely. And Mousavi is clearly making a
concerted effort to "out-Ahmadinejad" Ahmadinejad by blending
economic populism, a return to "pure" Islamic values, fierce
nationalism with his own record of competent management-an area
where Ahmadinejad is vulnerable.




11. (C/NF) Comment (contd.): Still, Mousavi's candidacy faces
several key challenges, not least of which is his poor
relationship with Khamenei. The Supreme Leader's continued
support for Ahmadinejad, and reported opposition to Khatami's
candidacy, suggests he wants a more pliable president in office.
And the reformist ranks still have two prominent candidates as
Mehdi Karroubi has vowed to remain in the race, at least through
the vetting process, which ends just two weeks before the
election. Karroubi came in third in the 2005 election and is
also likely to campaign as an economic populist, raising the
possibility that Karroubi and Mousavi will draw votes from one
another.
ASGARD