IRAN REGIONAL PRESENCE OFFICE - WINDOW ON IRAN - MARCH 10,

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 RPO DUBAI 000115

NOFORN
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 3/10/2019
TAGS: PREL PGOV KDEM CONS IR AF
SUBJECT: IRAN REGIONAL PRESENCE OFFICE - WINDOW ON IRAN - MARCH 10,
2009

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CLASSIFIED BY: Ramin Asgard, Director, Iran Regional Presence
Office - Dubai, DOS.
REASON: 1.4 (b),(d)

1. [S/NF] Reformist MP Khoeni On Future of Reform Movement: Last
week former MP (Sixth Majles) Moussavi Khoeni spoke about his
experiences as a parliamentarian and his views on reformist
participation in the upcoming presidential elections. Turning
now to his views on the future of the reformist movement in
Iran, he noted that Supreme Leader Khamenei and Guardian Council
head Ayatollah Jannati both referred to the Reformist period
(1997-2005) as a "mistake" during meetings with Majles officials
and had cautioned that "we won't make this mistake again".
Khoeni was in Dubai applying for a student visa for graduate
study in the US, and welcomed an opportunity to help the USG
better understand the reformist trend, both in Dubai and if/when
he comes to the US. As noted previously, Khoeni does not
support Khatami, but is aiming for "three or four" years down
the road, when he suggests Abdollah Nouri would be the best
candidate to lead a resurgent reformist movement. [Nouri, a
mid-ranking cleric, was Minister of Interior under Khatami, but
was dismissed and ultimately imprisoned for five years for
challenging the validity of the velayat-e faqih.] During the
next three-four years, Khoeni hopes to help build up a revived
reformist movement from the grassroots, apparently from outside
Iran.




2. [S/NF] The Role of the US in the Future of Reformism in Iran:
Moussavi Khoeni offered as assessment of what role the US can
play in the future of the reform movement. While he welcomed
the participation of international organizations in the
reformists' quest to establish human rights and the rule of law
in Iran, he cautioned that "strong outside pressure" would not
help. "Such pressure may be able to change the regime, but will
not be able to effectively administer what comes after it."
Rather, the international community should, he continued, "bring
pressure on areas the people need help". He cited human rights
as a priority, and added that "Democrats need to affirm their
commitment to human rights in Iran". He felt that international
broadcasting could play an important role, but noted VOA as
currently set up was too one-sided and remote from realities
inside Iran to be relevant. He cautioned against relying for
editorial direction on VOA staff that have been away from Iran
for decades and lack understanding of today's realities. He
suggested that VOA engage in greater direct dialogue with the
Iranian people about issues in a more "professional" manner.
They should not present every issue in "digital" terms, he said.
[Note: As an IT specialist by training, he explained that he
meant to avoid 1/0 or black/white analysis.] He suggested VOA
should allow broader debate of viewpoints, like Al Jazeera.
This he added, would remove the stigma facing those who appeared
on VOA, which rendered even highly credible Iranians who
appeared on VOA into "stooges of the US." Finally, Khoeni noted
that sanctions should be better targeted to hurt the IRIG, not
the Iranian people.




3. [S/NF] Comment: Mousavi Khoeni's advocacy for Abdollah Nouri,
who is a leading advocate in Iranian politics for abolishing the
Velayat-e Faqih, as a reformist standard bearer in the near
future suggests that at least some reformists are looking to
advance major structural changes to Iran's political system,
including targeting the top of the power structure for major
reform/elimination. Meanwhile, Khatami, who has also, according
to previous IRPO reporting, has reportedly abandoned his support
for the institution of the velayat-e faqih, continues to serve
as the reformists' best near term prospect of a return to
prominence. Given Rafsanjani's well-known plans to replace the
velayat with a ruling council, it appears the reformists have a
strong consensus on this core issue - the institution of the
Supreme Leader (at least as currently constituted) must go.




4. [S/NF] Iran Seeks Security Agreement, Greater Transport Links
with Afghanistan: During a recent encounter with a senior Afghan
government official transiting Dubai, IRPO Officer learned that
Iran is seeking a security partnership agreement with
Afghanistan, which would include a specific provision that
"Afghan territory would not be used to launch any attack on
Iran." He added that Iran raised this issue immediately after

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Afghanistan concluded a security agreement with the US. (Note:
The parallels to the US-Iraq SOFA/SA are striking.) This
official also noted that Iran is looking to greatly enhance its
transport ties with Afghanistan, and plans to invest 20 billion
USD over the next five years to develop its large blue water
port facilities at Chah Bahar on the Sea of Oman. [Note: The
Chah Bahar Port/Free Zone is the main port facility where goods
bound for transport to Afghanistan and Central Asia enter Iran.
Such shipments would be greatly facilitated through the 2008
inauguration of the India-Iran Chah Bahar - Zaranj - Delaram
highway project linking the Afghan ring road to the Indian
Ocean.] Finally, this official the Afghans and Iranians are
discussing a road project to link Herat directly to Kabul
through the Hazara region.




5. [S/NF] Does a Television Monopoly Help of Hurt Ahmadinejad?:
An IRPO contact who is heavily involved in the Star TV Farsi
project offered some analysis of the Iranian media market and
IRIB. He said that the conventional wisdom predicts that IRIB's
constant, positive coverage of Ahmadinejad will help his
electoral campaign. He noted, however, IRIB's packaging of the
president is unsophisticated propaganda. He suggested that many
Iranian viewers will see it for what it is, and it may reinforce
their negative perception of Ahmadinejad's mismanagement of the
economy. Although the Star TV project is exclusively
entertainment programming and may not represent the ideological
challenge to the IRIG of VOA or BBC Persian, our contact said
the IRIG may feel threatened by it for other reasons. He
explained that IRIB generates USD 200 to 300 million in
advertising and other revenue for the government. Star TV's
backers believe that they can attract some of those advertisers
away from IRIB, cutting into its revenue. If they succeed, and
hurt IRIB financially, then the IRIG may try to retaliate, he
said. Comment: Media access will be a defining feature of the
presidential campaign, and no candidate is likely to get as much
television coverage as Ahmadinejad. We agree with our
interlocutor's assessment that extensive coverage that tries to
conceal his failing economic policies may backfire.




6. [S/NF] Mixed Signals on Hollywood Delegation's Visit: The
visit of an Academy of Motion Picture Arts and Sciences (AMPAS)
delegation has prompted some curious recriminations within the
IRIG over who authorized the delegation to visit Iran.
Ahmadinejad's art advisor and other officials demanded an
apology for Hollywood's insults to Iran and the conservative
daily Kayhan asserted that the visit had the same ill intent as
USG-sponsored exchange programs. The visit generally received
positive press coverage in Iran and culminated in Annette
Benning and the others from Hollywood being named honorary
members of the Iranian House of Cinema. This week, MPs summoned
the ministers of Culture and Islamic Guidance, Foreign Affairs,
and Intelligence and Security on March 8 to answer questions on
who invited the group and issued them visas during a period of
"cultural onslaught," according to one MP. He criticized
officials for not scrutinizing the purpose of the visit closely
enough. Minister of Culture and Islamic Guidance Mohammad
Hossein Saffar Harandi defended the visit as completely legal.
Comment: As our recent experience shows, the IRIG is strictly
vetting any visits with some connection to the U.S. Despite the
public criticism of Hollywood's treatment of Iran, however,
there was sufficient support within the IRIG from behind the
scenes for this visit to go forward. This episode reinforces our
view that exchanges with the U.S. remain a highly factionalized
issue within the IRIG but that under the right conditions, i.e.
no obvious USG connection and devoid of any political overtones,
they can go forward.




7. [C/NF] Majles Rejects Ahmadinejad's Cash Handouts: On March
8th the Majles voted to remove the clause in the government's
proposed Economic Reform Plan that would have redistributed
subsidies on fuel, water and electricity as cash handouts to
low-income Iranians. According to the Ministry of Economic
Affairs and Finance, under the plan some 70% of families would
have been eligible to receive $80 per month on average in direct

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cash payments. Comment: Ahmadinejad has made the Economic
Reform Plan and its goal of replacing subsidies with direct
payments to needy families key elements of his promise to both
reduce the economy's dependence on oil exports and to provide
"economic justice" to lower and working-class Iranians. The
Majles' rejection of his cash payment plan will force the
president to find other ways to appeal to lower-income voters,
who make up his base. The decision also casts in doubt the
timing of the removal of subsidies, since the government will
have to come up with another way to offset the steep rise in
prices for consumers.




8. [C] Iranians Booking Fewer Visa Appointments in Dubai: The
online booking system for visa appointments in Dubai has
availability throughout March and into April - a rarity in
recent memory. The consulate has been offering 170 visa
appointments per day to Iranians and, until the last two weeks,
applicants had booked every opening soon after becoming
available. The total number of incoming applicants is also
down. Last year, 1,411 applicants applied for visas between 11
February and 10 March; this year 1,044 applied during the same
time frame (Only a portion of those with an appointment appear
at the consulate for an interview; the figures cited refer to
those actually appearing). Comment: IRPO Conoff queried a few
applicants regarding whether the visa application process has
become harder recently; none mentioned anything accounting for
the decrease. The drop may be temporary and may relate to the
Iranian New Year (March 21),but Norouz in past years has not
coincided with such a drop.




9. [U] Window on Iran is a classified, weekly product providing
Washington policy community and Iran watchers highlights of key
developments on Iran. It is produced by the Iran Regional
Presence Office - Dubai. Please direct any questions/comments
to Kay McGowan (mcgowanka2@state.sgov.gov
) or Charlie Pennypacker
(pennypacker@state.sgov.gov
).
ASGARD