U.S.-RUSSIA TALKS IN ROME ON START FOLLOW-ON

S E C R E T ROME 000476

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/29/2029
TAGS: PARM PREL KACT START JCIC US RS IT
SUBJECT: U.S.-RUSSIA TALKS IN ROME ON START FOLLOW-ON
AGREEMENT

REF: A. STATE 41125

B. 08 STATE 114461

C. 08 STATE 117164

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Elizabeth L. Dibble for reasons 1.4 (b
) and (d)

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Summary
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1. (S) During the initial discussions of the START follow-on
agreement, the heads of delegation (Assistant Secretary for
Verification, Compliance and Implementation Rose Gottemoeller
and Russian Ambassador Anatoly Antonov) agreed to a tentative
work program for developing the major elements of the
agreement for presentation to Presidents Obama and Medvedev
in July. A/S Gottemoeller presented some initial U.S.
thoughts on substantive elements the U.S. believed should be
contained in a START follow-on agreement, and on how
verification measures drawn from START, when combined with
experience gained during implementation of START, could be
modified to construct an effective verification regime for
the START follow-on agreement. Antonov stated that the
Russian position on START follow-on was already well known
and that key issues for Russia included discussion in the
negotiations of the linkage between strategic offensive and
defensive forces, and the inclusion in the agreement of
strategic systems armed with conventional warheads. A/S
Gottemoeller noted that the Presidents' London statement
included agreement that the sides would discuss missile
defense cooperation, but stated that the current talks should
focus "like a laser" on negotiating a treaty on offensive
reductions. Antonov expressed concern that the other three
START parties (Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan) all have
stated they wanted to be part of the START follow-on
agreement. He and A/S Gottemoeller agreed that the United
States and Russia should develop a joint approach to make it
clear to Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine that we are firm in
our intent that the START follow-on agreement be bilateral,
but are willing to assure them that their status regarding
security assurances remains unchanged. End summary.

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July Report to Presidents
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2. (S) Assistant Secretary for Verification, Compliance and
Implementation Rose Gottemoeller led the U.S. delegation for
talks on a START follow-on agreement in Rome on April 24,

2009. Ambassador Anatoly Antonov led the Russian delegation.
The three-hour session was held in the U.S. Embassy and was
followed by a brief press conference. Full delegation lists
are provided in paragraph 16.


3. (S) A/S Gottemoeller began the meeting by noting that the
purpose of the meeting was to discuss how the United States
and the Russian Federation would meet the mandate given by
Presidents Obama and Medvedev to provide a progress report in
July in Moscow on their progress in negotiating a follow-on
START agreement. She suggested incorporating elements of
this report into a document that could be signed by the two
presidents at the summit. As a possible template for the
structure of this document, she passed Antonov a copy of the
text of the June 17, 1992, Washington Summit Joint
Understanding signed by Presidents Bush and Yeltsin.


4. (S) Antonov replied that the Russian Federation would
consider the 1992 document, but would be open to a variety of
possible formats. He added that substance would be more
important than the format and stressed the need to agree on a
common approach. Antonov commented that the 1992 document
took more than six months of negotiations in Geneva to reach
agreement, and noted that much less time exists prior to the
July summit.

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Schedule for START Follow-On Talks
--------------


5. (S) After discussion on a variety of possible dates and
venues for further talks, a tentative schedule was agreed
upon. On May 6, A/S Gottemoeller and Antonov would meet in
Washington to continue with the preparatory talks for opening
formal negotiations. (Begin Comment: Antonov also proposed
the possibility of additional discussions while he and A/S

Gottemoeller were in New York for the NPT PrepCom that week.
End Comment.) On May 18-20, the Delegations would meet in
Moscow to begin a detailed discussion of the major elements
each side proposed for the START follow-on agreement. On
June 1-3, the Delegations would meet in Geneva. Antonov said
that Russia proposed Geneva (which the U.S. said it would
consider) because all Russian arms control experts would be
in Geneva for the JCIC talks, preventing the possibility of
holding START follow-on negotiations elsewhere. Antonov
signaled a strong preference not to hold a round in early
June in Moscow. Beginning on June 15, the Delegations would
meet in Geneva to conclude framework discussions and prepare
the final version of the progress report to Presidents. A/S
Gottemoeller stated the U.S. would be prepared to continue
this session as long as necessary to conclude the report to
be presented at the July summit.

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Substantive Elements
--------------


6. (S) Drawing upon guidance contained (Ref A),A/S
Gottemoeller presented some initial U.S. thoughts on the
possible form of the START follow-on framework within the
progress reports to the Presidents and the substantive
elements the U.S. believed should be contained in a START
follow-on agreement. She also outline U.S. views (Ref A)on
how verification measures drawn from START and modified for
the specific provisions of the follow-on agreement could be
combined with experience gained during implementation of
START, to construct an effective verification regime for the
START follow-on agreement. She passed the Russian side
separate non-papers (points contained in Ref A) on the
substantive elements and effective verification measures.


7. (S) Antonov responded by noting that the U.S. had an
advantage in the START follow-on talks because the U.S.
"already knew the Russian position," which had been
presented , for example, in the Aide-Memoire (Begin Comment:
No Reporting Cable. End Comment )provided by Russia on
December 15, 2008, in response to a draft treaty the United
States had provided to Russia in October 2008 (Refs B and
C). Referring to the U.S. proposal made in A/S
Gottemoeller's remarks that the new treaty count
"operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads," Antonov
commented that no common U.S./Russian understanding existed
on the definition of that term, and that one needed to be
developed and agreed upon by both sides. He noted, however,
that the U.S. position outlined by A/S Gottemoeller contained
"new and nuanced" changes from previous U.S. proposals.


8. (S) Antonov stressed that the Russian goal in these talks
was not simply to reduce nuclear armaments for their own
sake, but Russia must also take into account its own
important security interests in negotiating the treaty. In
addition, Russia was interested in protecting strategic
stability in any new treaty. During the course of the
discussions, Antonov returned several times to the assertion
that Russia's security interests in START follow-on talks
required a linkage between limits on strategic offensive and
strategic defensive capabilities. Antonov's complaints on
U.S. missile defense activities focused on the so-called
"third site" deployments in Poland and the Czech Republic,
and the prospects for fourth and fifth sites in Europe. He
noted that if the talks did not address this linkage, it
would be "extremely difficult to find a common basis for a
START follow-on treaty." Antonov noted that the Russian
Federation supported effective verification measures but that
it would need explanations from the United States on which
START Verification provisions it wanted to retain and delete,
and the reasoning behind the decisions.


9. (S) A/S Gottemoeller noted that the U.S. would not link
missile defense to the START follow-on talks and suggested
instead that discussions of missile defense cooperation
should be carried out in a separate high-level series of
bilateral consultations. She stressed that the U.S. believes
that both sides should maintain a "laser-light' focus during
the START follow-on talks on limiting strategic offensive
arms. Antonov persisted in stating that there must be a link
to strategic defense measures in the START follow-on talks.
Antonov responded that the United States and Russia had
discussed possible missile defense cooperation at a number of
meetings over the last several years and that during those
meetings Russia had made it very clear that it would never
support U.S. missile defense programs that would undercut

Russian security, even if cooperation were offered by the
United States for those programs. Lt. Gen. Buzhinskiy noted
that all MOD assessments of the adequacy of future Russian
strategic nuclear forces must take into account prospective
U.S. missile defense capabilities.


10. (S) A/S Gottemoeller pressed Antonov on whether any
elements of the Russian position had changed since the
December 15, 2008 Aide-Memoire. Antonov repeated that the
Russian position was well known to the United States. Look
asked that the Russian side prepare a paper identifying the
basic elements of the Russian position for the meetings in
May. Antonov said he would look into doing so.


11. (S) Antonov asked whether the United States had decided
what numerical limits should be imposed by the START
follow-on agreement. Warner, noting Antonov's earlier
remarks that Russian security interests were an important
element in the development of Russian negotiating positions,
replied that the U.S. also had to take into account its
national security requirements in developing positions for
the START follow-on treaty. He noted that efforts were just
getting underway in the Department of Defense to conduct the
Congressionally-mandated Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) that
would analyze U.S. nuclear force requirements for the coming
years. Warner stated that in recognition of the importance
of the START follow-on efforts, the Department of Defense was
accelerating the NPR-related analyses needed to support the
negotiations, and was committed to having U.S. numbers
available for discussion during June for the negotiations
leading up to the July Summit.


12. (S) Antonov stated that another element of the START
follow-on agreement that was an important issue for Russia
was the inclusion of conventionally-armed strategic ballistic
missiles. He stated that he understood that the United
States was planning to deploy only a small number of such
conventionally-armed missiles and, if the number was to be
small, wondered why the United States could not simply agree
to include these weapons in the warheads limited by the new
treaty. Antonov continued that yet another serious element
of the Russian position was that the new treaty should
contain the START provision that prohibits basing of
START-limited systems outside the national territory of each
state. He said that Russia could support the extension of
the START provisions on verification of bombers that were
temporarily stationed outside of national territory.

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Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine
--------------


13. (S) Antonov stated that he was concerned by the
statements made by Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan in
December 2008 at the START Joint Compliance and Inspection
Commission session, that they wanted to be included in the
START follow-on negotiations and the treaty that emerged. He
was particularly concerned by the Ukrainian statement that
Ukraine believed the security assurances provided to Ukraine
from the United States and Russia were directly connected to
Ukraine's participation in START. Once START expires,
Ukraine asserted, these security assurances would also expire
and Ukraine might be forced to withdraw from the Nuclear
Nonproliferation Treaty. Ultimately, Antonov suggested, this
issue was not a substantive issue for Ukraine, but was driven
by its belief that participation in strategic arms control
gave it a higher status in the eyes of the rest of the world.
In his view, the United States and Russia needed to work
together to convince the three other parties to START that
the assurances given to them will not expire with the START
Treaty, and to confirm to the three that we are firm in our
intent that the START follow-on negotiations and agreement be
bilateral in nature. A/S Gottemoeller, mentioning a
commemoration of the 1993-94 Trilateral Statement
negotiations that she had participated in in December 2008 in
Moscow, said that further ideas for security cooperation may
help to assuage concerns and invest the three countries
further in the nonproliferation regime. She undertook to
provide some ideas for further discussion.

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Compliance Report
--------------


14. (S) During the discussions, Antonov stated that he
thought the U.S. scheduled issuance in the near term future

of the report to Congress on national compliance with various
arms control agreements that was harshly critical of Russia
would "spoil the atmosphere" of greater cooperation that both
countries were working to develop. He said that if such a
report were to be issued, Russia would be forced to issue a
strong denial of any claims it contained that Russia was not
meeting it treaty obligations. A/S Gottemoeller noted that
this report is a legal requirement and could not be ignored.


15. (S) At the end of the meeting Antonov stated that an
Aide-Memoire on missile defense which Russia had provided to
the United States during the London meetings in March seems
to have been lost in Washington, given the fact that Russia
had not received a response to this Aide-Memoire. He passed
another copy of the document to A/S Gottemoeller, and asked
that she take it back to Washington and provide it to the
appropriate people. (Begin Comment: The Russian Aide-Memoire
will be hand-carried back to Washington. End Comment.)

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Delegation Lists
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16. (U) Russia:

U.S.

Assistant Secretary Rose Gottemoeller, State/VCI
George Look, Senior Director, NSC
Edward Warner, OSD
Matthias Mitman, U.S. Embassy, Rome

Russian Federation

Ambassador Anatoly Antonov, MFA
Lieutenant General Evgeniy Buzhinskiy, MOD
Sergey Koshelev, MFA
Vladimir Proshin, Russian Embassy, Rome
Colonel Sergey Kolevatov, Russian Embassy, Rome


17. (U) This cable was cleared by A/S Gottemoeller.
DIBBLE