G-8 NONPROLIFERATION DIRECTORS GROUP MEETING

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 ROME 001240

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/02/2019
TAGS: PREL PARM UNSC KNNP KSUM
SUBJECT: G-8 NONPROLIFERATION DIRECTORS GROUP MEETING

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Classified By: Political-Military Counselor Liam Wasley for Reasons 1.4
(b) and (d)


Summary
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1. (C) The last Nonproliferation Directors Group (NPDG)
meeting of Italy's G8 Presidency was held October 28 at the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) in Rome. Chaired by
Minister Filippo Formica, deputy director of the MFA's Office
of Multilateral Political Affairs, the agenda covered
regional issues (Iran, DPRK); Nonproliferation and
Disarmament (NPT review process, CTBT, FMCT, and sensitive
technology transfer); UNSC 1540; the IAEA Additional
Protocol, a report on the G8 Global Partnership, and a
preview of Canada's 2010 G8 Presidency. Representatives from
all G8 countries attended, as well from the EU Secretariat
and the EU Commission. The U.S. delegation was led by DAS
for Nuclear Nonproliferation Policy and Negotiations Eliot
Kang. Threat Reduction Program Coordinator Ambassador Bonnie
Jenkins also attended the meeting. End summary.

NPDG Divided on Iran
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2. (C) During the last NPDG meeting of the 2009 Italian G8
presidency on October 28, 2009 in Rome, directors confirmed
their basic differences on Iran, with France and Japan
warning that the TRR arrangements risked legitimizing Iran,s
nuclear enrichment program and joining the U.S. and UK in
arguing that an effective dual track approach must present
the compelling possibility of strict sanctions for
non-compliance. Russia was strongly skeptical of this
approach, taking issue with interpretations of the UNSC
resolutions and questioning the validity of intelligence
assessments on Iran. Russia said Iran was deeply suspicious
as well and wanted &material collateral,8 not just
guarantees; this was behind Iran,s pressing for schemes
involving immediate exchanges and supply of uranium in
portions, rather than all at once.

Japan Reports on DPRK
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3. (C) Japan updated on the visit of the Chinese Premier to
North Korea and further noted the need to recognize that the
DPRK had not taken any positive steps and actually had
conducted ballistic tests; Japan supported strong G-8
sanctions against DPRK and said China,s role in the effort
would be important. DAS Kang emphasized that the Six-Party
Talks were about denuclearization and observed that the
sanctions were having an effect.

2010 NPT RevCon Planning
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4. (C) All agreed that Middle East issues could
completely disrupt the RevCon, and on the importance of
engaging Egypt to take a more realistic approach. France
also said the RevCon could not be a success without
addressing Iran. Germany noted very high NAM expectations on
disarmament and warned that &there was a long way to go in
overcoming very negative reactions8 among some NAM to
efforts such as UNSCR 1887. Japan reported briefly on the
International Commission on Nuclear Nonproliferation and
Disarmament (ICNND) report, noting it would contain 20 points
for a new international consensus to update the 13 steps
agreed in 2000. (Note: the ICNND is co-chaired by Australia
and Japan; it is not official but is supported by the two

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governments. End note.) Japan said the report would be
issued no later than January 2010 (we asked Japanese
representative Toshio Sano about Australian interest in a
trilateral meeting with the United States to unveil the
report on the margins of the November APEC, but Sano thought
this timing was probably not feasible). Canada drew
attention to its nonpaper describing ways to strengthen the
NPT and said formal demarches requesting G8 views would be
forthcoming.

CTBT Ratification; Pakistan FMCT Policy
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5. (C) Italy said Secretary Clinton,s participation in
the September 24, 2009 CTBT Article XIV Conference on
facilitating entry into force of the Treaty had contributed
greatly to the success of the conference. He also referenced
Under Secretary Tauscher,s side meetings at the conference
to update supporters on U.S. ratification efforts and
exchange ideas on promoting early entry into force. DAS Kang
said the United States was carefully laying the groundwork
for the ratification effort, citing the National Academy of
Sciences study on technological advances, direct involvement
of the Vice President,s office as well as Secretary Clinton
and U/S Tauscher, and work on the U.S. CTBTO assessment to
help operationalize the global verification regime. The
other G8 members echoed Italy,s positive remarks: France
said U.S. CTBT ratification could help spur non-members to
join the NPT, promote support for a Middle East WMD-Free
Zone, and encourage Chinese CTBT ratification. At Russia,s
suggestion, there was agreement to explore a G8 demarche to
the other Annex 2 countries (China, DPRK, Egypt, India,
Indonesia, Iran, Israel, and Pakistan),although approaching
DPRK remained problematic. DAS Kang noted that it was also
important for the G8 to mobilize third countries to press
remaining Annex 2 countries as well. The EU Council said a
G8 demarche would show Egypt that the G8 was serious about
Israel and could also be effective in leveraging G-20
membership for India. Japan noted gaps in the International
Monitoring System (IMS) in Egypt and Saudi Arabia and
suggested that having the PTS and CTBTO press Egypt and Saudi
on this could facilitate Israeli accession to the CTBT. The
EU Council noted a new EU joint action plan to support CTBTO
was needed and would factor in the missing IMS stations.


6. (C) On FMCT, Italy noted G8 member efforts to address
Pakistan,s concerns and press it to join consensus on the
2009 program of work at the Conference on Disarmament (CD).
DAS Kang and the UK rep supported G8 action to reach out to
Pakistan; the UK noted that many, including London, shared
some of Pakistan,s concerns about a Fissile Material Cut-off
Treaty (FMCT). Germany emphasized that the credibility of
the CD was at stake if negotiations did not get underway in
January 2010; nevertheless, Pakistan had legitimate security
concerns that needed to be taken into account. Germany noted
its November 17-18 experts, seminar, &Towards FMCT.8 The
Directors seemed resigned to Pakistan,s being too
distracted at the moment to make a meaningful change in its
FMCT policy; Japanese DG Sano opined that China and others
(undefined) were continuing to hide behind Pakistan on this
issue; Germany agreed and suggested the United States might
leverage its security support for Pakistan. Sano said China
was key to persuading Pakistan, and because of this the P5
might be more effective than the G8.

Sensitive Technology Transfers and NSG
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7. (C) On transfers of sensitive technology and the NSG,
Germany lamented the lack of progress in the NSG on the
criterai approach. Japan cited very intensive NSG

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discussions on the Additional Protocol as a condition of
supply and reiterated that while Argentina and Brazil claimed
special status, such status should be temporary and no other
countries should have such consideration. Russia said the
NSG decision had been incorporated in Russian legislation and
that paragraph 7 was the best outcome that could have been
achieved; in addition, it was not acceptable for Turkey to
receive sensitive technology. France cited the vacuum in NSG
rules, so that the L,Aquila language on this was key. DAS
Kang reported on U.S. outreach to Turkey (Kang) and South
Africa (Einhorn). He said Turkey had very ambitious plans
for civil nuclear energy. Suppliers need to make clear that
Turkey cannot ask for the impossible. Kang noted that
nuclear fuel assurances could help. In this regard,
Russia,s excellent proposal in Vienna was potentially very
helpful.


8. (C) Canada said the black box approach was hard to
accept; but Canada joined consensus and hoped in the future
it would develop its own enrichment technology. However,
Canada observed that the timing of attempts to restrict
transfers of ENR before the NPT RevCon was perhaps not very
good and would send the wrong signal. Russia noted recent
talks with South Africa, in which they indicated they could
move ahead on the criteria approach after the NPT RevCon.

UNSCR 1540
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9. (SBU) On UNSCR 1540, Italy recalled the Comprehensive
Review held in New York in September, at which the G-8
statement had been provided. The Review concluded that
outreach activities had largely achieved their purpose, and
there was increased focus on country reporting on
capabilities. Germany hoped to follow up on the October
22-23 G8 meetings with more in-depth discussions and
information exchanges, but not decision-making. On
universalization of 1540 and its follow-on 1810, Italy said
demarches had been made to all the 31 countries that had not
submitted a report to the 1540 committee (except North
Korea). The demarches had been productive, identifying
reasons for lack of implementation and receiving assurances
about intentions to comply. However, cited obstacles such as
lack of resources or knowledge and political stability
indicated that full 1540 implementation remained a distant
goal. Italy suggested demarches to try to encourage greater
1540 activism by regional leaders: China, Egypt, Indonesia,
Mexico, and South Africa, as well as regional organizations
such as the AU, ASEAN, and CARICOM. Russia reiterated,
although in a much lower key, familiar complaints about lack
of support from capitals for 1540, need for higher profile
1540 efforts, avoidance of G8 duplication of the work of the
1540 committee, etc. The UK and United States agreed with
the need for even greater profile and focus of 1540 efforts.
Italy raised the question of whether sub-groups of experts
should be established, noting this had not been resolved.

Universalization of the Additional Protocol
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10. (C) On universalization of the IAEA Additional
Protocol (AP),Italy noted generally encouraging responses to
22 demarches it had carried out, with assistance from Russia
and Germany for two additional demarches to Belarus and
Namibia. A table of responses was circulated. The
conclusion of the demarches was apparently encouraging. Most
delays were caused by bureaucratic difficulties. However,
for some there was a clear political choice involved, such as
Egypt and Israel. All agreed the Egypt/Israel problem was
key, but Canada noted that Argentina's position was ambiguous
and Brazil was likely much more resistant to the AP than

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their official policy pronouncements would indicate. DAS
Kang used this discussion to press for increased resources
for the IAEA as that organization was being asked to do a lot
more. Kang noted that expertise could not be built
overnight; with a new DG from a G8 country coming on board,
there might now be a window of opportunity ) but a narrow
one ) to prepare for the future. Italy noted a seminar on
IAEA AP that it is sponsoring.

Global Partnership
--------------


11. (C) On Global Partnership, Italy reported on the
October 27 meeting of the G8 Global Partnership Working Group
(GPWG) it had hosted with the G8 plus Ukraine, Australia,
Denmark, Finland, Ireland, The Netherlands, Sweden,
Switzerland, and others. Highlights included updates on
Russia and Ukraine projects, including the need for finishing
CW destruction facilities, a Russian briefing on sub
dismantlement to be completed by 2012, a French presentation,
and Italian contributions to dismantlement of an additional
submarine. The October 26 scientist engagement (a
comprehensive new approach replacing the previous
"redirection8 focus) workshop sought to replace the old
fragmented approach with increased emphasis on coordination,
networking, and commercialization as a way to enhance
sustainability. The group also discussed its interest in
continuing geographic expansion of the Partnership, and
anticipated discussion of an extension to the Partnership in

2010. An October 7-8 Mediterranean Contact Group worked to
address Russian recommendations for combating WMD knowledge
proliferation.

Outlook for the Canadian G8 Presidency
--------------


12. (C) On the outlook for the Canadian G8 presidency,
Canada provided a notional schedule of NPDG meetings (week of
January 25 in Ottawa; week of March 15 in Montreal; week of
June 7 in Toronto; and week of October 18 in Ottawa). Canada
said it was virtually decided by the GOC that the G8 FM
meeting would be March 29-30, so the January NPDG would
consider a first draft of a ministerial statement. The
ministerial might be focused on targeted outreach involving
key non-G8 players. Russia asked about a separate
nonproliferation/disarmament document at the summit. Canada
said probably there would be one, but the GOC had not yet
decided. Canada stressed that the ministerial would probably
seek to be involved in the preparations for the NPT RevCon.
Russia also asked about the structure of an FM statement;
Canada said its consultations on the margins of the UNGA
revealed interest in nonproliferation as an area of focus for
the 2010 summit.


13. (SBU) DAS Kang has cleared this cable.


THORNE