Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09ROME1180
2009-10-23 13:00:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Rome
Cable title:
SOMALIA: PRODDING ERITREA TO PLAY A MORE
how-toVZCZCXRO8272 PP RUEHAG RUEHROV RUEHSL RUEHSR DE RUEHRO #1180 2961300 ZNY CCCCC ZZH P 231300Z OCT 09 FM AMEMBASSY ROME TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2802 INFO RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE PRIORITY RUEHDS/AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA PRIORITY 0805 RUEHAE/AMEMBASSY ASMARA PRIORITY 0345 RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO PRIORITY 0457 RUEHDJ/AMEMBASSY DJIBOUTI PRIORITY 0281 RUEHNR/AMEMBASSY NAIROBI PRIORITY 1602 RUEHYN/AMEMBASSY SANAA PRIORITY 0200 RUEHFL/AMCONSUL FLORENCE PRIORITY 3857 RUEHMIL/AMCONSUL MILAN PRIORITY 0289 RUEHNP/AMCONSUL NAPLES PRIORITY 4070 RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 1041
C O N F I D E N T I A L ROME 001180
SENSITIVE
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/20/2019
TAGS: PREL PTER IT SO XW ER
SUBJECT: SOMALIA: PRODDING ERITREA TO PLAY A MORE
CONSTRUCTIVE ROLE
Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission Elizabeth Dibble for reasons 1.4
(b) and (d).
C O N F I D E N T I A L ROME 001180
SENSITIVE
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/20/2019
TAGS: PREL PTER IT SO XW ER
SUBJECT: SOMALIA: PRODDING ERITREA TO PLAY A MORE
CONSTRUCTIVE ROLE
Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission Elizabeth Dibble for reasons 1.4
(b) and (d).
1. (U) This cable is a guidance request. Please see paragraph
5.
2. (C) SUMMARY: On October 19, DCM Dibble met with MFA DG for
Sub-Saharan Africa, Giusseppe Morabito, to discuss strategies
for making the Eritrean government's (GSE) role in Somalia
"more positive." The GOI does not want to single out (for
sanctions or otherwise) the GSE as being directly responsible
for supporting the Shabab insurgents currently fighting
against AMISOM and government forces in Somalia. The GOI
believes such an approach would be ineffective and would
further isolate the Eritrean leadership. Instead, the GOI
favors maintaining an open channel of communication through
enhanced political dialogue and being "flexible in case of
positive signals from Asmara." This effort to engage in a
positive manner does not preclude supporting other measures
to eliminate, or at least limit, assistance to the Shabab
from entities outside of Somalia. Morabito would support a
no-fly zone and port blockade that prevented weapons from
entering Somalia. DCM Dibble indicated she would convey
Morabito's suggestions and relay any feedback. END SUMMARY
Italy Supports the TFG
- - - - - - - - - - -
3. (SBU) The GOI states that it fully supports the
Transitional Federal Government (TFG) of Somalia (as outlined
in its position paper distributed at the September 23, 2009
extraordinary meeting of the International Contact Group
(ICG) on Somalia) and is eager to work with the USG in
stabilizing the region. The GOI has honored its pledges of
support and is planning to send a technical mission to assess
the re-opening of an embassy in Mogadishu as announced at the
ICG meeting in Rome in June 2009, (assuming the security
requirements can be met without breaking the bank). The GOI
will continue its contributions to AMISOM and Somali Security
Forces through the Italian Africa Peace Facility. The GOI
also intends to offer a training program in Nairobi to the
Somali police force with Italian Carabinieri, as well as a
training program for ten Somali customs officers in Italy
with Guardia di Finanza. The GOI states that it will explore
bi-lateral financing to "key" Somali ministries.
Use the Carrot, But No Stick Yet
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
4. (C) As Shabab insurgents continue attacks against AMISOM
and the security forces of the UN-recognized TFG of Somalia,
the GOI has offered to leverage its "special relationship"
with the GSE should the USG request such assistance.
Notwithstanding this offer to serve as an "honest broker"
between the GSE and the USG, the GOI is reluctant to employ
severe language or measures against the GSE out of a concern
that such an approach would leave that government more
isolated. A UNSC resolution which includes sanctions against
Eritrea or specific politicians (such as Yemane Ghebreab,
named by Morabito) risks "backing the country into a corner."
The GOI estimates that such marginalization could
subsequently leave the GSE vulnerable to advances from Iran
and non-state Arab actors in an attempt to impose a
fundamentalist regime.
5. (SBU) Guidance Request. Post requests guidance on how to
most effectively manage Eritrea's currently unhelpful
involvement in Somalia and enhance stability in the Horn of
Africa.
THORNE
SENSITIVE
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/20/2019
TAGS: PREL PTER IT SO XW ER
SUBJECT: SOMALIA: PRODDING ERITREA TO PLAY A MORE
CONSTRUCTIVE ROLE
Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission Elizabeth Dibble for reasons 1.4
(b) and (d).
1. (U) This cable is a guidance request. Please see paragraph
5.
2. (C) SUMMARY: On October 19, DCM Dibble met with MFA DG for
Sub-Saharan Africa, Giusseppe Morabito, to discuss strategies
for making the Eritrean government's (GSE) role in Somalia
"more positive." The GOI does not want to single out (for
sanctions or otherwise) the GSE as being directly responsible
for supporting the Shabab insurgents currently fighting
against AMISOM and government forces in Somalia. The GOI
believes such an approach would be ineffective and would
further isolate the Eritrean leadership. Instead, the GOI
favors maintaining an open channel of communication through
enhanced political dialogue and being "flexible in case of
positive signals from Asmara." This effort to engage in a
positive manner does not preclude supporting other measures
to eliminate, or at least limit, assistance to the Shabab
from entities outside of Somalia. Morabito would support a
no-fly zone and port blockade that prevented weapons from
entering Somalia. DCM Dibble indicated she would convey
Morabito's suggestions and relay any feedback. END SUMMARY
Italy Supports the TFG
- - - - - - - - - - -
3. (SBU) The GOI states that it fully supports the
Transitional Federal Government (TFG) of Somalia (as outlined
in its position paper distributed at the September 23, 2009
extraordinary meeting of the International Contact Group
(ICG) on Somalia) and is eager to work with the USG in
stabilizing the region. The GOI has honored its pledges of
support and is planning to send a technical mission to assess
the re-opening of an embassy in Mogadishu as announced at the
ICG meeting in Rome in June 2009, (assuming the security
requirements can be met without breaking the bank). The GOI
will continue its contributions to AMISOM and Somali Security
Forces through the Italian Africa Peace Facility. The GOI
also intends to offer a training program in Nairobi to the
Somali police force with Italian Carabinieri, as well as a
training program for ten Somali customs officers in Italy
with Guardia di Finanza. The GOI states that it will explore
bi-lateral financing to "key" Somali ministries.
Use the Carrot, But No Stick Yet
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
4. (C) As Shabab insurgents continue attacks against AMISOM
and the security forces of the UN-recognized TFG of Somalia,
the GOI has offered to leverage its "special relationship"
with the GSE should the USG request such assistance.
Notwithstanding this offer to serve as an "honest broker"
between the GSE and the USG, the GOI is reluctant to employ
severe language or measures against the GSE out of a concern
that such an approach would leave that government more
isolated. A UNSC resolution which includes sanctions against
Eritrea or specific politicians (such as Yemane Ghebreab,
named by Morabito) risks "backing the country into a corner."
The GOI estimates that such marginalization could
subsequently leave the GSE vulnerable to advances from Iran
and non-state Arab actors in an attempt to impose a
fundamentalist regime.
5. (SBU) Guidance Request. Post requests guidance on how to
most effectively manage Eritrea's currently unhelpful
involvement in Somalia and enhance stability in the Horn of
Africa.
THORNE