SAUDI KING WILL TRAVEL TO DAMASCUS WHEN HARIRI IS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 RIYADH 000896

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/07/2019
TAGS: PREL PGOV PINR UNSC SA SY LE
SUBJECT: SAUDI KING WILL TRAVEL TO DAMASCUS WHEN HARIRI IS
"READY"

REF: BEIRUT 746

Classified By: CHARGE AMBASSADOR RICHARD ERDMAN,
REASONS 1.4 (B) & (D).


1. (U) This is an action request. See paragraph 10.

SUMMARY
--------------


2. (C) Saudi Information Minister Khoja confirmed to Charge
that King Abdullah's planned July 6 visit to Damascus had
been postponed to allow Saad Hariri the time he needed to
form an inclusive government that did not give the opposition
a blocking third. Achieving this would require Syrian
acquiescence, Khoja argued, but was Lebanon's best chance for
stability and independence. The Saudis were conditioning
improved relations with Syria on Syrian good behavior in
Lebanon and the King would visit Damascus when Hariri advised
he was "ready." Khoja counseled patience, resisting the
influence of Lebanese actors such as Geagea, and "allowing
the Lebanese to create their own solution." Khoja emphasized
the need to consider a wider regional context in which
stability and Syrian cooperation were paramount. To that end,
Khoja suggested a Hariri/King Abdullah visit to Damascus
after the new Lebanese government was agreed but before it
was actually formed. End summary.

KING'S DAMASCUS TRIP POSTPONED
--------------


3. (C) Charge called on Minister of Culture and Information
(and former Saudi Ambassador to Lebanon) Abdulaziz Khoja in
Jeddah on July 6 to reinforce USG concerns regarding a
planned Saudi-Syrian-Lebanese summit in Damascus. Pressing
Hariri to visit Syria before the Lebanese cabinet was formed,
Charge confirmed, could be seen as inviting the Syrians back
into Lebanon, and undoing all the gains Lebanon and March 14
had made toward real independence. Khoja advised that the
Saudis agreed completely and consequently, the King's planned
July 7 visit had been postponed.

SYRIA'S UNDENIABLE ROLE
--------------


4. (C) Charge welcomed this decision, making clear we
continued to believe that bringing Hariri to Damascus prior
to government formation would be a serious mistake. Khoja
agreed this was not a good idea, emphasizing their intention
was to support Hariri and facilitate formation of a new
government that preserved Lebanese independence and
sovereignty. Khoja argued that Hariri had three choices for
the incoming cabinet. He could form a cabinet that excluded
the opposition; he could agree to a cabinet that gave the
opposition a blocking third minority; or he could form a
cabinet that included all parties but did not give any
faction veto power. Lebanon's best option, in the Saudi
view, was the latter choice: an all-inclusive government that
did not/not give the opposition a blocking third minority.
This goal could not be achieved, however, in the face of
Syrian opposition. Therefore the Saudis were attempting to
influence Syrian thinking by making clear to Damascus that
any improvement in Saudi-Syrian relations would be linked to
stability (AKA Syrian good behavior) in Lebanon.



5. (C) The Syrians professed to share the goal of Lebanese
stability, Khoja explained, but "had many requirements." The
Saudi strategy for dealing with these demands was to engage.
Khoja said he did not "refuse out of hand" the initial Syrian
proposals to allow time to consult with the King and Lebanese
parties. Khoja wanted to give the Syrians room to propose an
alternative idea when the Saudis ultimately rejected the
Syrian idea of Hariri and leaders of the other Lebanese
factions traveling to Damascus for negotiations in the
presence of the King and Asad. The Syrians now wanted Hariri
to come to Damascus before a new government was announced.
According to Khoja, the Syrians explained that if Saad came
before government formation, Damascus could be helpful to

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Lebanon. But if he came after government formation, they
would not be helpful.


6. (C) Charge commented that this sounded like blackmail, and
Syria would likely just pocket a visit if it occurred before
cabinet formation and then do whatever it pleased to maximize
its influence and role. Khoja stressed that the Kingdom had
no illusions whatsoever about Syria and agreed this tactic
was tantamount to blackmail. The stark reality, however, was
that Syria could prevent the formation of a government in
Lebanon if it wanted to, and we thus needed to figure out how
to deal with this reality.

THE VISIT WHEN HARIRI IS READY
--------------


7. (C) Charge asked for clarification: had King Abdullah
definitely decided not to visit Damascus before the new
Lebanese government was announced? Khoja answered that the
King would not travel until an agreement had been reached.
"When Saad tells us they're ready, then we'll go." Khoja
then floated a scenario in which Hariri and the King would go
to Damascus AFTER agreement on a government had been reached,
but BEFORE it had actually been formed. Charge, while not
rejecting this idea, responded that a visit after government
formation would be a much cleaner, more straightforward
approach that would avoid the risk of sending the wrong
signal and undermining Hariri. Khoja indicated that this
scenario offered the possibility of gaining Syrian
acquiescence/cooperation while limiting its ability to
dictate government formation. He added that the Saudis
wouldn't consider a trip until they were sure that this
mission (i.e., the kind of government we want) was
accomplished. "We're not in a hurry to go."

WHAT IF HARIRI CAN'T FORM A GOVERNMENT?
--------------


8. (C) Nevertheless, the Saudis were concerned that if Hariri
went to Damascus only after government formation, Asad might
not receive him. Charge rejoined if that was the case, it
said something about Syria's reliability and readiness to be
helpful. Syria's desire for closer cooperation with the
U.S., Charge suggested, should give it an incentive to view
the Lebanon issue in a broader context. We shouldn't play
Syria's game. Khoja agreed, saying "this is a fact."
However, there was "another fact" to be considered: what if
Hariri were unable to form a government? Who would help him?
What would the U.S. be able to do in such a situation? In
Lebanon, there were two alternatives: either "the fighting
continued," or "we start over (with a new Hariri government
the Syrians agree to),because we have many other problems in
the region."

KEEP AN OPEN MIND AND
RESIST PAROCHIAL INTERESTS
--------------


9. (C) Khoja suggested that perhaps the best approach would
be to let the Lebanese "create their own solution." Hariri
should be given time to see what he could achieve in the next
week or two. "Let him create his own future as a leader." In
the meantime, Khoja urged U.S. patience. Please "think with
us," he urged. "We shouldn't give orders to our allies, and
we should resist the influence of Geagea and others. The
problem in Lebanon was that there were 17 countries and 17
leaders. "Geagea thinks he's the U.S. President. Aoun
thinks he's emperor of the world, and Nasrallah thinks he can
rule a country ten times bigger!" The focus now needed to be
on the interests of Lebanon, with a view to its links to
broader regional stability. Khoja emphasized that he wanted
to keep in touch as the Lebanese situation evolved and to
brainstorm with Charge &with an open mind8 on how to
support the government formation process and secure Syrian
cooperation without inviting negative Syrian interference.
In this regard, Khoja said he was calling Saad every 2-3 days
&just to say hello8, see how things were going, and provide
encouragement.


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COMMENT/ACTION REQUEST
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10. (C) Khoja's account of the latest developments largely
tracks with what Embassy Beirut reported in reftel. King
Abdallah would be the first to agree with Hariri's assessment
that "Bashar is a liar." The Saudis have a huge stake in
Lebanon and in preserving the gains they have worked hard to
achieve in the last year. They are unlikely to succumb to
Syrian blackmail. However, they are convinced that
preserving Lebanese independence requires some realpolitik to
mitigate Syria's trouble-making potential. At Khoja's
request, Charge is planning to see Khoja in Jeddah on or
about July 1, following Treasury Secretary Geithner's visit,
to review developments in Lebanon. It would be helpful to
have Washington's views on the idea Khoja floated about a
possible Damascus visit after agreement on government
formation has been reached but before the government is
actually formed.
ERDMAN