Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09RIYADH843
2009-06-27 04:44:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Riyadh
Cable title:  

CHARGE,S JUNE 24 MEETING WITH MFA DEPUTY MINISTER

Tags:  PREL PGOV PTER LE IR IS SA 
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 RIYADH 000843 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/26/2019
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER LE IR IS SA
SUBJECT: CHARGE,S JUNE 24 MEETING WITH MFA DEPUTY MINISTER
JINDAN

Classified By: CDA Ambassador Richard W. Erdman
for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

SUMMARY
-------

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 RIYADH 000843

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/26/2019
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER LE IR IS SA
SUBJECT: CHARGE,S JUNE 24 MEETING WITH MFA DEPUTY MINISTER
JINDAN

Classified By: CDA Ambassador Richard W. Erdman
for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

SUMMARY
--------------


1. (C) In a June 24 meeting with the Charge, MFA Deputy
Minister for Bilateral Affairs Jindan confirmed that
improving Saudi-Syrian relations were being driven by Syria's
improved behavior toward Lebanon and Hamas and by Saudi
Arabia's strategic interest in pulling Syria away from Iran
and drawing it into a more constructive role in the region.
On Middle East peace and Palestinian reconciliation, Jindan
said the President's Cairo speech was resonating with the
"pragmatic" wing of Hamas; indicated that Palestinian
reconciliation efforts were continuing but there was more to
be done; criticized Prime Minister Netanyahu's recent speech
while acknowledging several times that it contained positive
elements; parried Charge's push for confidence-building steps
and increased financial support for the Palestinian
Authority; and urged increased U.S. efforts to "influence"
Israel to take more constructive positions. On Pakistan,
Jindan said his government was quietly working for
reconciliation between the Pakistani government and the
opposition and, in response to CDA's strong push for
additional emergency humanitarian assistance for displaced
persons, said he would raise our request at higher levels.
(END SUMMARY)


IMPROVING RELATIONS WITH SYRIA
--------------


2. (C) MFA Deputy Minister for Bilateral Relations, Khaled
Al-Jindan, during Charge's June 24 introductory call,
described improving Saudi-Syrian relations and Egyptian-Saudi
efforts to work with Syria to promote Palestinian unity.
Echoing the June 23 comments of his MFA colleague Prince
Torki to the Charge, Jindan ascribed the SAG's new policy
tack as a product of Syria's more constructive behavior vis a
vis Lebanon and Hamas, Saudi desires to draw Syria away from
Iran, and the need to enlist Syrian help in forging
Palestinian unity. Jindan noted that Damascus-based Hamas
leader Mishal's recent public statements about accepting an
Israeli state within 1967 borders was one manifestation of

evolving Hamas attitudes.


PRESIDENT'S CAIRO SPEECH RESONATING
WITH HAMAS' MORE PRAGMATIC WING
--------------


3. (C) Jindan praised the President's Cairo speech and said
the President's nuance references to Hamas -- as an
organization with deep roots in Palestinian society and a
responsibility to base its policies on realism, not illusions
-- had been widely and positively noted in the region. The
previous Administration, he added, had oversimplified things,
treating Hamas as homogeneous when in fact it contained
within it two distinct current of thought. One current saw
things as black and white, wanted to re-create the Caliphate,
and was fundamentally radical. Their ambition was not
confined to Palestine but sought a rebirth of the entire
Muslim world. The second current, Jindan suggested, was more
pragmatic, more responsive to Syria, and more willing to cut
a deal on Palestinian unity. Achieving such unity was
essential to resuming negotiations, and Israel could do a lot
to make this possible. By contrast, if it took a hard line,
Israel would simply force the Palestinians to take a hard
line as well.


NEED FOR CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES,
BUDGETARY ASSISTANCE TO PALESTINIAN AUTHORITY
--------------


4. (C) Charge underscored that this was a two-way street and
that both sides, if they were serious about peace, needed to
send positive signals to the other. Everyone -- the parties,
regional players, the U.S., and others -- needed to take
steps to build confidence and create a positive environment
for negotiations. As the President had told the King in
their June 3 meeting, the U.S. could not do this alone. We
needed help. We didn't expect full normalization before a

RIYADH 00000843 002 OF 003


peace settlement but, surely some modest steps in that
direction should be possible and should be considered. With
regard to Palestinian unity, Charge said he fully agreed with
(FM) Prince Saud's comment to him the other day that such
unity was a matter of bringing the radicals (i.e., Hamas) to
the moderates (the PA),and not vice versa. In this regard,
providing additional budgetary support to the Palestinian
Authority was essential, if the moderates were to prevail.


5. (C) Jindan responded that the SAG had never stopped
providing financial assistance to the Palestinians, while
noting their ongoing concerns about corruption. Charge
countered that misuse of budgetary assistance was no longer a
problem, in our view, and the United States was never easily
persuaded on this sort of thing. In this case, however, we
were convinced that the mechanisms and reforms PM Fayyad has
put in place have effectively ensured transparency and
prevented misuse of such assistance. (Comment: We believe
Saudi reluctance to commit to new aid is not a function of
corruption concerns, but of their desire to keep pressure on
the PA to make the necessary compromises with Hamas while
still ensuring that any Palestinian unity government be
committed to Quartet principles.)


FOCUS ON POSITIVES IN NETANYAHU SPEECH,
WHICH HAVE CREATED SOME COMMON GROUND
--------------


6. (C) Jindan said the purpose of this week's Arab League
Summit in Cairo was to provide a joint response to the
President's Cairo speech. Charge hoped whatever statement
came out of the session would make a positive contribution to
Middle East peace efforts and build on the positive aspects
of Israeli PM Netanyahu's speech. Netanyahu, Charge
commented, was addressing multiple audience and it was no
surprise, given the political configuration of his cabinet,
that he had staked out positions unacceptable to the
Arab/Palestinian side. That said, it was important to
distinguish between negotiating preconditions and negotiating
objectives. It was also important to look beyond the obvious
and unfortunate negatives in his speech to recognize that the
speech in fact contained some positive aspects and, for the
first time with a Likud-led government, created common ground
we can now begin to build on. Among these positive elements
were: 1) the acceptance of the two-state principle; 2) the
call for Israel to recognize Palestinian rights; 3)
recognition that an economic peace could not be a substitute
for a diplomatic peace; and 4) readiness to begin
negotiations without preconditions.


7. (C) Jindan agreed there were "positive elements" in the
speech and repeated the phrase several times, suggesting he
had absorbed Charge's argument. But, he commented, the
negative aspects of the speech had made it difficult to see
the positive elements. In addition, the demand to recognize
Israel as a "Jewish state" was problematic because it
excluded Israeli Arabs and prejudged the refugee return
issue. Charge noted he had seen Netanyahu's remarks rendered
two ways in English -- Israel as a "Jewish state" and Israel
as "a state of the Jews," which was a more inclusive concept.
Jindan said the positive aspects of the speech needed to be
defined, clarified, and successful explained, and urged the
U.S. to do everything in its power to exercise positive
influence on Israel and advance Middle East peace.


A CLEAR, STEADY, AND POSITIVE MESSAGE
CONCERNING A TWO-STATE SOLUTION IS ESSENTIAL
--------------


8. (C) Charge responded that it was important to understand
the nature of our interactions with Israel. Israel was a
democracy, we had an unshakable commitment to its security,
and we could not just order it around. Rather, we had to
make clear how we saw U.S. interests -- in this case, Middle
East peace achieve through a two-state solution and
opposition to actions from either side that undermined the
possibility of such a solution and that were ultimately
against the parties' own need for a peaceful settlement. In
this context,for example, we felt Israel was making a
strategic blunder and acting against its own interests to
the extent that it was undermining the possibility of a
two-state solution by pursuing settlement activity. The role

RIYADH 00000843 003 OF 003


of a real friend was to speak honestly and openly, and that
was what we were trying to do with both sides. In the case
of Israel, it was a matter of being steady, clear, and firm
and of conditioning the Israeli leadership, political elite,
and public as to our expectations, interests, needs, and
concerns. If we held firm and kept a clear message, Israeli
attitudes would evolve because they knew that working against
the interest of their most important strategic partner was
ultimately not sustainable. While Israel as well needed to
do its share to build a more positive environment for
negotiations, Arab confidence-building steps were essential
to influencing public opinion in Israel, which ultimately
determined the nature and policies of Israel's government.


SHARED INTEREST IN PROVIDING URGENTLY NEEDED
HUMANITARIAN RELIEF ASSISTANCE TO PAKISTAN
--------------


9. (C) Asked to comment on Saudi relations with Pakistan,
Jindan said that Saudi Arabia had close and long-time ties
with Pakistan and that Pakistan was an important ally of both
the U.S. and Saudi Arabia. Consulting with one another was
essential, because the situation was dangerous, al Qaeda was
seeking to exploit differences between the government and
opposition, and "if things go wrong over there, it will have
a negative impact on all of us." For this reason, the SAG
was quietly working to encourage reconciliation between
President Zadari and opposition leader Nawz Sharif, to whom
the SAG had given the "green light" to leave the Kingdom and
return to Pakistan, once the situation had stabilized.


10. (C) Charge said the situation remained extremely fragile.
Taliban advances into the Swat Valley and other areas had
triggered an enormous humanitarian crisis, increasing
prospects for further instability and creating over two
million displaced persons who would likely be vulnerable to
extremist messages. We appreciated Saudi Arabia's pledge of
$700 million at the Tokyo Conference and its recent airlifts
(5-6 planeloads) of emergency relief supplies. Nonetheless,
the U.S. had provided two-thirds of emergency relief
assistance to date in response to the unfolding humanitarian
crisis, and we strongly hoped our partners could take another
look and do their share.


11. (C) Charge stressed this was a very high priority for the
U.S., especially given our shared interest in preventing
further destabilization and radicalization. Failure to
address the humanitarian crisis would almost certainly leave
the displaced population more vulnerable to extremist
messages. While registering some skepticism as to whether
assistance to Pakistan always ended up with the intended
recipients, Jindan promised to report our request to higher
levels and noted that Minister of State for Foreign Affairs
Madani would be attending the upcoming meetings in Trieste,
where Pakistan and its needs would be discussed.
ERDMAN