Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09RIYADH836
2009-06-24 15:53:00
SECRET//NOFORN
Embassy Riyadh
Cable title:
SAUDIS URGE PUBLIC RESTRAINT ON IRAN
how-toVZCZCXRO8042 OO RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHDIR RUEHKUK RUEHTRO DE RUEHRH #0836/01 1751553 ZNY SSSSS ZZH O 241553Z JUN 09 FM AMEMBASSY RIYADH TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1045 INFO RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL IMMEDIATE
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 RIYADH 000836
NOFORN
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/23/2019
TAGS: PREL SA IR UAE UK
SUBJECT: SAUDIS URGE PUBLIC RESTRAINT ON IRAN
REF: RIYADH 806
Classified By: CDA Ambassador Richard Erdman
reasons 1.4 (b) & (d).
SUMMARY
-------
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 RIYADH 000836
NOFORN
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/23/2019
TAGS: PREL SA IR UAE UK
SUBJECT: SAUDIS URGE PUBLIC RESTRAINT ON IRAN
REF: RIYADH 806
Classified By: CDA Ambassador Richard Erdman
reasons 1.4 (b) & (d).
SUMMARY
--------------
1. (C) The Saudi Deputy Foreign Minister commended President
Obama's "wise policy" on Iran and urged continued restraint
to avoid playing into the regime's attempts to cast the
opposition as pawns of the West. Ahmadinejad would likely
survive but would be severely weakened by this unprecedented
"insiders revolt." End summary.
DON'T ABET IRANIAN ATTEMPTS TO DISCREDIT OPPOSITION
-------------- --------------
2. (C) During an introductory call June 23 by CDA, Saudi
Deputy Foreign Minister for Multilateral Affairs Dr. Prince
Torki bin Mohammed bin Saud Al-Kabeer commended President
Obama's "wise policy" thus far on events unfolding in Iran.
Torki strongly emphasized the need for all countries to avoid
taking actions that would be seen as meddling and that the
Iranian government could exploit to discredit the opposition.
"They are desperate to drag you in and brand Mousavi and the
others as agents of the US," he warned, "because they want to
crush the opposition but need a pretext." Torki worried
particularly about the French and the British, who risked
being "pinned down in a media war with the Iranian regime."
DON'T ADMIT SUPPORT FOR MOUSAVI
--------------
3. (S/NF) Prince Torki said the Saudi government would
refrain from public comments about the situation. He wished
the UAE would do the same, referring ruefully to statements
by UAE FM Abdallah bin Zayid congratulating Ahmadinejad on
his victory. Whereas the Saudis "definitely supported
Mousavi," Torki declared, they could never admit this.
However, he implied that the SAG would support efforts to
assist Mousavi and the other members of the opposition, so
long as the assistance remained untraceable.
UNPRECEDENTED CRACK IN REVOLUTIONARY FOUNDATION
-------------- --
4. (C) The situation in Iran was unprecedented, Torki
observed; it was "a revolt from inside." Khamenei made a
"big mistake" in siding with Ahmadinejad; whereas before the
Supreme Leader had kept himself above the fray of politics,
his support for Ahmadinejad has left him open to attacks by
rival clerics such as Rafsanjani and Khatami. This in turn
would eventually open the door for those outside the inner
circle to join the fight, and ultimately undermine the
revolution.
REGIME WILL SURVIVE, FOR NOW
--------------
5. (C) Torki assessed that in the end the Iranian government
would be able to put down the current unrest, and that
Ahmadinejad would probably stay, but in a considerably
weakened position. His longevity would depend on whether he
chose to be as "demagogic" on other issues as he has been on
the nuclear file. The irony in this crisis was that despite
the power struggles, when it came to Iran's nuclear policies,
Torki opined that "there were no differences between the
politicians." Torki maintained that the crisis had started
with Iran's economic problems. Ahmadinejad had mismanaged
government spending, wasting millions on overseas adventures
while tolerating internal corruption. Ordinary Iranians had
"seen no benefits," which explained the depth of anger
towards the government. Ahmadinejad deserved "credit" for
his role in making Iranian intentions clear, Torki suggested.
His arrogance had revealed Iran's true nuclear ambitions and
had widened the fissures within the regime, which had now
become "fragile." Charge agreed that the regime had been
fundamentally altered by the crisis, though it was still too
early to predict an outcome.
CONSULT WITH US, PLEASE
--------------
6. (C) The Saudi government was watching closely, and Torki
underscored the importance of close consultations and sharing
of information to maintain a calibrated international
response to the crisis. Charge assured Prince Torki that the
USG would continue to stay in close touch on all regional
issues, including on Iran.
RIYADH 00000836 002 OF 002
ERDMAN
NOFORN
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/23/2019
TAGS: PREL SA IR UAE UK
SUBJECT: SAUDIS URGE PUBLIC RESTRAINT ON IRAN
REF: RIYADH 806
Classified By: CDA Ambassador Richard Erdman
reasons 1.4 (b) & (d).
SUMMARY
--------------
1. (C) The Saudi Deputy Foreign Minister commended President
Obama's "wise policy" on Iran and urged continued restraint
to avoid playing into the regime's attempts to cast the
opposition as pawns of the West. Ahmadinejad would likely
survive but would be severely weakened by this unprecedented
"insiders revolt." End summary.
DON'T ABET IRANIAN ATTEMPTS TO DISCREDIT OPPOSITION
-------------- --------------
2. (C) During an introductory call June 23 by CDA, Saudi
Deputy Foreign Minister for Multilateral Affairs Dr. Prince
Torki bin Mohammed bin Saud Al-Kabeer commended President
Obama's "wise policy" thus far on events unfolding in Iran.
Torki strongly emphasized the need for all countries to avoid
taking actions that would be seen as meddling and that the
Iranian government could exploit to discredit the opposition.
"They are desperate to drag you in and brand Mousavi and the
others as agents of the US," he warned, "because they want to
crush the opposition but need a pretext." Torki worried
particularly about the French and the British, who risked
being "pinned down in a media war with the Iranian regime."
DON'T ADMIT SUPPORT FOR MOUSAVI
--------------
3. (S/NF) Prince Torki said the Saudi government would
refrain from public comments about the situation. He wished
the UAE would do the same, referring ruefully to statements
by UAE FM Abdallah bin Zayid congratulating Ahmadinejad on
his victory. Whereas the Saudis "definitely supported
Mousavi," Torki declared, they could never admit this.
However, he implied that the SAG would support efforts to
assist Mousavi and the other members of the opposition, so
long as the assistance remained untraceable.
UNPRECEDENTED CRACK IN REVOLUTIONARY FOUNDATION
-------------- --
4. (C) The situation in Iran was unprecedented, Torki
observed; it was "a revolt from inside." Khamenei made a
"big mistake" in siding with Ahmadinejad; whereas before the
Supreme Leader had kept himself above the fray of politics,
his support for Ahmadinejad has left him open to attacks by
rival clerics such as Rafsanjani and Khatami. This in turn
would eventually open the door for those outside the inner
circle to join the fight, and ultimately undermine the
revolution.
REGIME WILL SURVIVE, FOR NOW
--------------
5. (C) Torki assessed that in the end the Iranian government
would be able to put down the current unrest, and that
Ahmadinejad would probably stay, but in a considerably
weakened position. His longevity would depend on whether he
chose to be as "demagogic" on other issues as he has been on
the nuclear file. The irony in this crisis was that despite
the power struggles, when it came to Iran's nuclear policies,
Torki opined that "there were no differences between the
politicians." Torki maintained that the crisis had started
with Iran's economic problems. Ahmadinejad had mismanaged
government spending, wasting millions on overseas adventures
while tolerating internal corruption. Ordinary Iranians had
"seen no benefits," which explained the depth of anger
towards the government. Ahmadinejad deserved "credit" for
his role in making Iranian intentions clear, Torki suggested.
His arrogance had revealed Iran's true nuclear ambitions and
had widened the fissures within the regime, which had now
become "fragile." Charge agreed that the regime had been
fundamentally altered by the crisis, though it was still too
early to predict an outcome.
CONSULT WITH US, PLEASE
--------------
6. (C) The Saudi government was watching closely, and Torki
underscored the importance of close consultations and sharing
of information to maintain a calibrated international
response to the crisis. Charge assured Prince Torki that the
USG would continue to stay in close touch on all regional
issues, including on Iran.
RIYADH 00000836 002 OF 002
ERDMAN