Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09RIYADH702
2009-05-24 14:05:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Riyadh
Cable title:  

INTERIOR MINISTRY BRIEFS SPECIAL ADVISOR HOLBROOKE

Tags:  PREL PTER SA 
pdf how-to read a cable
O 241405Z MAY 09
FM AMEMBASSY RIYADH
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0848
C O N F I D E N T I A L RIYADH 000702 


FOR S/SRAP

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/20/2019
TAGS: PREL PTER SA
SUBJECT: INTERIOR MINISTRY BRIEFS SPECIAL ADVISOR HOLBROOKE
ON SAUDI COUNTERTERRORISM STRATEGY

Classified By: CDA DAVID RUNDELL, 1.4(b),(d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L RIYADH 000702


FOR S/SRAP

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/20/2019
TAGS: PREL PTER SA
SUBJECT: INTERIOR MINISTRY BRIEFS SPECIAL ADVISOR HOLBROOKE
ON SAUDI COUNTERTERRORISM STRATEGY

Classified By: CDA DAVID RUNDELL, 1.4(b),(d)


1. KEY POINTS:

-- (SBU) Special Advisor Ambassador Richard Holbrooke was
briefed on Saudi counterterrorism efforts at a May 16 meeting
with Interior Ministry officials at the Security Forces
officers Club in Riyadh. At the same meeting Holbrooke
received a second briefing on Saudi terrorist finance
activities (septel).

-- (C) The officials said the common motivation uniting most
Saudi extremists was the conflict in Afghanistan, where many
of the extremists had served and fought, and the Saudis now
see that encouraging this under the label of Jihad was a
mistake.

-- (C) A key strategy in the MOI's response to terrorism is
to treat detained extremists as misguided in their view of
Islam rather than as criminals.

-- (C) The MOI officials indicated strongly that release of
additional photographs of U.S. detainees would have a
negative impact on Saudi counterterrorism efforts and would
be a "gift" to the extremists since Guantanamo detainees are
seen by them as victims and heroes.


2. (C) Ministry Senior Advisor Major General Dr. Sa'ad
al-Jabri welcomed Amb. Holbrooke on behalf of the Ministry,
noting that Holbrooke was well known to the Saudis who
remember him as the "Man of Bosnia." Holbrooke responded
that his visit to Saudi Arabia had the attention of the
highest levels of the U.S. Administration, and he hoped his
meetings would mark the start of increased U.S./Saudi
cooperation.


3. (C) The counterterrorism briefing began with history and
geography: Briefer Captain Bandar Al-Subaie said the Takfiri
ideology behind extremist groups dated back to the earliest
days of Islam, and had figured in the killings of two early
Caliphs. Its tenets were reflected in the beliefs of the
Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and had spread from there to
Afghanistan and Pakistan, and then to the Arabian Peninsula
where it had been taken up by modern day terrorists including
Al-Qaeda (AQ). Recent years had been punctuated by a series
of "objections to modernity," such as the attack on the Grand
Mosque in 1979, and the Olaya and Khobar bombings, both of
which had killed Americans. Saudi Arabia had 2200 kilometers
of land borders with Yemen and Iraq which posed challenges.
The Iraqi border was flat and porous, while the frontier with

Yemen presented difficult terrain where it was easy for
terrorists to hide.

MEN, MONEY, AND MINDSET


4. (C) Saudi Counterterrorism strategy focused on addressing
the "men, money, and mindset" behind terrorism, Bandar
continued. The terror movement in Saudi Arabia had gone
through three phases: momentum, regrouping, and
fragmentation. In the first phase, AQ had built its
terrorist cells and operations using returned fighters from
Afghanistan and new recruits. The government had responded
tactically and strategically, including introduction of the
terrorist rehabilitation program. This phase had ended with
the killing of "AQ on the Arabian Peninsula" leader al-Muqrin
in 2004. In the regrouping phase, government pressure had
pushed AQ back, forcing it to leave Riyadh and seek new
targets and tactics, including attacks on the oil industry.
This phase ended in 2005 with the killing of terrorist leader
Saud al-Qutaini at al-Rass in Qassim. In the final phase of
fragmentation, the authorities pursued the remnants of the
terrorist cells, which were left without ideological
leadership or safe places to hide. The Saudis had measured
their success by a downward trend of incidents and
casualties; the security forces had suffered 74 killed and
over 600 wounded in action against terrorist since 2003.


5. (C) Bandar related that the MOI had conducted a study in
2004 of terrorism detainees as a basis for developing a
"processing model" of extremist violence, to account for the
political, economic, social, and media, factors that created
alienation and led individuals to active or passive
involvement in extremist groups. The research had revealed
that 77 percent of extremists were Saudi, the majority was
between the ages of 21-30, and was in general less educated.
Income level was not necessarily a motivation.

RECRUITING AND RADICALIZATION


6. (C) Holbrooke asked how the extremists targeted and
recruited new adherents, and whether there was a distinction
between those recruited to extremism generally and those
recruited to specific extremist groups. Dr. Sa'ad said the
Saudis had discerned a process of recruitment and
radicalization that began with scouting for prospects in
mosques, schools, and internet chat rooms. Madrassahs were
not a big factor because they were not common in Saudi
Arabia. Tribal affiliations also played a part, he said; in
particular some tribes in northern Saudi Arabia had been more
involved because of their links to Iraq and Syria, but no
single tribe stood out. Extremist groups employed various
tactics, including "trap and scare," to increase their ranks.
Recruits entered a culture like that of a gang or cult, from
which it could be hard to escape. The MOI had reports of
individuals who had been killed because they wanted to leave.


7. (C) Holbrooke asked what motivated the detainees the
Saudis had studied. Dr. Sa'ad answered that Afghanistan was
the "common factor." Many of those who engaged in extremist
violence in Saudi Arabia had been to Afghanistan during the
Soviet occupation "when we encouraged them," he said, adding
that "It was a mistake to say Afghanistan was Jihad."
Holbrooke acknowledged the U.S. had also encouraged
opposition to the Soviets, and asked whether the detainees
were driven by animosity towards Israel. Dr. Sa'ad replied
that "all of these conflicts contribute." Capt. Bandar said
the MOI had good information on the organization of terrorist
cells in Saudi Arabia. As a result of previous military
training, the cells are trained to carry out operations
without knowing the bigger picture. One of the terrorist
goals was to attract foreign forces to Saudi Arabia (e.g. the
U.S. forces stationed in the country during the invasion of
Iraq) and use the presence of these forces as a recruiting
tool.

SAUDI RESPONSES


8. (C) The MOI had responded by conducting a war of ideas in
mosques and the media, Bandar continued, to "expose"
Takfirism and violence, focused on the concept that the
extremists were not "terrorists," but "deviants" who were
"misguided" in their view of Islam. ("The extremists don't
like this label," interjected al-Humaydan. Holbrooke said
"misguided" was a useful term which would be relevant to
counterterrorism work in Afghanistan.) The Saudi
"counter-radicalization" effort was distinct from the
"de-radicalization" program created to help individual
extremists "disengage" and rehabilitate. Disengagement by
itself could also be a good result if the individuals
abandoned active participation and violence. Bandar said the
MOI's measure of success was whether its counterterrorism
efforts were "killing more than we are making." Holbrooke
asked about MOI resources; Dr. Sa'ad assured that the
Ministry had "many resources" to fight terrorism.


9. (C) Bandar indicated that of the 117 returned Guantanamo
detainees placed in the MOI's rehabilitation program, 107 had
'graduated' and ten were still in the program. Only 12 had
been rearrested, for violating travel restrictions,
recontacting extremist associates, or because an assessment
of their behavior indicated they were not fully
rehabilitated. Another 11 former detainees were unaccounted
for; most were presumed to be in Yemen. One relapsed former
detainee had surrendered again. Holbrooke asked whether any
rehabilitated detainees now helped rehabilitate others.
Al-Humaydan said this was the case, mentioning one former
detainee who had survived a suicide bombing mission in Iraq
and now assisted the rehabilitation program.


10. (C) Holbrooke asked whether any women were among the
detained terrorists. Al-Humaydan replied that several had
been arrested. The women had worked mostly on recruiting.
The most "famous" of these had turned out to be a 22 year old
Egyptian woman married to an older Saudi man, who had used
the Internet to start a web magazine for female extremists.
She had served a prison sentence and been deported. The
lesson, al-Humaydan said, was that "we need to use our women,
too" in the fight against terrorism.


11. (C) Summing up, Captain Bandar stated that Saudi Arabia
wanted greater international cooperation to fight terrorism.
The Saudis faced counterterrorism challenges emanating from
neighboring states, regional conflicts, and non-state actors.
The influx of pilgrims for Hajj and Umrah, and protecting
critical infrastructure were issues of specific concern.
"International events" such as the release of detainee
photographs also had an impact on Saudi efforts, he concluded.

A GIFT TO AQ


12. (C) Holbrooke noted the debate in the U.S. over the
release of additional photographs of U.S. detainees, and
asked whether release would have an impact in Saudi Arabia.
Dr. Sa'ad replied that this would be a "gift" to the
extremists. Guantanamo detainees are seen as victims within
extremist groups, and are thus "candidates to be heroes," and
to be given leadership roles in AQ, he said.


13. (U) Meeting participants

U.S.

Special Advisor Ambassador Richard Holbrooke
Barnett Rubin, Senior Advisor
Dan Glaser, Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Treasury
David Rundell, Charge d'Affaires
Andrew Roth, Embassy Riyadh
Edwin Brown, Embassy Riyadh (notetaker)
Jeff Smith, Embassy Riyadh

Saudi Arabia

Major General Sa'ad al-Jabri, Senior Advisor, Ministry of
the Interior

Major General Khalid al-Humaydan ("Abu Ali"),
Counterterrorism Advisor,
Ministry of the Interior

Brigadier General Ahmed al-Issa, U.S. Liaison, Ministry of
the
Interior

Captain Bandar al-Subaie, Assistant to Sa'ad al-Jabri


14. (U) Amb. Holbrooke cleared this telegram.


RUNDELL