Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09RIYADH61
2009-01-10 13:50:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Riyadh
Cable title:  

SAUDI VIEWS ON IRAN

Tags:  PGOV PREL IR SA 
pdf how-to read a cable
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ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 101350Z JAN 09
FM AMEMBASSY RIYADH
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9795
INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHJI/AMCONSUL JEDDAH PRIORITY 9970
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 0024
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 RIYADH 000061 

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR NEA/ARP (HARRIS) AND NEA/IPA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/10/2019
TAGS: PGOV PREL IR SA
SUBJECT: SAUDI VIEWS ON IRAN

REF: A. A) STATE 13000

B. B) MANAMA 835

C. C) RIYADH 15

D. D) RIYADH 14

Classified By: DCM David Rundell for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

-----------
Key Points:
-----------

-- The KSA and other GCC members insist on being consulted
before any
proposals are made to the Iranians.
-- Iran,s enrichment program is an unacceptable threat to
the Kingdom.
-- Pursuing further sanctions is a waste of time, because the
Iranians are
stalling to create facts on the ground.
-- Concerned countries must break Iranian ranks by
appealing to moderates.

-------
Comment
-------

-- The Saudi Government fears that Iran, Hezbollah, Syria,
and Hamas will
exploit events in Gaza just as they did in Lebanon in 2006
to extol armed
resistance and discredit moderate Arab diplomacy.
-- The Saudi Government seems to feel that Bahrain and the
UAE pay only lip
service to the Iranian threat while major powers like the
U.S., EU, and Russia do not treat KSA as a serious
interlocutor on Iran.

End Key Points and Comment.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 RIYADH 000061

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR NEA/ARP (HARRIS) AND NEA/IPA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/10/2019
TAGS: PGOV PREL IR SA
SUBJECT: SAUDI VIEWS ON IRAN

REF: A. A) STATE 13000

B. B) MANAMA 835

C. C) RIYADH 15

D. D) RIYADH 14

Classified By: DCM David Rundell for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

--------------
Key Points:
--------------

-- The KSA and other GCC members insist on being consulted
before any
proposals are made to the Iranians.
-- Iran,s enrichment program is an unacceptable threat to
the Kingdom.
-- Pursuing further sanctions is a waste of time, because the
Iranians are
stalling to create facts on the ground.
-- Concerned countries must break Iranian ranks by
appealing to moderates.

--------------
Comment
--------------

-- The Saudi Government fears that Iran, Hezbollah, Syria,
and Hamas will
exploit events in Gaza just as they did in Lebanon in 2006
to extol armed
resistance and discredit moderate Arab diplomacy.
-- The Saudi Government seems to feel that Bahrain and the
UAE pay only lip
service to the Iranian threat while major powers like the
U.S., EU, and Russia do not treat KSA as a serious
interlocutor on Iran.

End Key Points and Comment.


1. (C) On January 4, the DCM, British Charge Andrew Turner,
and German Counselor Stephan Schneck delivered Ref A points
to Saudi Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs for International
Organizations, Prince Turki Saud Al Kabir. Representatives
from the French and Italian Embassies were scheduled to
participate but did not come, and the Prince seemed
disappointed at their absence. Clearly anticipating the
opportunity afforded by the multilateral delegation, Prince
Turki, after listening patiently to Ref A points, delivered a
long exposition of Saudi views on Iran, during which he
occasionally slapped the table for emphasis, repeatedly
called Iranian president Mahmoud Ahmedinejad "crazy," and
scorned Iranian practices such as temporary marriages ("nikah
al-mut,a") and dissimulation under duress ("taqiyya").



2. (C) Iran was the subject of long discussions at the 29th
annual summit of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) in
Muscat, the Prince said. All agreed that Iran should not
have nuclear facilities to produce nuclear weapons, but
opinions diverged on how to achieve this, with some
suggesting making positive gestures to Iran. The Saudi
Government, however, cited unprecedented Iranian interference
in Arab affairs (Yemen, Egypt, Gaza, Lebanon, and Shia
minorities in the Gulf),and argued forcibly against such
gestures. Some at the summit bruited the notion of removing
foreign forces from the Gulf, but the KSA said having Iran
fill the resulting vacuum was unacceptable. Apparently
referring to the Bahrain-Iranian Security Agreement of
December 25, Prince Turki doubted whether Iran would honor
its promise not to interfere in Bahrain affairs. He
expressed exasperation that the U.A.E. could maintain good
relations with Iran while the latter still occupies Abu Musa
island.


3. (C) Prince Turki singled out European Union proposals to
Iran for censure.
At Muscat, GCC members expressed anger about not being
consulted before the proposals were made to Iran. Striking
the table for emphasis, the Prince said henceforth GCC
members must be consulted and that the Kingdom would never
accept any agreement that threatens its security. "If you
don,t treat us seriously, neither will the Iranians."


4. (C) The KSA acknowledges Iran,s right to a peaceful
nuclear program, but believes that the enrichment program is
a clear sign that Iran wants a weapons program. "Iranian
enrichment is a serious threat." The Kingdom attaches no
credence to Iran,s economic rationale for enrichment. It,s
an open question, however, what Iran hopes to achieve with

RIYADH 00000061 002 OF 002


nuclear weapons. "What should the Kingdom do if Iran
acquires such weapons," the Prince asked rhetorically,
"Invite others to station nuclear weapons in Saudi Arabia?"


5. (C) Prince Turki said, "Time is not on our side."
Pursuing further sanctions plays into the hands of Iranian
negotiators who are stalling and allows Iran to create new
facts on the ground. He alluded to a letter that Russian
Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov sent to Arab League Secretary
General Abu Mussa in mid-December that proposed a fourth
round of sanctions without, however, stopping enrichment.
While rejecting the use of armed force, the Prince said
concerned countries, including the EU, Russia, and China,
should try to split Iranian ranks by appealing to moderates
within Iran.


6. (C) Iranian/Saudi relations are particularly cool at the
moment, the Prince said. When the Iranian ambassador came to
the MFA recently to complain about an anti-Iranian article in
the Saudi press, the Prince greeted him with six anti-Saudi
articles in the Iranian press. The Prince told the
ambassador that the Kingdom would publish two anti-Iranian
articles for each anti-Saudi one until Iran desists.
FRAKER