SAUDI KING APPOINTS STAND-IN, NOT SUCCESSOR

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 RIYADH 000482

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/29/2019
TAGS: PGOV PINR PREL PTER SA
SUBJECT: SAUDI KING APPOINTS STAND-IN, NOT SUCCESSOR

REF: A. 08 RIYADH 1757

B. 08 RIYADH 1748

Classified By: Ambassador Ford Fraker,
Reasons 1.5 (b) & (d)


1. (U) Key points:

--(U) Saudi King Abdallah issued a royal decree appointing
his half-brother, Interior Minister Nayif bin Abdalaziz, as
second deputy prime minister. The position had been vacant
since Abdallah became King in 2005.

-- (C) Though the previous two crown princes held Nayif's new
position prior to being formally tapped as heirs to the
throne, the appointment does not necessarily mean Nayif is
"Crown Prince in Waiting," because there is now a new
mechanism )- the Allegiance Commission -- to select the
King's successor.

-- (C) The King was likely driven by expediency. Crown
Prince Sultan is for all intents and purposes incapacitated,
and the King needed to travel abroad. Someone had to be left
in charge.

-- (C) Nayif, by virtue of his seniority among the sons of
Abdalaziz and his position as Minister of Interior, was by
tradition the leading candidate for the job.

--(S) Assistant Interior Minister Mohammed bin Nayif told the
Ambassador that his father's appointment should not be seen
in the light of succession, but as "an administrative
necessity."

-- (U) The King concomitantly appointed his 35-year old son,
Mishaal bin Abdallah, to be Governor of the troubled Yemeni
border province of Najran, one of the major potential transit
points for foreign fighters in/out of the country.

End key points.


2. (C) WHY NOW? The King had to travel first to attend the
Arab League Summit in Doha and then to London to attend the
G-20 summit on April 2. The Saudi Basic Law stipulates that
when the King travels abroad, he shall deputize the Crown
Prince (Deputy Prime Minister) to manage the affairs of the
state. However, the incumbent Deputy Prime Minister )-
Crown Prince Sultan -- is incapacitated. Therefore the King
needed to appoint a second deputy prime minister who could
serve as "acting Prime Minister" in the King's absence.


3. (U) BUT WHAT ABOUT THE ALLEGIANCE COMMISSION? As in the
case of all ministerial-level appointments, filling the
position is the King's prerogative. The second deputy prime
minister position was established in 1975, when then-King
Khalid appointed then-Prince Abdallah. In 1982, Prince
Sultan was named second deputy prime minister by King Fahd.
However, when Abdallah became king in 2005, he did not fill
the vacancy. Neither the Basic Law nor the Law on the
Allegiance Commission mention this position. The Law on the
Council of Ministers merely states that the King, as Prime
Minister, has the power to appoint all deputies and
ministers.


4. (C) WHY NAYIF? Nayif, by virtue of his relative seniority
among the still-living sons of Abdalaziz, and his position as
Minister of Interior, is by tradition the leading, and in
that sense least controversial, candidate for the job. His
appointment was widely expected when Abdallah became King
nearly four years ago. The King's failure to act was widely
seen as confirmation that relations between the two were not
good. Despite rumored tensions between the two, they have
collaborated effectively to combat the domestic insurgency
mounted by Al-Qaeda and strengthen Saudi Arabia's
counterterrorism partnership with the U.S. The Saudi
government's strong commitment to fighting terrorism make the
interior minister an obvious choice to serve as caretaker
while the Crown Prince recovers and the King travels abroad.


5. (C) WHAT ABOUT THE U.S.? Like then-Crown Prince Abdallah
before him, Nayif is often said to be a strong Arab
nationalist suspicious of ties with the U.S. However, the
USG currently has an excellent and expanding institutional
relationship with the Ministry of Interior. While this is
usually attributed to Assistant Minister Mohammed bin Nayif
(Nayif's son),this could not be happening without the
Minister's full support. Despite his rumored poor health,
Nayif still controls the MOI.


6. (C) Septel will report further details on Nayif's
background and views.


7. (C) MIXED REACTION: The country is buzzing with the news,

RIYADH 00000482 002 OF 002


with many assuming that the appointment signals that the
Crown Prince is close to death, and others concluding that,
in the words of one contact, "100 percent there was a deal."
A sampling of opinions on Saudi blogs revealed unhappiness
among so-called reformers (the liberal Al-Toomar site said
the appointment "bypassed the Allegiance Commission"),
equanimity from others, and support from some conservative
blogs. Nayif is generally seen as unpopular, though in the
absence of opinion polls on this issue, that sentiment is
difficult to verify.


8. (C) TALAL SOUNDS OFF? Prince Talal bin Abdalaziz, a royal
family outsider long known for his expressing his maverick
views publicly, issued a statement calling on the King to
"confirm" that this appointment is an "administrative action"
and not intended to pre-empt the role of the Allegiance
Council in the eventual selection of Crown Prince Sultan's
successor. The King has not commented in response.


9. (C) MUHAMMAD BIN NAYIF'S COMMENT: In a conversation with
the Ambassador late the night of March 29, Prince Mohammad
bin Nayif told the Ambassador that his father's appointment
should not be seen in the light of succession, but as "an
administrative necessity."


10. (C) ANOTHER APPOINTMENT: The King issued a second
decree the same day (March 27) appointing one of his younger
sons, Mishaal bin Abdallah, as Governor of the troubled
Yemeni border province of Najran, one of the major potential
transit points for foreign fighters in/out of the country.
The position had been vacant for several months after the
incumbent had been relieved of his duties, essentially for
failing to manage unrest among the Ismaili Shia population
there (ref b). The position is a sensitive one, and the
appointment has raised eyebrows given Mishaal's youth (he is
about 35) and inexperience (he has been working in the Saudi
Ministry of Foreign Affairs.)


--------------
COMMENT: A SHORT TERM FIX?
--------------


11. (S) We are not/not inclined to view this appointment as
part of a larger quid pro quo to appease conservatives
opposed to the King's reforms. While Nayif is widely seen as
a conservative, this is not surprising for a minister whose
main preoccupation is maintaining law and order. Most
observers viewed then-Crown Prince Abdallah as much more
conservative and reactionary than he has proven to be as
King. While Nayif has always been somewhat of an enigma, his
actions do not support the theory that he is a reactionary or
actively working against the King. Indeed, if the views of
his son, Mohammed bin Nayif are any guide, he is more likely
a pragmatist who eschews ideology, and who has supported the
King's efforts to combat both terrorism and radical
ideologies. Whatever differences of opinion Nayif may have
with the King, at the end of the day the "will to power" of
the senior Al Saud and lessons from previous Al Saud
dynasties drive them to work together to preserve the
monarchy. The senior leadership recognizes that to survive,
they must continue the process of institution-building and
modernization. End comment.


FRAKER