SAUDI ARABIA: SUDAN'S NEW FRONT IN DARFUR CRISIS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 RIYADH 000442

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR NEA/ARP, AF A A/S CARTER, AF/SPG, AF/E
NSC FOR MGAVIN AND CHUDSON
ADDIS ABABA FOR USAU
DEPT PLS PASS USAID FOR AFR/SUDAN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/18/2019
TAGS: LE PHUM PREL QA SA SU
SUBJECT: SAUDI ARABIA: SUDAN'S NEW FRONT IN DARFUR CRISIS

RIYADH 00000442 001.2 OF 002


Classified By: DCM David Rundell for
reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

KEY POINTS:

-- Sudanese Presidential Advisor Dr. Mustafa Othman Ismael
traveled to Riyadh to make his government's case regarding
the ICC indictment of President al-Bashir. The Sudanese
Embassy hosted a large gathering for its citizens which Dr.
Ismael attended. He also held a press conference for
approximately thirty reporters at the Sudanese Embassy's
commercial office.

-- Saudi Arabia's government publicly expressed concern over
the ICC warrant after the March 9 Council of Ministers
meeting. However, the SAG statement stopped short of
outright condemnation. This reportedly upset the GOS. Dr.
Ismael met this week with Foreign Minister Prince Saud
al-Faisal, who the next day delivered a stronger public
statement against the indictment at a press conference,
calling it a "politically motivated decision."

-- According to local sources, Dr. Ismael also used his time
in Riyadh to meet with the Saudi Red Crescent Society and
other aid organizations. Reportedly, he sought to fill the
assistance vacuum left by the expulsion of Darfur aid
organizations.

END KEY POINTS


1. (C) DIPLOMATIC OFFENSIVE: Dr. Mustafa Othman Ismael,
advisor to Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir, visited Riyadh
the week of March 14 to influence public opinion and seek aid
contributions for Darfur. The contributions are intended to
supplant those lost following this week's expulsion of aid
organizations from Sudan. Dr. Ismael also participated in a
"town hall" for Sudanese citizens at their Riyadh embassy the
night of March 15, and followed that with a March 16 press
conference. He also met with Saudi Foreign Minister HRH
Prince Saud al-Faisal and reportedly visited several
Saudi-based aid organizations.


2. (C) THE OFFICIAL SAUDI LINE: The Saudi Council of
Ministers issued a statement on March 9 expressing "concern
and displeasure" over the ICC warrant, which he said will not
solve Sudan's problems but increase them. He said the
Kingdom will stand by Sudan in confronting "whatever
undermines its sovereignty, stability and territorial
integrity." Contacts noted that the GOS viewed this initial
statement as insufficient. Following his meeting with Dr.
Ismael, Prince Saud held a March 15 press conference where,
according to press reports, he "toughened the tone" of Saudi
Arabia's opposition. "It's a politically motivated decision,
otherwise it would not have come at this particular time,"
declared the Prince.

3, (C) A NUANCED POSITION: According to an Egyptian
diplomat, the Saudis will not outright condemn the ICC
warrant because they are looking ahead to the Special
Tribunal on Lebanon (STL). According to this source, while
the Saudis privately condemn the warrant and strongly oppose
it, they plan to support the STL and do not want to take
contradictory positions. Therefore, the SAG is speaking as
strongly as it can about the ICC warrant without condemning
it. The Egyptian source added that Bashir's actions against
the NGOs served as a preview of other destabilizing acts he
would take -- a message to large investors in Sudan.


4. (C) PRESS CONFERENCE: Vice President of the Sudanese
Journalist Association in Saudi Arabia, a U.S. Embassy
employee, received a journalist's invitation to attend the
March 16 press conference at the Sudan Embassy's commercial
office in Riyadh. Dr. Ismael addressed approximately 30
reporters, including Sudanese nationals working for Saudi
press establishments as well as Saudi, Egyptian and Chinese
reporters. Dr. Ismael informed reporters that Prince Saud
invited him to discuss the ICC warrant. He reiterated the
Sudanese position that the 13 evicted NGOs represented
intelligence bodies. He justified eviction by comparing it

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to post-9/11 when the U.S. "closed down many Saudi charitable
organizations, regardless of being responsible for any
terrorist act." He confirmed that President al-Bashir will
attend the Arab League summit in Doha.

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WHY SUDAN MATTERS TO THE SAUDIS
--------------


5. (C) SAUDI INTERESTS IN SUDAN: Virtual neighbors except
for the narrow Red Sea, Saudi Arabia and Sudan share close
ties. An estimated one million Sudanese live in the Kingdom,
and Saudi Arabia has sharply increased investment in Sudan.
Hail Agricultural Development Co. (Hadco) announced in
February a $45.3 million plan to develop over 22 thousand
acres in northern Sudan. The SAG-owned Saudi Industrial
Development Fund will fund 60 percent of the project. March
3, Saudi Finance Minister Ibrahim al-Assaf traveled to Sudan
to attend the inauguration of the Marawi dam with President
Bashir. The dam project received Saudi funding.


6. (C) MORE ON EGYPT'S VIEW OF SUDAN: The Egyptian diplomat
expressed pessimism about Sudan's unity after the 2011
north-south referendum. He said Egypt is preparing for the
possibility of a break-up. One problem this presents is yet
another country to negotiate with on Nile river issues. He
made clear that Egypt's interest is in a stable Sudan since
that is the source of Egypt's water. When asked if Bashir's
exodus would solve many of the current problems, he said
Bashir, though guilty, "is the best there is," opining that
Bashir has agreed to most of the West's terms in Darfur. He
added that the Egyptians unsuccessfully have asked the French
to expel Sudan Liberation Movement leader Abdul Wahib al-Nur,
who in his view enjoys a life of luxury in Paris.

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THE DOHA PEACE PROCESS
--------------


7. (C) A GOOD START?: One week prior to the ICC announcement,
a Sudanese diplomat based in Riyadh expressed fear that the
warrant would destabilize Sudan and dampen peace prospects.
He viewed the Doha negotiations as a good beginning but cited
the complexity of bringing so many actors to the table. He
worried that the media in Qatar will shine too bright a light
on negotiations, which necessitate private dialogue free of
public debate about every proposal. He viewed the Qataris as
sufficiently neutral hosts for the negotiations.


8. (C) SAUDIS STANDING ASIDE: The Sudanese diplomat also
shared information about discussions between his government
and the Saudis on the Doha peace process. Reportedly, the
Saudis offered to participate as a mediator with the Doha
process. The Sudanese feared that such "help" combined with
Saudi's desire to be a regional leader, could undermine
Qatar's effort. The Sudanese asked the Saudis to "help
positively or not at all." The Saudis have quietly allowed
Qatar to take the lead.
FRAKER