Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09RIYADH1442
2009-11-01 06:44:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Riyadh
Cable title:  

NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION TREATY: PART 2 OF 2:

Tags:  AORC CDG ENRG IAEA KNNP MNUC PARM PGOV PREL 
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TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1811
INFO RUEHUNV/USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA PRIORITY 0032
RHEBAAA/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 0046
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS PRIORITY
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY 0095
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA PRIORITY 0742
C O N F I D E N T I A L RIYADH 001442 

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR ISN/MNSA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/01/2019
TAGS: AORC CDG ENRG IAEA KNNP MNUC PARM PGOV PREL
UNGA, NPT
SUBJECT: NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION TREATY: PART 2 OF 2:
REVIEW CONFERENCE INPUT FOR SAUDI ARABIA

REF: A. STATE 083600

B. RIYADH 1061

Classified By: Ambassador James B. Smith for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L RIYADH 001442

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR ISN/MNSA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/01/2019
TAGS: AORC CDG ENRG IAEA KNNP MNUC PARM PGOV PREL
UNGA, NPT
SUBJECT: NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION TREATY: PART 2 OF 2:
REVIEW CONFERENCE INPUT FOR SAUDI ARABIA

REF: A. STATE 083600

B. RIYADH 1061

Classified By: Ambassador James B. Smith for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (U) SUMMARY AND COMMENT: The Saudi Arabian government is
generally supportive of nuclear nonproliferation and arms
control issues, although its cooperation is calibrated
against regional concerns, such as Israeli policies, Iranian
threats, and the imperative of maintaining Arab unity. END
SUMMARY.


2. (U) What is the host government's general attitude towards
CTBT, FMCT, NPT, and U.S.-Russian arms control efforts? What
factors influence its attitudes and positions?
-- The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is generally supportive of
CTBT, FMCT, NPT, and U.S.-Russian arms control efforts. The
lack of Israeli participation in NPT influences KSA's
attitudes and positions.


3. (U) What position on CTBT, FMCT, NPT, and U.S.-Russian
arms control efforts is the host government likely to take in
upcoming fora, such as the Conference on Disarmament, the
UNGA First (Disarmament) Committee, and the NPT Review
Conference in 2010?
-- The Saudi Arabian government (SAG) is likely to be
supportive of others' efforts but not likely to be proactive
in offering to host a conference or take leadership roles.


4. (U) With which countries does the host country work most
closely on these issues?
-- The SAG works most closely with Arab League members, GCC
states and the U.S. on NPT issues.


5. (C) Who are key government personnel involved in nuclear
arms control and nonproliferation decision-making in the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, related ministries (such as
defense and energy),and their diplomatic missions to arms
control fora?

-- The key nonproliferation advisor is Foreign Minister Saud
Al Faisal. Prince Turki, the number 3 at the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs (MFA),is also an influential official though
decisions on these issues rest with the Foreign Minister.


6. (U) What role do you play in arms control and
nonproliferation organizations? Do you take a leadership role
on any issues?
-- The U.S. Embassy's main role has been to keep Saudi
counterparts apprised of nonproliferation initiatives,
programs, and events.


7. (C) How does the nuclear arms control and nonproliferation
policymaking process work, and what is the interplay among
government officials and agencies?
-- Key nonproliferation issues would be presented to King
Abdullah during weekly Council of Ministers meetings. The MFA
develops policy based on the King's directions. The King
Abdulaziz City for Science and Technology (KACST) serves as
the implementing organization within the Saudi government.


8. (C) Which people and agencies carry the most weight, and
on which issues?
-- The King, the MFA, and KACST carry the most weight on
nonproliferation issues.


9. (C) What are the key factors that drive adoption or
rejection of particular policies or positions on nuclear arms
control or nonproliferation issues?
-- The key factors that drive adoption or rejection of
policies are limited Saudi capacity (i.e. to execute
obligations of PSA) and limited number of effective senior
managers in government. Another factor is Saudi concern about
how its diplomatic agreements are perceived in the Arab world
and by regional governments.


10. (C) How many people in host country's missions (New York,
Geneva, and Vienna) to arms control fora deal with arms
control and nonproliferation issues? Who are they?
-- Our understanding is that no more than one officer in each
mission has nonproliferation as a part of his portfolio.


11. (C) Are mission personnel and resources augmented during
key relevant meetings?

-- During meetings considered of high importance, Saudi
representatives from MFA will represent the SAG. For events
regarded to be of less importance, a Saudi official from the
nearest embassy or consulate would represent.


12. (U) What are the roles and influence of the host
country's nuclear power industry (if any),academia, and
non-governmental organizations in nuclear arms control and
nonproliferation decision-making?
-- The nuclear power industry, academia, and non-governmental
organizations have a very limited role and little influence
in nuclear arms control and nonproliferation decision-making.


13. (U) What are the key alliances with other governments on
arms control and nonproliferation issues. For example, the
Nonaligned Movement (NAM) and the Group of 77 (G-77)?
-- The key alliance for the SAG on arms control and
nonproliferation issues is with the GCC. Arab League
consensus is also important to the SAG on these issues.


14. (C) To what extent does the host government appear to
influence, follow, or diverge from the NAM or G-77 line?
-- KSA views its NPT policies and obligations primarily as
justified by Saudi national interest, and secondarily as part
of the Arab League and GCC collective, with constraints
imposed by regional political conditions, i.e. Israel's non
participation in NPT and Iran's maverick nuclear development
policy.


15. (C) How much flexibility do the missions to the UN, CD,
and IAEA appear to have, and to what extent do they appear to
receive guidance from capital? To what extent do they need
further guidance from capital to engage on RevCon objectives?
-- It can be assumed that the Saudi missions to the UN, CD,
and IAEA will not take significant decisions or initiatives
without clear guidance and approvals from MFA Riyadh.
SMITH