SAUDIS TO OBAMA ADMINISTRATION: PEACE PROCESS NOW

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 RIYADH 000134

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/19/2019
TAGS: PREL SAIS IS KPAL
SUBJECT: SAUDIS TO OBAMA ADMINISTRATION: PEACE PROCESS NOW

Classified By: Ambassador Ford Fraker, reasons 1.4 b, d.

Key Points:

--(U) FM Saud Al-Faisal strongly urged that the new US
administration engage early and meaningfully to restart the
Middle East peace process.

--(C) The Saudis fear that strong popular Arab reaction to
events in Gaza may destabilize region unless the US acts.

--(C) Saud said leaders gathered in Kuwait might call for
deployment of an international force to Gaza.

--(U) FM Saud asked to arrange a congratulatory phone call to
Secretary-designate Clinton as soon as convenient.

(C) COMMENT: Saud,s gently worded warnings about the
dangers posed by delays in resuming the peace process were
bluntly and succinctly echoed by King Abdallah in the opening
session of the Arab Economic Summit in Kuwait on January 19:
Israel should realize that the choice between peace and war
will not be available indefinitely, and that the Arab Peace
Initiative, currently on the table, will not remain on the
table forever. To underscore his determination, he then held
reconciliation talks with Bashar Al-Asad. Events in Gaza
have apparently resulted in renewed Arab unity, at least in
popular outrage. The Saudis fear instability and increased
Iranian influence could result, and believe that there is a
limited window of opportunity for action. They say they are
ready to participate as partners if the US is ready to lead.
End comment.


1. (U) This is an action request. See paragraph 7.


2. (C) SAUDIS PLEASED WITH AMBASSADORIAL EXTENSION: In a
January 18 meeting, Saudi Foreign Minister Saud al-Faisal
warmly welcomed the news that Ambassador Fraker,s tenure had
been extended to facilitate the transition between US
administrations. "This is an excellent sign for the new
administration," Saud declared, adding that it would ensure a
smooth handover and continued good bilateral cooperation.


3. (C) NEXT STEPS ON GAZA: The January 19-20 Arab Economic
Summit in Kuwait would focus on the Gaza situation, Saud
explained, though the ministers would also be considering
some 42 decisions related to regional economic development.
With a fragile cease-fire in place, there was a growing
consensus that the best case scenario would involve the
deployment of an international force in Gaza, along the
border with Egypt and possibly in a buffer zone along the
northern border with Israel. Some worried that such forces
would end up in conflict with Hamas, but the Saudis believed
this was not likely. Saud did not provide details about the
make up or sponsorship of such an international force, but
said it was likely that the final summit communiqu would
urge its creation.


4. (C) URGENT US ACTION NEEDED: Saud said that he hoped
Ambassador Fraker could convince the new US administration to
urgently engage in the Middle East peace process by taking
"meaningful steps" towards establishing a Palestinian state.
Such action would strengthen those on the Arab side who favor
peace and help undermine Hamas and build Palestinian unity.
"Hamas is not an option," but the people of Gaza will only
support the side able to secure benefits. "Abu Mazen is the
only one who can do this, but he needs help."


5. (C) THE SAUDI MESSAGE: Prince Saud strongly urged that
President Obama and Secretary-designate Clinton start early
on the peace process and convince Israel that the US
government has a firm position on establishing a Palestinian
state. The Arab peace initiative was based on the concept
that "the US would bring Israel, and the Arabs would bring
the Palestinians." Now, the Saudi and other Arab governments
looked to the US to act, and for both sides to move in
tandem. In Saud,s view, this was most important. If Israel
believed that the Arabs remained disillusioned with the US
(and presumably disinclined to act as partners in a peace
process),it would continue to act unilaterally, and count on
unqualified US support for its actions. This was very
shortsighted, because Israel should have seen the limits of
what its military action could achieve. A chink had appeared
in Israel's armor, Saud warned. In the absence of a peace
process, there will be growing turmoil and instability in the
region, and pressure to exploit Israel's weaknesses.
(Comment: Saud appeared to be alluding to Iranian attempts
to expand its influence, and the belief among the
rejectionist Palestinian factions encouraged by Syria and

RIYADH 00000134 002 OF 002


Iran, that since Hizballah and now Hamas had both survived
military confrontations with Israel, armed confrontation was
a viable option. End comment.)


6. (C) BILATERAL PRIORITIES: In response to the Ambassador's
question, Saud mentioned two key priorities for the new
administration: continuing efforts to strengthen Saudi
Arabia's military, which should help stabilize the region by
providing some balance to the Iranian threat, and increasing
"human to human contact."


7. (U) PHONE CALL REQUEST. In that connection, the Foreign
Minister requested the Ambassador's assistance in arranging
for a phone call with the Secretary-Designate; it was his
hope to extend his congratulations on her assumption of her
new duties personally. The Ambassador assured him that he
would convey the request as soon as possible.


8. (U) Please advise.

FRAKER