REYKJAVIK CIWG ANNUAL MEETING

S E C R E T REYKJAVIK 000225

NOFORN
SIPDIS

DEPT. FOR DS/IP/EUR, DS/ICI/CI, DS/TIA/ITA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/24/2019
TAGS: ASEC IC
SUBJECT: REYKJAVIK CIWG ANNUAL MEETING

REF: A) STATE 133533 B) 08 STATE 111936 C) 08
REYKJAVIK 298

Classified By: A/DCM Kathleen Eagen for Reasons 1.4 (a) and (c)


1. (S/NF) On December 17, 2009, American Embassy Reykjavik
convened a Counter Intelligence Working Group (CIWG) meeting.
CDA Sam Watson chaired the meeting. In attendance were
A/DCM, POL, PAO, CONS, ECON, IPC, MILREP, MGT and RSO. Ref A
discusses Post's previous CIWG. Ref C discusses Post's
previous CIWG meeting.


2. (S/NF) RSO began the meeting by discussing Post's current
ratings on the Security Environment Threat List (SETL). Per
Ref A., Post's HUMINT rating remains LOW, and Post's
Technical rating is considered to be MEDIUM. RSO advised
that the current CRITICAL threat countries represented in
Iceland are Russia and China and the HIGH threat country is
France. In addition to the countries noted above, accredited
diplomatic missions in Iceland include Germany, Norway,
Sweden, Denmark, India, Poland, Japan, Finland, Canada and
the United Kingdom.


3. (S/NF) It is believed that the Chinese are continuing to
utilize their TECHNICAL and HUMINT capabilities to conduct
industrial espionage. It is also believed that the Russians
are monitoring the Chinese actions. The current Russian DCM
in Iceland is considered to be a China expert. The current
Chinese AMB to Iceland is a known U.S. expert. It is unknown
if there is any targeting of the mission or any of its
employees by the Russians or Chinese. There is no current
GRPO presence at Post and visits are infrequent.


4. (S/NF) RSO reminded the CIWG that Post's classified
information processing level goes only to SECRET. The C-LAN,
STE, classified FAX, conversations, storage, etc., should
remain at the SECRET level or below.


5. (S/NF) RSO apprised the CIWG that there are NO/NO
technical security exceptions at Post and that NO/NO
electronic items (unless securely procured and shipped to
post via classified pouch) are permitted in the controlled
access area (CAA) at any time. RSO also counseled the CIWG
that all personal items brought into a CAA must be screened
and logged by the RSO. The CIWG approved the secure
procurement of a television to Post to be placed in the CAA,
to be procured through secure means and shipped via
classified pouch per regulations.


6. (S/NF) IMO recommended that the proposed sound masking
equipment to be procured for the IPC was not necessary. Due
to high costs of equipment and lengthy wait times, coupled
with the low overall threat in Iceland, IMO recommended that
the current situation did not merit the procurement of the
equipment. CIWG voted against the procurement of the
equipment, but agreed to reassess the necessity of such
equipment again in the future.
WATSON