Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09RANGOON99
2009-02-17 07:11:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Rangoon
Cable title:  

BURMA MFA OFFICIAL ON ENGAGEMENT, VISITS, AND

Tags:  PREL PGOV MARR OREP OFDP ODIP PINR SNAR BM 
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OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHGO #0099/01 0480711
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 170711Z FEB 09
FM AMEMBASSY RANGOON
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8687
INFO RUEHJA/AMEMBASSY JAKARTA IMMEDIATE 0435
RHHMUNA/CDR USPACOM HONOLULU HI PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L RANGOON 000099 

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR EAP/MLS, PACOM FOR FPA, JAKARTA PLEASE PASS EAP
DAS MARCIEL

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/17/2019
TAGS: PREL PGOV MARR OREP OFDP ODIP PINR SNAR BM
SUBJECT: BURMA MFA OFFICIAL ON ENGAGEMENT, VISITS, AND
LEVEL OF REPRESENTATION WITH U.S.

REF: A. IIR 6 812 0119 08

B. IIR 6 812 0018 09

C. RANGOON 30

D. IIR 6 812 0045 09

E. RANGOON 42 (NOTAL)

F. RANGOON 44 (NOTAL)

Classified By: CDA Larry Dinger for Reasons 1.4 (b) & (d)

Summary
-------
C O N F I D E N T I A L RANGOON 000099

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR EAP/MLS, PACOM FOR FPA, JAKARTA PLEASE PASS EAP
DAS MARCIEL

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/17/2019
TAGS: PREL PGOV MARR OREP OFDP ODIP PINR SNAR BM
SUBJECT: BURMA MFA OFFICIAL ON ENGAGEMENT, VISITS, AND
LEVEL OF REPRESENTATION WITH U.S.

REF: A. IIR 6 812 0119 08

B. IIR 6 812 0018 09

C. RANGOON 30

D. IIR 6 812 0045 09

E. RANGOON 42 (NOTAL)

F. RANGOON 44 (NOTAL)

Classified By: CDA Larry Dinger for Reasons 1.4 (b) & (d)

Summary
--------------

1. (C) The Government of Burma (GOB) has provided another
signal that it wishes to engage with the Obama
Administration, perhaps with a two-track, military and
civilian approach. During a dinner the Charge hosted for MFA
Americas Director Yin Yin Oo, she suggested initial topics
for engagement could include anti-narcotics cooperation and
recovery of U.S. remains from WWII. Asked about human-rights
as a topic, Yin Yin Oo was visibly uncomfortable. When Yin
Yin Oo asked if Senator Kerry might wish to visit Burma,
Charge mentioned possible interest by Senator Webb also, and
noted that visit requests from the Hill in the past have
stumbled over regime unwillingness to permit access to Aung
San Suu Kyi (ASSK). Yin Yin Oo reiterated the GOB's interest
in replacing its current military Charge in Washington with a
civilian Ambassador. In comment, we note repeated recent
signals of GOB interest in engaging with the USG, and
speculate that the reason is likely a desire to achieve
international "respect" rather than a willingness to unclench
fists. Still, the only way to clearly establish motive is to
test it. We seek Washington guidance for responding to Yin
Yin Oo's several inquiries. End summary.

Burma regime again signals desire to engage USG
-------------- -

2. (C) During dinner with the Charge on February 14, Burma
MFA Americas Director Yin Yin Oo, speaking under instruction,
reconfirmed that the Burma regime wants to engage in dialogue
with the USG. (See Refs A-C for previous recent approaches.)

Yin Yin Oo referred to Charge's meeting with LtGen. Ye
Myint, head of Military Intelligence (Ref C),and suggested
the possibility of two engagement tracks: military and
civilian, with perhaps a beginning on the military side at
the colonel level. She noted that Ye Myint might want to
lead a delegation to the U.S. at some point during such
talks. (Note: Per Refs C and D, LtGen. Ye Myint has
recently made clear his interest in visiting the U.S.) The
Charge noted previous expressions of GOB interest and said
Embassy Rangoon has not yet received the Obama
Administration's views.

Themes: mutual understanding, drugs, WWII remains; not human
rights
-------------- --------------

3. (C) Asked the GOB motivation, YYO said: "to develop
mutual understanding." She suggested topics could include
"DEA-type issues" to strengthen cooperation in combating
drugs, and/or the USG's interest in recovering WWII remains.
(See Ref A re an initial unsatisfactory regime response on
the remains issue, and Ref C for further discussion.) When
Charge suggested that the U.S. side would likely want to
include human rights and democracy themes, including the
release of political prisoners, in any engagement, YYO
visibly squirmed.

Visitors from the Hill? The ASSK factor
--------------

4. (C) YYO asked if Senator Kerry might want to visit
Burma. Charge recalled that when Senator Kerry sought to
visit a few years ago and insisted on a meeting with ASSK,
the visit didn't come off. Charge reiterated his view that
the GOB should let in all who seek to come. Perspectives,
already extremely skeptical, will not become darker; and an
"on scene" look is beneficial. Charge mentioned Senator Webb
as also reportedly interested in visiting, and stressed that
any congressional visitor is likely to see a need to meet
with ASSK. Yin Yin Oo asked if a meeting with other
political parties might suffice. Charge speculated, "No."
Yin Yin Oo asked if putting an ASSK meeting at the end of a
visit, after government meetings, might be acceptable.
Charge said that might work, though it would be the visitor's
perspective that counts.

Amb or Charge for Burmese Embassy in Washington?
-------------- -


5. (C) Yin Yin Oo raised the issue of the level of GOB
representation in Washington, reiterating the regime's desire
to upgrade the chief of mission from Charge to Ambassador
(see Refs. E and F). The Charge noted he had passed the
inquiry to the State Department and had not yet received a
formal response. Per informal guidance, Charge made clear
that the title of a chief of mission from Burma is not a key
element for that person's access or effectiveness in
Washington. If the GOB wants to replace the current military
Charge with a civilian Charge, that would be fine. Yin Yin
Oo responded that, as is true of many Asian governments, the
GOB cares about formalities. She asked if it would be
helpful for the GOB to send a formal request for agrement for
a new COM with the "ambassador" title. Charge said he would
seek guidance.

Bio data
--------------

6. (C) While Yin Yin Oo serves as Director of the Americas
Division in Burma's MFA, she also seems to be the primary POC
for other key "western" embassies, the UK and Australia. She
is the younger sister of U Kyaw Thu, chair of the
post-Cyclone Nargis Tripartite Core Group, who was until
recently a Deputy Foreign Minister and now is the
ministerial-level head of the civil service. Yin Yin Oo
also appears to have good military-intelligence connections,
including at the top with LtGen. Ye Myint. Yin Yin Oo's
husband is a Director in MFA dealing with visa issues.

Comment and request for guidance
--------------

7. (C) Yin Yin Oo's inquiries about engagement,
congressional visits, and upgrading the diplomatic title in
Washington, were all under instruction and are yet another
signal that the regime wants a visibly improved relationship
with the Obama Administration. One has the impression,
though, that the GOB aim is symbolic rather than substantive.
The generals chafe at being seen as international pariahs.
They want respect. Whether, in the words of President Obama,
they are willing to unclench their fists in order to deserve
a measure of respect is yet to be seen. The regime's
behavior to date raises serious doubts. Still, the only way
clearly to establish the motives is to test them. We seek
Washington guidance for responding to Yin Yin Oo's inquiries.
DINGER