Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09RABAT589
2009-07-10 14:07:00
SECRET
Embassy Rabat
Cable title:
WESTERN SAHARA UN ENVOY ROSS IN RABAT: PUBLIC
how-toVZCZCXRO4362 OO RUEHTRO DE RUEHRB #0589/01 1911407 ZNY SSSSS ZZH O 101407Z JUL 09 ZDK FM AMEMBASSY RABAT TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0389 INFO RUCNMGH/MAGHREB COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE RUEHNY/AMEMBASSY OSLO IMMEDIATE 0193 RUEHSM/AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM IMMEDIATE 0230 RUEHVI/AMEMBASSY VIENNA IMMEDIATE 0146 RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE 0946
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 RABAT 000589
SIPDIS
STATE FOR NEA, NEA/MAG AND IO/UNP
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/09/2019
TAGS: PREL PBTS WI AG UNSC NO MO
SUBJECT: WESTERN SAHARA UN ENVOY ROSS IN RABAT: PUBLIC
PROGRESS, PRIVATE PROBLEMS
REF: A. ALGIERS 0642 (NOTAL)
B. RABAT 0541 (NOTAL)
RABAT 00000589 001.2 OF 003
Classified By: Charge d'Affaires, a.i., Robert P. Jackson for reasons 1
.4 (b) and (d).
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 RABAT 000589
SIPDIS
STATE FOR NEA, NEA/MAG AND IO/UNP
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/09/2019
TAGS: PREL PBTS WI AG UNSC NO MO
SUBJECT: WESTERN SAHARA UN ENVOY ROSS IN RABAT: PUBLIC
PROGRESS, PRIVATE PROBLEMS
REF: A. ALGIERS 0642 (NOTAL)
B. RABAT 0541 (NOTAL)
RABAT 00000589 001.2 OF 003
Classified By: Charge d'Affaires, a.i., Robert P. Jackson for reasons 1
.4 (b) and (d).
1. (S) Summary: UNSYG Personal Envoy for Western Sahara
Christopher Ross left Morocco after his second visit June 30,
without final agreement on proposed informal talks. Despite
positive statements in public, neither place nor date has
been agreed for the informals, designed to re-launch
UN-sponsored negotiations, stalled for almost a year and a
half. Apparently, after learning that the UNSYG's Envoy had
brought no reply from Bouteflika on better bilateral
relations, King Mohammed VI declined at the last minute to
see Ambassador Ross. MFA contacts also told us that despite
Algerian assent to attend the informals (as sought Ref B),
the GOM now wanted assurances the GOA would "fully"
participate, and asked Ross for a roadmap of how the
informals would lead to negotiations. The Polisario
announcement that it would go to a Vienna meeting made it
difficult for the GOM to agree, but Ross has other
prospective venues. While in Rabat, Ross also saw Arab
Maghreb Union (AMU) Secretary General Habib Ben Yahya to talk
regional integration and met rising politician and royal
friend Fouad Ali El Himma. The Moroccans agreed with Ross to
follow up in New York. They have asked for engagement by the
USG and the other Friends with Algeria. A diplomatic push
for flexibility by both countries might help get the process
back on track. End Summary.
--------------
Positive Spin on a Diplomatic Curveball
--------------
2. (U) Foreign Minister Taieb Fassi Fihri was joined by
external intelligence service chief and de facto national
security advisor Mohamed Yassine Mansouri and MFA Director
General for Multilateral Relations Ambassador Affairs Nasser
Bourita for extended meetings July 29 with Personal Envoy of
the Secretary General (PESYG) Ambassador Christopher Ross,
who was accompanied by staffers from DPA and DPKO. They were
joined at dinner by CORCAS head Kalihenna Ould er Rachid, who
also met with them separately. Ould er Rachid was boosted by
his party's recent victory in local council elections in
Laayoune, the capital of Western Sahara. Ross and delegation
also met with Minister of Interior Chakib Benmoussa. In
remarks to the press, Fassi Fihri declared Morocco was
willing to participate in the informals.
3. (C) According to a July 1 readout from local UN ResRep
Mourad Wahba, the meeting produced Moroccan agreement to
attend the informal meetings proposed by Ross, but with a
condition: that Algeria openly participate, albeit
informally. (Note: Ref A reported that Algeria had accepted
to join the informal talks, which the Moroccans had sought
per Ref B. End Note.) Algeria had not agreed to the profile
that the GOM has demanded as a condition. Neither date nor
site was fixed but Ross has a good offer from Norway to host
the talks, which still could take place in early August.
4. (S) Ross was kept on tenterhooks until the very last
minute about whether he would have a meeting with King
Mohammed VI. The meeting ultimately did not happen. It is
likely that in his preparatory meetings with the Foreign
Minister, Ross was not able to report that he had a direct
answer from President Bouteflika, despite two intervening
visits to Algiers, to the proposals on bilateral ties Ross
had carried in February from the King to the Algerian
President.
--------------
What a Moroccan Wants
--------------
5. (C) MFA Director General for Multilateral Affairs Nasser
Bourita, a GOM expert on the Western Sahara issue,
subsequently told PolCouns that the King had already accepted
the informal round in principle during the envoy,s visit in
February. However, Morocco still had questions that it
needed Ross to clarify; Algerian agreement to attend as
observers only was not sufficient. In informals normally all
would participate in the discussions. Algeria needed to
participate fully, if informally.
6. (C) Bourita said Morocco also wanted from Ross a vision,
RABAT 00000589 002 OF 003
in effect a roadmap of where the informal will lead, before
agreeing. Would there be multiple informals? Was there a
target date for negotiations? Would the informals produce an
agenda? He feared the informals could turn into a whole new
process/format. Finally, he said the GOM remained unhappy
with the Vienna location, since it was announced by the
Polisario. Why should the GOM accept a Polisario fait
accompli? The Polisario's announcement showed that the Front
would not respect the confidentiality that Ross wanted for
the informal talks.
--------------
Next Steps
--------------
7. (C) Ambassador Bourita said Ross would continue to work
details with the parties and the Friends in New York on the
many open questions; these include the level of the informal
meetings, which could be below the ministerial level of
Manhasset. On July 9, Bourita re-convoked PolCouns to
underscore Moroccan interest in substantive Algerian
participation in the informals, to include on bilateral
issues. He requested that the USG and other Friends engage
with Algeria to urge flexibility. PolCouns recalled
traditional Algerian reticence, and hoped that Morocco could
avoid putting at risk the informals, and a re-start of the
long stalled negotiating process.
--------------
Ross's Side Meetings in Rabat
--------------
8. (SBU) At the embassy,s suggestion, Ross took the
initiative to meet Arab Maghreb Union Secretary General Habib
Ben Yahya, who briefed him on AMU efforts to promote
low-level economic functional regional integration. In his
remarks to the press, Ross spoke of his efforts to promote
integration, referring to the part of his mandate to enhance
Moroccan-Algerian relations.
9. (C) On June 28, Ross, his team and PolCouns met
informally with Fouad Ali El Himma, the closest friend of
King Mohammed VI and the driving force behind the new Party
of Authenticity and Modernity (PAM). The PAM, although
created only a year ago, won the most seats in recent local
council elections. PAM Party Secretary General Mohammed
Sheikh Biadillah, a Sahrawi and former Minister of Health,
joined the meeting at El Himma's residence. In addition to
domestic politics, they detailed their failed efforts to
defeat the political machine of Kalihenna Ould er Rachid,
current Chairman of the Royal Sahara Council (CORCAS),in the
municipal elections in Laayoune, capital of Western Sahara.
While winning not a seat in the capital, the PAM was able to
unite the opposition, and Biadillah himself, a former
Polisario leader, was elected deputy chairman of the council
of Samara, another town near the berm. He and El Himma
indicated that PAM would continue to work against the
Kalihenna clan. (Note: Ross had in February conveyed to the
GOM Polisario objections to Kalihenna being a member of the
GOM delegation. End Note.) That evening, at the embassy's
July 4 reception, Ross met some Sahrawis from this side of
the berm, helping him gain perspective on the views of
residents of the Western Sahara territory, which he has so
far not visited.
--------------
Comment
--------------
10. (C) The visit led to the first public acceptance by the
GOM of the proposed informal meeting, although it had earlier
agreed in principle. It is unclear whether GOM conditions
and objections over details reflect issues of principle or
pique; it may have moved the goalposts on its conditions for
the talks. The Moroccans surely remain concerned that their
efforts to improve the environment with Algeria continue to
get nowhere, despite Ross, efforts on his wider mandate. It
is far from certain that these questions can be resolved in
time to permit the convening of the informals before
mid-August. Any later runs the risk of being disrupted by
Ramadan, which would carry them into the September UNGA
timeframe. It is not certain that even with delegations
limited to two, that Morocco would not use one seat for
Kalihenna or another pro-Morocco Sahrawi. For now, the
discussion shifts to the corridors of the UN. Encouragement
by the Friends of flexibility from both the Algerians and the
RABAT 00000589 003 OF 003
Moroccans could help get this still-elementary stage in the
rebirth of Western Sahara negotiations and inter-Mahgreb
dialogue back on track. End Comment.
*****************************************
Visit Embassy Rabat's Classified Website;
http://www.intelink.sgov.gov/wiki/Portal:Moro cco
*****************************************
Jackson
SIPDIS
STATE FOR NEA, NEA/MAG AND IO/UNP
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/09/2019
TAGS: PREL PBTS WI AG UNSC NO MO
SUBJECT: WESTERN SAHARA UN ENVOY ROSS IN RABAT: PUBLIC
PROGRESS, PRIVATE PROBLEMS
REF: A. ALGIERS 0642 (NOTAL)
B. RABAT 0541 (NOTAL)
RABAT 00000589 001.2 OF 003
Classified By: Charge d'Affaires, a.i., Robert P. Jackson for reasons 1
.4 (b) and (d).
1. (S) Summary: UNSYG Personal Envoy for Western Sahara
Christopher Ross left Morocco after his second visit June 30,
without final agreement on proposed informal talks. Despite
positive statements in public, neither place nor date has
been agreed for the informals, designed to re-launch
UN-sponsored negotiations, stalled for almost a year and a
half. Apparently, after learning that the UNSYG's Envoy had
brought no reply from Bouteflika on better bilateral
relations, King Mohammed VI declined at the last minute to
see Ambassador Ross. MFA contacts also told us that despite
Algerian assent to attend the informals (as sought Ref B),
the GOM now wanted assurances the GOA would "fully"
participate, and asked Ross for a roadmap of how the
informals would lead to negotiations. The Polisario
announcement that it would go to a Vienna meeting made it
difficult for the GOM to agree, but Ross has other
prospective venues. While in Rabat, Ross also saw Arab
Maghreb Union (AMU) Secretary General Habib Ben Yahya to talk
regional integration and met rising politician and royal
friend Fouad Ali El Himma. The Moroccans agreed with Ross to
follow up in New York. They have asked for engagement by the
USG and the other Friends with Algeria. A diplomatic push
for flexibility by both countries might help get the process
back on track. End Summary.
--------------
Positive Spin on a Diplomatic Curveball
--------------
2. (U) Foreign Minister Taieb Fassi Fihri was joined by
external intelligence service chief and de facto national
security advisor Mohamed Yassine Mansouri and MFA Director
General for Multilateral Relations Ambassador Affairs Nasser
Bourita for extended meetings July 29 with Personal Envoy of
the Secretary General (PESYG) Ambassador Christopher Ross,
who was accompanied by staffers from DPA and DPKO. They were
joined at dinner by CORCAS head Kalihenna Ould er Rachid, who
also met with them separately. Ould er Rachid was boosted by
his party's recent victory in local council elections in
Laayoune, the capital of Western Sahara. Ross and delegation
also met with Minister of Interior Chakib Benmoussa. In
remarks to the press, Fassi Fihri declared Morocco was
willing to participate in the informals.
3. (C) According to a July 1 readout from local UN ResRep
Mourad Wahba, the meeting produced Moroccan agreement to
attend the informal meetings proposed by Ross, but with a
condition: that Algeria openly participate, albeit
informally. (Note: Ref A reported that Algeria had accepted
to join the informal talks, which the Moroccans had sought
per Ref B. End Note.) Algeria had not agreed to the profile
that the GOM has demanded as a condition. Neither date nor
site was fixed but Ross has a good offer from Norway to host
the talks, which still could take place in early August.
4. (S) Ross was kept on tenterhooks until the very last
minute about whether he would have a meeting with King
Mohammed VI. The meeting ultimately did not happen. It is
likely that in his preparatory meetings with the Foreign
Minister, Ross was not able to report that he had a direct
answer from President Bouteflika, despite two intervening
visits to Algiers, to the proposals on bilateral ties Ross
had carried in February from the King to the Algerian
President.
--------------
What a Moroccan Wants
--------------
5. (C) MFA Director General for Multilateral Affairs Nasser
Bourita, a GOM expert on the Western Sahara issue,
subsequently told PolCouns that the King had already accepted
the informal round in principle during the envoy,s visit in
February. However, Morocco still had questions that it
needed Ross to clarify; Algerian agreement to attend as
observers only was not sufficient. In informals normally all
would participate in the discussions. Algeria needed to
participate fully, if informally.
6. (C) Bourita said Morocco also wanted from Ross a vision,
RABAT 00000589 002 OF 003
in effect a roadmap of where the informal will lead, before
agreeing. Would there be multiple informals? Was there a
target date for negotiations? Would the informals produce an
agenda? He feared the informals could turn into a whole new
process/format. Finally, he said the GOM remained unhappy
with the Vienna location, since it was announced by the
Polisario. Why should the GOM accept a Polisario fait
accompli? The Polisario's announcement showed that the Front
would not respect the confidentiality that Ross wanted for
the informal talks.
--------------
Next Steps
--------------
7. (C) Ambassador Bourita said Ross would continue to work
details with the parties and the Friends in New York on the
many open questions; these include the level of the informal
meetings, which could be below the ministerial level of
Manhasset. On July 9, Bourita re-convoked PolCouns to
underscore Moroccan interest in substantive Algerian
participation in the informals, to include on bilateral
issues. He requested that the USG and other Friends engage
with Algeria to urge flexibility. PolCouns recalled
traditional Algerian reticence, and hoped that Morocco could
avoid putting at risk the informals, and a re-start of the
long stalled negotiating process.
--------------
Ross's Side Meetings in Rabat
--------------
8. (SBU) At the embassy,s suggestion, Ross took the
initiative to meet Arab Maghreb Union Secretary General Habib
Ben Yahya, who briefed him on AMU efforts to promote
low-level economic functional regional integration. In his
remarks to the press, Ross spoke of his efforts to promote
integration, referring to the part of his mandate to enhance
Moroccan-Algerian relations.
9. (C) On June 28, Ross, his team and PolCouns met
informally with Fouad Ali El Himma, the closest friend of
King Mohammed VI and the driving force behind the new Party
of Authenticity and Modernity (PAM). The PAM, although
created only a year ago, won the most seats in recent local
council elections. PAM Party Secretary General Mohammed
Sheikh Biadillah, a Sahrawi and former Minister of Health,
joined the meeting at El Himma's residence. In addition to
domestic politics, they detailed their failed efforts to
defeat the political machine of Kalihenna Ould er Rachid,
current Chairman of the Royal Sahara Council (CORCAS),in the
municipal elections in Laayoune, capital of Western Sahara.
While winning not a seat in the capital, the PAM was able to
unite the opposition, and Biadillah himself, a former
Polisario leader, was elected deputy chairman of the council
of Samara, another town near the berm. He and El Himma
indicated that PAM would continue to work against the
Kalihenna clan. (Note: Ross had in February conveyed to the
GOM Polisario objections to Kalihenna being a member of the
GOM delegation. End Note.) That evening, at the embassy's
July 4 reception, Ross met some Sahrawis from this side of
the berm, helping him gain perspective on the views of
residents of the Western Sahara territory, which he has so
far not visited.
--------------
Comment
--------------
10. (C) The visit led to the first public acceptance by the
GOM of the proposed informal meeting, although it had earlier
agreed in principle. It is unclear whether GOM conditions
and objections over details reflect issues of principle or
pique; it may have moved the goalposts on its conditions for
the talks. The Moroccans surely remain concerned that their
efforts to improve the environment with Algeria continue to
get nowhere, despite Ross, efforts on his wider mandate. It
is far from certain that these questions can be resolved in
time to permit the convening of the informals before
mid-August. Any later runs the risk of being disrupted by
Ramadan, which would carry them into the September UNGA
timeframe. It is not certain that even with delegations
limited to two, that Morocco would not use one seat for
Kalihenna or another pro-Morocco Sahrawi. For now, the
discussion shifts to the corridors of the UN. Encouragement
by the Friends of flexibility from both the Algerians and the
RABAT 00000589 003 OF 003
Moroccans could help get this still-elementary stage in the
rebirth of Western Sahara negotiations and inter-Mahgreb
dialogue back on track. End Comment.
*****************************************
Visit Embassy Rabat's Classified Website;
http://www.intelink.sgov.gov/wiki/Portal:Moro cco
*****************************************
Jackson