Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09RABAT541
2009-06-25 09:31:00
SECRET
Embassy Rabat
Cable title:
MOROCCO:WESTERN SAHARA/ALGERIA - NEW PRIORITIES,
how-toVZCZCXYZ0001 OO RUEHWEB DE RUEHRB #0541/01 1760931 ZNY SSSSS ZZH O 250931Z JUN 09 FM AMEMBASSY RABAT TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0308 INFO RUCNMGH/MAGHREB COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE RUEHSW/AMEMBASSY BERN PRIORITY 0311 RUEHVI/AMEMBASSY VIENNA PRIORITY 0140 RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA PRIORITY 1154
S E C R E T RABAT 000541
SIPDIS
STATE FOR NEA, NEA/MAG AND IO/UNP
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/25/2019
TAGS: PREL PBTS UNSC WI AG MO
SUBJECT: MOROCCO:WESTERN SAHARA/ALGERIA - NEW PRIORITIES,
LOW EXPECTATIONS FOR ROSS AND UN INFORMALS
Classified By: Charge d'Affaires, a. i., Robert P. Jackson for reasons:
1.4 (b) and (d).
S E C R E T RABAT 000541
SIPDIS
STATE FOR NEA, NEA/MAG AND IO/UNP
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/25/2019
TAGS: PREL PBTS UNSC WI AG MO
SUBJECT: MOROCCO:WESTERN SAHARA/ALGERIA - NEW PRIORITIES,
LOW EXPECTATIONS FOR ROSS AND UN INFORMALS
Classified By: Charge d'Affaires, a. i., Robert P. Jackson for reasons:
1.4 (b) and (d).
1. (S) SUMMARY: One June 23, before the visit of UNSYG
Personal Envoy (PE) Christopher Ross, Morocco's top foreign
policy officials told Charge and PolCouns they expected
little progress on Western Sahara or better relations with
Algeria, which now was their higher near-term priority.
Foreign Minister Fassi Fihri said he was &upset8 with the
Algerians, who were unresponsive to multiple GOM efforts at
dialogue, including via Ross. He claimed the GOA was bent on
deceiving Washington by appearing flexible but showed no give
in reality. The GOM wants Algeria in the proposed informal
sessions, but the parties have not yet agreed on any site for
those meetings. Everything but sovereignty remained on the
table. For the first time, we heard real interest in a
possible track two effort.
2. (S) In a separate meeting, apparently choreographed at
the highest level, external intelligence (DGED) chief and de
facto national security advisor Mansouri, plowed the same
ground, but later &informally8 added that Morocco expected
the USG to be an effective intermediary. Like the Minister,
he pleaded for past advances to be maintained, but also
sought assistance in improving relations with Algeria.
Neither responded to our suggestions to broaden human rights
and the political space in the Western Sahara. End Summary.
--------------
FM on Western Sahara
--------------
3. (C) Minister of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation Taieb
Fassi Fihri, joined by Chief of Staff and Director General
for International Organization Ambassador Nasser Bourita,
told Charge and PolCouns that the GOM welcomed PE Ross,
visit. One of Morocco's main goals was to ensure that
Algeria, the real decision maker, participated in the
informal discussions Ross wants to hold before convening a
formal session. Looking forward to the informals, with their
limited delegations, he hoped they would improve an
atmosphere poisoned by rude Polisario behavior toward CORCAS
Head Kalihenna. Morocco has the right to choose who sits on
its delegations, he maintained. Morocco had made a major
concession by agreeing to meet with the Polisario separately,
but not if that meant Algeria's exclusion.
4. (C) Visibly fatigued from a long round of foreign travel,
Fassi Fihri said there had been no agreement yet on a
location for the informal meetings. Morocco is uncomfortable
with Austria, due to the pro-Polisario statements in Vienna
by new Minister of Social Affairs Karin Scheele, a longtime
outspoken Polisario supporter, while the Polisario has nixed
a Portuguese offer. The GOM could live with Switzerland. He
underscored Moroccan flexibility within a framework of
discussions on autonomy. Within that context, everything but
sovereignty was on the table. Anything that would engage
Algeria and &break the ice,8 would have Moroccan support.
--------------
New Opening for Track 2
--------------
5. (C) For the first time we recall, Fassi Fihri spoke with
some interest in Ross mobilizing some help for a Track 2
approach, perhaps from Search for Common Ground, but he was
skeptical about discussions of any involvement of Nobel Prize
winner Maati Ahtissari. He was very concerned about USG
backsliding on its support for Morocco and the autonomy plan
in the April 30 Explanation of Vote on the Security Council
resolution. (Comment: He had not explicitly raised this
before, only querying the views of the new administration.)
Fassi Fihri said the GOM wanted to see the USG reengaged in
Sahara. Per guidance, Charge replied that the decision in
New York to speak only of our support for Ross and the UN
process, was tactical rather than strategic, and a detailed
policy review was still pending.
--------------
Upset at Algerian &Games8
--------------
6. (C) Fassi Fihri said Morocco strongly supported PE Ross'
dual but separate mandates from the Secretary General; to
resolve Sahara and to work on Algerian-Moroccan
rapprochement. This is Morocco's priority goal. He was
upset with Algerian and Polisario exploitation of Western
Sahara human rights issues, when the human rights situation
was worse on their side of the border. The compromise models
Algeria has talked about, such as Andorra, Monaco and Puerto
Rico, have been on the GOA agenda for many years. They
appear to exclude Moroccan sovereignty (not even the flag and
postage stamp variant laid out by former King Hassan II).
The Minister said he understood that new Algerian Ambassador
in Washington Balli had been conveying an image of
flexibility to USG interlocutors. He believed that in fact,
this was far from the case.
7. (C) Fassi Fihri recalled that multiple Moroccan
initiatives, direct, indirect, public and private have
received no response from the GOA. The King sent a personal
message to Bouteflika via Ross, during the latter's last
visit, proposing a joint meeting of Foreign and Interior
Ministers for both sides to discuss security issues, one area
where there is already ongoing cooperation. &Radio
silence8 from Algiers, where the generals remain in charge,
characterized the Algerian response. Algeria remains
petrified of the autonomy concept, he said.
8. (C) In response to CDA's query, Fassi Fihri denied
suggestions that Rabat had not ratified the treaty
demarcating its border with Algeria. The Treaty was signed
in 1971 during the post-coup period of emergency rule so that
parliamentary ratification was not possible at that time.
Nevertheless, Morocco had carried out its formalities and had
even exchanged instruments of Ratification with Algeria in
1989. What had not occurred was the creation of the joint
commission specified in the agreement to demarcate the
boundary. In the meantime, the frontier is observed de facto
and when it needed small technical adjustments, such as when
rains moved the river valley, the two sides had worked that
out through Ambassador Belkheir in Rabat. (Comment: We see
this as potentially one area in which the USG could be a
catalyst for rapprochement by offering both sides technical
assistance on demarcation as a confidence-building measure
(CBM). End comment.)
--------------
Mansouri,s More Complex Message
--------------
9. (S) We had arranged through indirect channels what we
expected would be an informal discussion with Director
General for Studies and Documentation (GED) Mohamed Yassine
Mansouri. Before the meeting took place, however, the
dynamics changed, apparently on instructions from King
Mohammed VI. Instead of another royal intimate, whom we
expected to participate, Mansouri was accompanied only by a
DGED notetaker, belying his repeated assertions that the
meeting would be informal.
10. (S) After discussing regional issues (septel),Mansouri
turned to Western Sahara, generally repeating the Foreign
Minister's talking points. After some time, however,
Mansouri, reaffirming the informality of his comments, turned
to U.S. policy. He praised former negotiator Van Walsum, but
noted that his statement favoring autonomy weakened the
negotiator's status and did not help Morocco. He added that
the Kingdom's leadership now understood that the last U.S.
administration also had appeared &too partial8 to Morocco.
He believed, however, that the U.S. position was not so much
pro-Moroccan as pro-solution. The new Administration would
have different interests, including, he averred, in Algerian
hydrocarbons. He counseled that the U.S. would be unwise to
abandon its true friends in the pursuit of petroleum.
11. (S) Mansouri went on to explain that the GOM had told
French President Nicolas Sarkozy that it would be better for
France not to be perceived, as in the past, as completely
pro-Moroccan on Western Sahara. It was better to be a good
mediator. The Bush Administration,s strong support for
Morocco had put some pressure on Algeria, which helped launch
the Manhasset talks, but then they went nowhere. He said the
GOM accepted there would be some adjustment in U.S. policies,
and welcomed anything the USG could do to bring Morocco
closer to Algeria. Still, he also pleaded for maintaining
some past progress, underscoring flexibility on autonomy.
Charge assured him that the U.S. was not abandoning Morocco
but rather giving Ross room to maneuver by not highlighting
the autonomy proposal which remains a central part of the
unanimous Security Council resolution extending MINURSO for
another year.
12. (S) Charge pressed Mansouri on continuing improvements
in human rights in Western Sahara, including by possibly
implementing the court decision that ordered the government
to give legal status to ASVDH, a pro-self determination human
rights NGO. Charge noted that Morocco could enhance its
political position through more progress in this domain.
However, neither Mansouri nor the Minister before him gave
any sign of willingness to open up more in the territory.
13. (S) Comment: These were rather more mixed, but at the
same time less nuanced messages from the Moroccans than we
usually get on the hot-button Sahara issue. They subtly
signaled that they were coordinated but left details unclear.
The Minister's encouragement was the first we have really
heard for a track-two effort, although we have been aware of
SFCG's interest in facilitation. Mansouri's was the first
GOM recognition of the potential evolution of U.S. policy,
which the Moroccans have glumly pondered since the April
rollover. They seem to have taken on board that enhanced USG
neutrality might serve their now higher priority goal of
rapprochement with Algeria, perhaps motivated by economic
considerations. We will likely hear more after the Ross
consultations. Discussion on the Middle East and other
regional issues has been reported septel. End Comment.
*****************************************
Visit Embassy Rabat's Classified Website;
http://www.intelink.sgov.gov/wiki/Portal:Moro cco
*****************************************
Jackson
SIPDIS
STATE FOR NEA, NEA/MAG AND IO/UNP
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/25/2019
TAGS: PREL PBTS UNSC WI AG MO
SUBJECT: MOROCCO:WESTERN SAHARA/ALGERIA - NEW PRIORITIES,
LOW EXPECTATIONS FOR ROSS AND UN INFORMALS
Classified By: Charge d'Affaires, a. i., Robert P. Jackson for reasons:
1.4 (b) and (d).
1. (S) SUMMARY: One June 23, before the visit of UNSYG
Personal Envoy (PE) Christopher Ross, Morocco's top foreign
policy officials told Charge and PolCouns they expected
little progress on Western Sahara or better relations with
Algeria, which now was their higher near-term priority.
Foreign Minister Fassi Fihri said he was &upset8 with the
Algerians, who were unresponsive to multiple GOM efforts at
dialogue, including via Ross. He claimed the GOA was bent on
deceiving Washington by appearing flexible but showed no give
in reality. The GOM wants Algeria in the proposed informal
sessions, but the parties have not yet agreed on any site for
those meetings. Everything but sovereignty remained on the
table. For the first time, we heard real interest in a
possible track two effort.
2. (S) In a separate meeting, apparently choreographed at
the highest level, external intelligence (DGED) chief and de
facto national security advisor Mansouri, plowed the same
ground, but later &informally8 added that Morocco expected
the USG to be an effective intermediary. Like the Minister,
he pleaded for past advances to be maintained, but also
sought assistance in improving relations with Algeria.
Neither responded to our suggestions to broaden human rights
and the political space in the Western Sahara. End Summary.
--------------
FM on Western Sahara
--------------
3. (C) Minister of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation Taieb
Fassi Fihri, joined by Chief of Staff and Director General
for International Organization Ambassador Nasser Bourita,
told Charge and PolCouns that the GOM welcomed PE Ross,
visit. One of Morocco's main goals was to ensure that
Algeria, the real decision maker, participated in the
informal discussions Ross wants to hold before convening a
formal session. Looking forward to the informals, with their
limited delegations, he hoped they would improve an
atmosphere poisoned by rude Polisario behavior toward CORCAS
Head Kalihenna. Morocco has the right to choose who sits on
its delegations, he maintained. Morocco had made a major
concession by agreeing to meet with the Polisario separately,
but not if that meant Algeria's exclusion.
4. (C) Visibly fatigued from a long round of foreign travel,
Fassi Fihri said there had been no agreement yet on a
location for the informal meetings. Morocco is uncomfortable
with Austria, due to the pro-Polisario statements in Vienna
by new Minister of Social Affairs Karin Scheele, a longtime
outspoken Polisario supporter, while the Polisario has nixed
a Portuguese offer. The GOM could live with Switzerland. He
underscored Moroccan flexibility within a framework of
discussions on autonomy. Within that context, everything but
sovereignty was on the table. Anything that would engage
Algeria and &break the ice,8 would have Moroccan support.
--------------
New Opening for Track 2
--------------
5. (C) For the first time we recall, Fassi Fihri spoke with
some interest in Ross mobilizing some help for a Track 2
approach, perhaps from Search for Common Ground, but he was
skeptical about discussions of any involvement of Nobel Prize
winner Maati Ahtissari. He was very concerned about USG
backsliding on its support for Morocco and the autonomy plan
in the April 30 Explanation of Vote on the Security Council
resolution. (Comment: He had not explicitly raised this
before, only querying the views of the new administration.)
Fassi Fihri said the GOM wanted to see the USG reengaged in
Sahara. Per guidance, Charge replied that the decision in
New York to speak only of our support for Ross and the UN
process, was tactical rather than strategic, and a detailed
policy review was still pending.
--------------
Upset at Algerian &Games8
--------------
6. (C) Fassi Fihri said Morocco strongly supported PE Ross'
dual but separate mandates from the Secretary General; to
resolve Sahara and to work on Algerian-Moroccan
rapprochement. This is Morocco's priority goal. He was
upset with Algerian and Polisario exploitation of Western
Sahara human rights issues, when the human rights situation
was worse on their side of the border. The compromise models
Algeria has talked about, such as Andorra, Monaco and Puerto
Rico, have been on the GOA agenda for many years. They
appear to exclude Moroccan sovereignty (not even the flag and
postage stamp variant laid out by former King Hassan II).
The Minister said he understood that new Algerian Ambassador
in Washington Balli had been conveying an image of
flexibility to USG interlocutors. He believed that in fact,
this was far from the case.
7. (C) Fassi Fihri recalled that multiple Moroccan
initiatives, direct, indirect, public and private have
received no response from the GOA. The King sent a personal
message to Bouteflika via Ross, during the latter's last
visit, proposing a joint meeting of Foreign and Interior
Ministers for both sides to discuss security issues, one area
where there is already ongoing cooperation. &Radio
silence8 from Algiers, where the generals remain in charge,
characterized the Algerian response. Algeria remains
petrified of the autonomy concept, he said.
8. (C) In response to CDA's query, Fassi Fihri denied
suggestions that Rabat had not ratified the treaty
demarcating its border with Algeria. The Treaty was signed
in 1971 during the post-coup period of emergency rule so that
parliamentary ratification was not possible at that time.
Nevertheless, Morocco had carried out its formalities and had
even exchanged instruments of Ratification with Algeria in
1989. What had not occurred was the creation of the joint
commission specified in the agreement to demarcate the
boundary. In the meantime, the frontier is observed de facto
and when it needed small technical adjustments, such as when
rains moved the river valley, the two sides had worked that
out through Ambassador Belkheir in Rabat. (Comment: We see
this as potentially one area in which the USG could be a
catalyst for rapprochement by offering both sides technical
assistance on demarcation as a confidence-building measure
(CBM). End comment.)
--------------
Mansouri,s More Complex Message
--------------
9. (S) We had arranged through indirect channels what we
expected would be an informal discussion with Director
General for Studies and Documentation (GED) Mohamed Yassine
Mansouri. Before the meeting took place, however, the
dynamics changed, apparently on instructions from King
Mohammed VI. Instead of another royal intimate, whom we
expected to participate, Mansouri was accompanied only by a
DGED notetaker, belying his repeated assertions that the
meeting would be informal.
10. (S) After discussing regional issues (septel),Mansouri
turned to Western Sahara, generally repeating the Foreign
Minister's talking points. After some time, however,
Mansouri, reaffirming the informality of his comments, turned
to U.S. policy. He praised former negotiator Van Walsum, but
noted that his statement favoring autonomy weakened the
negotiator's status and did not help Morocco. He added that
the Kingdom's leadership now understood that the last U.S.
administration also had appeared &too partial8 to Morocco.
He believed, however, that the U.S. position was not so much
pro-Moroccan as pro-solution. The new Administration would
have different interests, including, he averred, in Algerian
hydrocarbons. He counseled that the U.S. would be unwise to
abandon its true friends in the pursuit of petroleum.
11. (S) Mansouri went on to explain that the GOM had told
French President Nicolas Sarkozy that it would be better for
France not to be perceived, as in the past, as completely
pro-Moroccan on Western Sahara. It was better to be a good
mediator. The Bush Administration,s strong support for
Morocco had put some pressure on Algeria, which helped launch
the Manhasset talks, but then they went nowhere. He said the
GOM accepted there would be some adjustment in U.S. policies,
and welcomed anything the USG could do to bring Morocco
closer to Algeria. Still, he also pleaded for maintaining
some past progress, underscoring flexibility on autonomy.
Charge assured him that the U.S. was not abandoning Morocco
but rather giving Ross room to maneuver by not highlighting
the autonomy proposal which remains a central part of the
unanimous Security Council resolution extending MINURSO for
another year.
12. (S) Charge pressed Mansouri on continuing improvements
in human rights in Western Sahara, including by possibly
implementing the court decision that ordered the government
to give legal status to ASVDH, a pro-self determination human
rights NGO. Charge noted that Morocco could enhance its
political position through more progress in this domain.
However, neither Mansouri nor the Minister before him gave
any sign of willingness to open up more in the territory.
13. (S) Comment: These were rather more mixed, but at the
same time less nuanced messages from the Moroccans than we
usually get on the hot-button Sahara issue. They subtly
signaled that they were coordinated but left details unclear.
The Minister's encouragement was the first we have really
heard for a track-two effort, although we have been aware of
SFCG's interest in facilitation. Mansouri's was the first
GOM recognition of the potential evolution of U.S. policy,
which the Moroccans have glumly pondered since the April
rollover. They seem to have taken on board that enhanced USG
neutrality might serve their now higher priority goal of
rapprochement with Algeria, perhaps motivated by economic
considerations. We will likely hear more after the Ross
consultations. Discussion on the Middle East and other
regional issues has been reported septel. End Comment.
*****************************************
Visit Embassy Rabat's Classified Website;
http://www.intelink.sgov.gov/wiki/Portal:Moro cco
*****************************************
Jackson