Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09RABAT517
2009-06-17 12:48:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Rabat
Cable title:  

MOROCCO: PARTY OF AUTHENTICITY AND MODERNITY

Tags:  PGOV PHUM PINR KDEM MO 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXYZ0000
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHRB #0517/01 1681248
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 171248Z JUN 09
FM AMEMBASSY RABAT
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0284
INFO RUCNMGH/MAGHREB COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHMFISS/HQ USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L RABAT 000517 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/17/2019
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PINR KDEM MO
SUBJECT: MOROCCO: PARTY OF AUTHENTICITY AND MODERNITY
EMERGES AS FRONT RUNNER IN LOCAL ELECTIONS

REF: A. RABAT 0485

B. RABAT 0473

C. RABAT 0497

D. RABAT 0487

Classified By: CDA Robert P. Jackson for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L RABAT 000517

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/17/2019
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PINR KDEM MO
SUBJECT: MOROCCO: PARTY OF AUTHENTICITY AND MODERNITY
EMERGES AS FRONT RUNNER IN LOCAL ELECTIONS

REF: A. RABAT 0485

B. RABAT 0473

C. RABAT 0497

D. RABAT 0487

Classified By: CDA Robert P. Jackson for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) Summary: Seven million Moroccans, or 52.4 percent of
eligible voters, participated in nationwide local/communal
elections in Morocco on Friday, June 12, according to the
Moroccan Ministry of Interior. Garnering over 20 percent of
the vote, the Palace-favored Party of Authenticity and
Modernity (PAM),in its nationwide election debut, was seen
as the biggest winner with other large parties making modest
gains with the notable exception of the United Socialist
Forces Party (USFP),which lost ground. The election of
women to over 13 percent of communal council posts was
unprecedented. The voting process at the ballot box appeared
professionally run and transparent although some critics
question the officially reported 50 percent plus
participation rate, given low numbers of voters observed at
the polls. Vote buying, although invisible to our election
observation teams, figured prominently in the election,
according to embassy contacts and press reports. Despite its
defects and a lingering skepticism about the efficacy of the
election process in Morocco, the Moroccan population has
largely accepted the local election results, positioning the
PAM to become the emergent political force in Moroccan party
politics. End Summary.

--------------
Election Results
--------------


2. (SBU) According to official government results, slightly
more than 7 million Moroccans, or 52.4 percent of eligible
voters, participated in nationwide local/communal elections
in Morocco on Friday, June 12th. The rate of participation
was slightly down compared to the last communal elections in
2003 (54 percent),but was considerably higher than the 37
percent turnout in the September 2007 parliamentary
elections, especially in light of expectations that the
participation rate might be much lower. Still, an 11 percent
vote spoiling rate (when voters choose no one on the ballot
as a sign of protest) signaled disaffection. Women won 3,406
seats out of 27,795 (or 13 percent),up from 127 in 2003

(less than one half of one percent of the vote at that time).
This exceeded the 12 percent quota set by the government
through an agreement among political parties (Refs A and B).
Eight parties won 90 percent of the seats, and 84 percent of
the votes, as follows:

-- Party of Authenticity and Modernity (PAM):
18.7 percent of votes (21.7 percent of seats);

-- Party Istiqlal (i.e., Independence) (PI):
16.6 percent (19.1 percent of seats);

-- National Rally of Independents (RNI):
13 percent of votes (14.8 percent of seats);

-- United Socialist Forces Party (USFP):
10.8 percent of votes (11.6 percent of seats);

-- Popular Movement (MP):
7.9 percent of votes (8 percent of seats);

-- Party of Justice and Development (PJD):
7.5 percent of votes (5.5 percent of seats);

-- Constitutional Union (UC):
5.1 percent of votes (4.7 percent of seats); and

-- Party of Progress and Socialism (PPS):
4.2 percent of votes (4 percent of seats).

--------------
PAM Makes its Mark
--------------


3. (C) The results of the election largely tracked with
embassy and Ministry of Interior (MOI) predictions (Ref C).
Securing 21.7 percent of communal seats in its first
nationwide electoral contest, the Party of Authenticity and
Modernity (PAM) scored a significant victory. Istiqlal was
also perceived to have done well, moving up from 16.9 percent
in 2003 elections to 19.1 percent of seats in this election,
although it had to accept an unfamiliar second place slot
behind PAM. The Islamist-inspired PJD made modest gains, as
predicted, in urban areas such as Casablanca, Meknes,
Tangiers, Temara, and Rabat but poorly overall. The head of

the PJD's list in Rabat and number two in the party, Lahcen
Daoudi, appears to have secured the support of a coalition of
PI, USFP, PJD, PPS, and RNI to become Mayor of Rabat,
according to press reports. As in 2007, the USFP was the
biggest loser among the large parties in Morocco, skidding
from 14.7 to 11.6 percent of seats. A USFP loss of a mayoral
contest to PAM in the northern city of Tangier typified USFP
overall loses. The Berber-oriented Popular Movement (MP)
also lost ground, going from 9.8 percent of seats to 8.0 but
potentially retaining key mayoral posts.

--------------
Transparency at the Ballot Box
--------------


4. (SBU) The Consultative Council for Human Rights (CCDH),
the entity in charge of electoral monitoring, declared
Friday's local elections "fair and free." Collaborating with
many domestic civil society associations including the
Moroccan Organization of Human Rights (OMDH),the Civil Forum
for Democracy, and dozens of international observer
organizations, CCDH declared that the voting took place in
"normal and adequate" conditions, except for some minor
incidents "related to continuing campaigning during campaign
silence periods and attempts by some people to destroy ballot
boxes." State-run Al-Aoula television reported an assessment
by the American Center for Democracy that the elections took
place in "good conditions," and that its members did not
record any irregularities.

-------------- -
What We Saw: Transparency at Voting Facilities
-------------- -


5. (SBU) The election appears to have been run in a
professional, fair, and transparent manner at the ballot
locations, as reported by our 15 embassy/consulate election
observation teams, which fanned out across the country to
observe conditions at numerous voting facilities. The voting
facilities were consistently well organized and welcoming,
often inviting observer teams inside the facilities to make
close observations. Election monitors from some of the
political parties were consistently present and monitors from
other national and international non-governmental
organizations were also sprinkled across several facilities
that we visited. Among the multiple reports from each of our
teams, we did not observe any incidents of systemic voting
irregularities, with the possible exception of lingering
party posters and graffiti. Security appeared appropriate
for the size of each facility with no signs of intimidation.
Generally speaking, at least one uniformed police officer and
an auxiliary force member were present at each voting
facility entrance, occasionally augmented by plainclothes
internal security officers.

--------------
Voting Volume Looked Lighter than Statistics
--------------


6. (SBU) Embassy personnel observed light to medium voter
turnout. Light is defined as ten or fewer voters in thirty
minutes, and medium as 10-50 voters in thirty minutes. We
observed higher volumes in rural polling stations than in
city/peri-urban areas, and small increases in participation
following Friday midday prayers. The observers also noted
the high number of women participating and the absence of
young voters. Women, who outnumbered men by two to three
from our observations, may have had a greater interest in the
elections because of the increase in the number of female
candidates running in this election and the special woman's
list (Refs A and B).

--------------
Possible Explanations of Turnout Disparities
--------------


7. (C) The disparities between our observations and the
official results of over 50 percent participation may be
explained by several factors. Our teams were out in various
remote spots in Morocco from 08:00 to 17:00, while most
voting took place from 17:00 to 19:00. Most voters did not
vote until evening, after Friday prayers, and/or after most
factory workers were released from work at 17:00. Most of
our teams focused on urban areas. According to MOI
statistics, turnout in urban areas was lower than rural
areas. The lowest percentage of votes, for example, was in
Casablanca (29 percent),where several of our observer teams
were concentrated. We detected some of this trend of higher
rural voting in places like Ifrane, Rommani, and Maril but
missed the even higher percentage turnouts areas of southern
Morocco/Western Sahara (e.g., Boujdor, 69 percent; Smara, 68

percent; and Wadi Addahb, 61 percent),where we had no
embassy/consulate observers. The fact that it was an
exceptionally hot day in Morocco (95-105 degrees Fahrenheit),
may have also diminished voter turnout.

--------------
Another, More Menacing, Explanation
--------------


8. (C) Post observers and local contacts in Rabat, such as
Associated Press correspondent for North Africa Alfred de
Monteesquiou, have an uneasy feeling about the low voter
turnout they witnessed and the official results published by
MOI. Despite some detectable angst among the populous in
Rabat and Casablanca about the reconciliation of the
participation numbers, there has been nothing in the press
about these concerns. In the absence of evidence to the
contrary, we, like the majority of the Moroccan population,
accept the results as reported by MOI.

--------------
Personality Matters
--------------


9. (C) Residents, particularly in rural areas, often told
our observers that they were voting for a person rather than
a party. Most residents reported that they saw little to no
ideological or political difference between the parties. If
an individual was perceived to have worked for a neighborhood
or was well respected then he or she stood to win support.
Rachid Nanae, an out-of-work resident of a shantytown in the
Ben M'sik neighborhood of Casablanca, told our observers that
he voted for Jawdad, Deputy Mayor of Casablanca, because he
had fixed the roads and provided other public works to the
neighborhood. At the same time, party affiliation as a
discriminator was not completely abandoned. Also from
anecdotes from voters, the PAM appeared to reap many
undecided voters because of the party's "newness" and/or the
closeness of defacto PAM de facto chief Fouad Ali El Himma to
King Mohammed VI (Refs C and D).

--------------
... And What We Did Not See:
Vote Buying Still Widespread
--------------


10. (C) While a handful of vote buying incidents were
detected and stopped by local authorities in scattered
locations, the practice, according to numerous embassy and
consulate contacts, was widespread. The going rate for a
vote was as high as 200 dirhams (approximately USD 24),
according to an informal survey of several locals in Rabat.
According to the same contacts, vote buying takes place on a
systemic level, with party militants passing out largesse in
neighborhoods door-to-door in the weeks and days prior to
election day.


11. (C) In a conversation with Poloff at a post-election
reception, PJD number two Lahcen Daoudi complained that
everyone was fixated on the rate of participation when
leaders should be more concerned about the widespread problem
of vote buying, which he described as organized, systemic,
and beyond detection by election monitors and observers. One
of our observers in the greater Casablanca district of Moulay
Rachid overheard a conversation between two female shoppers,
one of which protested to the other that she could not
continue shopping because she was out of money, to which
other quipped, "I take it you haven't voted yet!"


12. (C) Comment: "Warts and all," the election results
appear to have been largely accepted by the Moroccan
populous, despite lingering doubts and continued skepticism
about the efficacy of the election process in Morocco. The
election of women to over 13 percent of communal council
posts was an unambiguously positive aspect of these elections
(Ref A and B). At the party level, the PAM has been
relatively quiet in the last two days; no doubt busy counting
its gains and, like all other parties, engaging in the
post-election lobbying process of seeking coalition partners
for mayoral and communal presidential positions. The
election of communal council members now forms the basis of
an electorate for Morocco's indirect election system to pick
communal, provincial, and regional leaders, as well as one
third of the members of the upper house of Parliament (Ref D).


13. (C) Comment Continued: Having been in existence for
just over a year, the PAM has got to be satisfied. Many see
the results of this election as a harbinger of legislative
elections in 2012. More immediately, the USFP is licking its
wounds and considering whether to will withdraw from the
government to rebuild in opposition (Ref C). Whether or not

this comes to fruition and serves as a triggering event, we
believe that a rumored government shakeup will come to
fruition possibly after Ramadan, which ends in mid-September,
to realign coalition partners and to reflect the legitimacy
gains made by PAM in Morocco's political arena. End Comment.


*****************************************
Visit Embassy Rabat's Classified Website;
http://www.intelink.sgov.gov/wiki/Portal:Moro cco
*****************************************

Jackson